Democracy and disdain

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 126, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 1-71

  Karlan, Pamela S ^a  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84869822580     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Editorial

References (424)

1. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. 2504.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
3. S. Rep. No. 109-295, at 2 (2006) ("The Act is rightly lauded as the crown jewel of our civil rights laws because it has enabled racial minorities to participate in the political life of the nation. ").
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-322.pdf.
5. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
6. GENERAL VERRILLI: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court-CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Before you get into what the case is about, I'd like to clear up at the outset what it's not about. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-182.pdf.
7. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf.
9. Bill Klem Quotes, Baseball Almanac, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/quotes /quoklem.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
11. Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 306 (1977).
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
18. In each of the Reapportionment Cases, the Court pointed to the countermajoritarian nature of the challenged apportionments.
19. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. ").
20. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding key provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
21. Jim Newton, Justice for All 263-77 (2006).
22. Jim Newton, Justice for All 263-77 (2006).
23. Jim Newton, Justice for All 263-77 (2006).
24. Jim Newton, Justice for All 263-77 (2006).
25. Jim Newton, Justice for All 263-77 (2006).
26. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment Experience 24 (Univ. of Tenn. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 181, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010781.
27. See Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Lecture at the William H. Rehnquist Center on the Constitutional Structures of Government (Feb. 4, 2009), at 15:39-17:05, available at http://www.rehnquistcenter.org/ (stating that the Court shifted during the Rehnquist years from a "fluid" and "wide-ranging" consideration of "policy" in constitutional cases to "the more solid grounds of legal argument" and pointing to prior Courts' lack of federal judicial experience as a reason for the shift).
28. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (majority opinion).
29. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 Holmes-LaskiLetters 248, 249 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
30. Compare, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Will of the People (2009) (suggesting that the Justices pay attention to public opinion).
31. See generally Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It's Even Worse ThanIt Looks (2012).
32. See Dino Grandoni, Senate Gridlock Explained in One Chart, The Atlantic Wire (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2012/03/us-senate-now-completely-polarized /49641/ (stating that in 2011, "any remaining ideological overlap between the Democratic and Republican parties totally disappeared in the Senate, as the vote ratings, for the first time, were divided neatly by party line").
33. By contrast, on the Warren Court, Justice Frankfurter (nominated by President Roosevelt) was often to the right of the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan (both Eisenhower nominees). On the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, Justice White (a Kennedy nominee) was frequently to the right of Justice Blackmun (a Nixon nominee). So, too, in the first years of the Roberts Court, Justice Stevens (a Ford nominee) and Justice Souter (a George H.W. Bush nominee) were sometimes to the left of Justices Ginsburg or Breyer (both Clinton nominees). See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. Legal Analysis 775, 782-83 (2009) (providing a ranking of the Justices' votes in nonunanimous cases during the period between 1937 and 2007).
34. In one recent poll, a majority of respondents expressed concern that "the Supreme Court makes decisions based on a political agenda instead of the law, " with only eleven percent of respondents expressing "a great deal of confidence that the Supreme Court puts politics aside and makes decisions based on the law. " Memorandum from Geoff Garin et al., Hart Research Assocs., to Alliance for Justice, Views of the Supreme Court on Eve of the Health Care Ruling (June 11, 2012), available at http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-issues/supreme-court-ethics-reform/hart-afj-scotus-attitudes.pdf.
35. See, e.g., John Yoo, Chief Justice Roberts and His Apologists, Wall St. J., June 30-July 1, 2012, at A15 (arguing that the Chief Justice may have sacrificed constitutional principle for "a little peace and quiet from attacks during a presidential election year" and that future Republican presidents "have to be more careful" in selecting nominees).
36. See 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
38. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
39. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
40. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
41. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
44. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
45. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
46. Compare, e.g., Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Attachment to PPO Non-Career Appointment Form (Nov. 15, 1985), available at http://www.law.com/pdf/dc/alitoDOJ.pdf.
47. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
48. 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam).
49. Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson xiv (2012).
50. Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson xiv (2012).
51. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
52. Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson xiv (2012).
53. For discussion of the Powell Memorandum and its relationship to the conservative legal movement, see Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 Yale L.J. 1415, 1457-60 (1984). The two key documents laying out the broader conservative legal agenda are Office ofLegal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation(1988), available at http://www.ialsnet.org/documents/Patersonmaterials2.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines].
54. The Reagan Justice Department classified Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), as "inconsistent" with a proper understanding of constitutional law.
55. The Reagan Justice Department classified Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), as "inconsistent" with a proper understanding of constitutional law.
56. The Reagan Justice Department classified Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), as "inconsistent" with a proper understanding of constitutional law.
57. The Guidelines classified Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), as "inconsistent" with a proper understanding of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it barred literacy tests despite an earlier Supreme Court ruling that such tests were not unconstitutional on their face.
58. The Reagan Justice Department classified Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), as "inconsistent" with a proper understanding of constitutional law.
59. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455, 464 (1986) (claiming, before setting out his arguments for "a jurisprudence of original intention, " that, with respect to "Federalism" cases, "one may conclude that far too many of the Court's opinions were, on the whole, mere policy choices rather than articulations of constitutional principle, " and arguing against "a drift back toward the radical egalitarianism... of the Warren Court" (emphasis omitted).
60. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
61. Ecclesiastes 3:1, 3.
62. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958) (asserting "the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution" and declaring that principle "a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system").
63. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-58 (1966) (reading the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expansively).
64. And there is of course a third dimension that involves constitutional prohibitions. How a court construes constitutional prohibitions (for example, the First Amendment or the Eighth Amendment) will be especially important when it comes to addressing constitutional challenges to state-level statutes and policies. Since the time of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), while courts use a two-step process for addressing the constitutionality of federal laws-first, does some enumerated power authorize the government to act, and second, despite that grant of power, does some other constitutional prohibition nonetheless prevent the government from choosing the particular course of action at issue?-courts ask only the latter question when it comes to state laws.
65. In cases like Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
66. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).
67. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).
68. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
69. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
70. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
71. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
72. Professor Jack Balkin points out that "many Supreme Court decisions can be seen as either promoting democracy or detracting from it, depending on one's political priors. " Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1129, 1157 (2012).
73. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971) (declining to find unconstitutional racial vote dilution from the use of multimember electoral districts).
74. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
75. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
76. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
77. The Court's imposition of one-person, one-vote rendered nearly every state's existing legislative apportionment unconstitutional. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
79. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
80. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
81. In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937).
82. Harper, 383 U.S. at 667.
83. Harper, 383 U.S. at 667.
84. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
85. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
86. In fact, Professor Michael Klarman argues that this destabilization was more critical to the successes of the civil rights movement than Brown itself. The "violence that resulted from Brown's radicalization of southern politics enabled transformative racial change to occur as rapidly as it did" because the violence of the backlash transformed northern (white) opinion on race and led to landmark civil rights legislation like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights 441-42 (2004).
87. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (recognizing "the importance of education to our democratic society" because, among other things, "[i]t is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities" and "is the very foundation of good citizenship").
88. Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 Yale L.J. 1329, 1333 (2005).
89. G. Edward White, Earl Warren 337 (1982) (recounting that Chief Justice Warren thought that Reynolds v. Sims "insured that henceforth elections would reflect the collective public interest-embodied in the 'one-man, one-vote' standard-rather than the machinations of special interests").
90. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
91. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
92. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
93. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
94. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 327.
95. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 327.
96. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 327.
97. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 327.
98. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 327.
99. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 327.
100. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 327.
101. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643-45 & n.1 (1966).
102. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643-45 & n.1 (1966).
103. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643-45 & n.1 (1966).
104. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-53 (1959).
105. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658.
106. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
107. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654.
108. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654.
109. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
110. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-91 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
111. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
112. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
113. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (quoting S. Rep. No. 88-872, at 16-17 (1964).
114. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
115. The Civil Rights Cases held that the Fourteenth Amendment reached only state action.
116. See, e.g., Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
117. Ultimately, the Court either found some state action in the activities of government officials' enforcing trespass laws and the like or reached for some other doctrine that would allow it to reverse the demonstrators' convictions. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (straining to find a denial of due process in the state's enforcement of its trespass statute against sit-in participants). See generally McKenzie Webster, Note, The Warren Court's Struggle with the Sit-In Cases and the Constitutionality of Segregation in Places of Public Accommodations, 17 J.L. & Pol. 373 (2001).
118. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250.
119. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250.
120. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250.
121. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250.
122. The concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Goldberg were even more explicit on this point. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring) (expressing his reluctance "to rest solely on the Commerce Clause" because "the right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against them because of race[]... 'occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines'" (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
123. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 93 (1966).
124. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 93 (1966).
125. For arguments that the proper role of courts under these circumstances is to interact with the political branches rather than to solve the problem unilaterally, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy 221-37 (2001).
126. Roughly a decade after Brown, only 2.3% of black children in the South attended a school with any white students. Note, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YaleL.J. 321, 322 (1967). Litigation under the Fifteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 similarly did: little to cure the problem of voting discrimination.... [R]egistration of voting-age Negroes in Alabama rose only from 14.2% to 19.4% between 1958 and 1964.
127. Section 601 provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d-1973f (1970). In the five years after the Act was passed, executive enforcement efforts led to nearly as many African Americans registering to vote in six southern states as had registered in the century since the Fifteenth Amendment had been ratified. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in Controversies in Minority Voting7, 21 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
129. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
130. See Charles F. Adamson, The Toughest Copin America 170, 174 (2001).
131. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
132. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
133. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
134. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
135. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
136. For a discussion of this coincidence, see Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the "Unhappy History" Theory of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 737, 746-47.
137. Office of Judges Programs, Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 2011 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts 128 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf.
138. See Charles F. Adamson, The Toughest Copin America 170, 174 (2001).
139. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
140. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
141. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
142. See also Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Calendar of the Justices: How the Supreme Court's Timing Affects Its Decisionmaking, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 183, 213-14 (2004) (quoting Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, who worried that the quality of the Court's decisions in lateargued and late-decided cases suffers).
143. 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
144. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
145. 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012) (per curiam).
146. 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012) (per curiam).
147. A study covering the Terms between 1994 and 2005 found that the "justices var[ied] widely in their inclination to strike down Congressional laws, " with Justice Thomas "the most inclined, voting to invalidate 65.63 percent of" the federal laws on whose constitutionality the Court ruled, and Justice Breyer "the least, voting to invalidate 28.13 percent. " Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, Op-Ed., So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2005, at A19.
148. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455, 464 (1986) (claiming, before setting out his arguments for "a jurisprudence of original intention, " that, with respect to "Federalism" cases, "one may conclude that far too many of the Court's opinions were, on the whole, mere policy choices rather than articulations of constitutional principle, " and arguing against "a drift back toward the radical egalitarianism... of the Warren Court" (emphasis omitted).
149. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
150. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
151. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Comment: Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83 (2010).
152. See Robert Barnes, Campaign-Contribution Law Remains Unsettled, Wash. Post, May 23, 2011, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/citizens-united-decision-reverberates-in-courts-across-country/2011/05/20/AFbJEK9G_story.html (noting that Citizens United "free[d] corporations and unions to spend whatever they like for and against candidates [and] wiped out laws in 24 states banning such spending").
153. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
154. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
155. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980).
156. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
157. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
158. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 306 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II).
159. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
160. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
161. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
162. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000).
163. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
164. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
165. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
166. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
167. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
168. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court dramatically overstates its critique of identity-based distinctions, without ever explaining why corporate identity demands the same treatment as individual identity. Only the most wooden approach to the First Amendment could justify the unprecedented line it seeks to draw. ").
169. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court dramatically overstates its critique of identity-based distinctions, without ever explaining why corporate identity demands the same treatment as individual identity. Only the most wooden approach to the First Amendment could justify the unprecedented line it seeks to draw. ").
170. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
171. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
172. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976).
173. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
174. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
175. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
176. See, e.g., Virginia Foster Durr, Outside the Magic Circle 177-78 (Hollinger F. Barnard ed., 1985) (describing how the poll tax operated in Virginia).
177. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
178. Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
179. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
180. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
181. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
182. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
183. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
184. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
185. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
186. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
187. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
188. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
189. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Essay, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1739 (2008).
190. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 631, 658-61 (2007) (providing data suggesting that between six and ten percent of all citizens of voting age lack such documentation, with much higher rates among the youngest and oldest Americans of voting age and among minority communities, as well as somewhat higher rates among persons with disabilities).
191. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010).
192. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4.
193. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape, OpenSecrets Blog (May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05 /citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html. For more recent data, check the website of the Center for Responsive Politics at http://www.opensecrets.org.
194. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (striking down Federal Election Campaign Act limits on the amounts that could be contributed to a political committee that receives contributions solely for the purpose of making independent expenditures), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010).
195. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1, 21-44 (2012) (discussing the post-Citizens United landscape).
196. See generally Memorandum from Stan Greenberg et al. to Friends of Democracy Corps, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, and Public Campaign Action Fund (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://campaignmoney.org/files/DemCorpPCAFmemoFINAL.pdf.
197. 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
198. See W. Tradition P'ship v. Att'y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 3 (Mont. 2011).
199. See W. Tradition P'ship v. Att'y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 3 (Mont. 2011).
200. W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 7.
201. W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 7.
202. W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 7.
203. W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 7.
204. W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 7.
205. W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 7.
206. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
207. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
208. See W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 12-13.
209. See W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 12-13.
210. See W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 12-13.
211. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307 (2012).
212. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307 (2012).
213. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307 (2012).
214. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
215. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
216. See W. Tradition P'ship v. Att'y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 6 (Mont. 2011).
217. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
218. See W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 6.
219. See W. Tradition, 271 P.3d at 6.
220. Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 845 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
221. Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491, 503, 509-10 (1997).
222. See Charles J. Cooper & Derek L. Shaffer, What Congress "Shall Make" the Court Will Take: How McConnell v. FEC Betrays the First Amendment in Upholding Incumbency Protection Under the Banner of "Campaign Finance Reform, " 3 Election L.J. 223, 224-25 (2004) (quoting multiple senators as supporters of the law during floor debate or as intervenors in the litigation).
223. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 965 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted).
224. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 965 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 965 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Ernest J. Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term-Foreword: Process of Law, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 77 (1958).
227. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
228. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
229. See Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302-11 (1986).
230. See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 309-11.
231. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.
232. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.
233. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.
234. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.
235. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.
236. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.
237. See Letter from Laura W. Murphy et al., Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Senator Richard Durbin & Ranking Member Lindsey Graham 3 (July 24, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_statement_on_citizens_united_7_24_hearing_final.pdf.
238. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 800, 802-03 (2012).
239. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Comment: Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83 (2010).
240. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2293, 2296 (seeming to hold open the question whether opt-out regimes provide sufficient First Amendment protection).
241. Robert Pinsky, An Explanation of America 8 (1979).
242. More retired nuns were refused ballots in a single election-and by a poll worker who was a member of their own order, no less!, see Cynthia Tucker, Editorial, Even God Couldn't Vote in Indiana Without Proper ID, Balt. Sun, May 12, 2008, at 9A-than all the verified examples of in-person voter impersonation fraud in Indiana history.
243. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
244. Cf. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (referring to the "basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike").
245. Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 66 (1999) (concluding of the Rehnquist Court that "[t]he best description of the modern Court is that it acts in ways that satisfy a rather well-to-do constituency").
246. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
247. Butler, 297 U.S. at 63.
248. 297 U.S. 1, 62.
249. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579-80 (2012) (stating that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined and limited.
250. "Scholars have battled for decades... over the role of Justice [Owen] Roberts" in that ratification. Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. Legal Analysis69, 71 (2010) (suggesting that Justice Roberts veered sharply to the left during the 1936 Term before returning to the right, but that ultimately changes in the Court's membership solidified the New Deal settlement).
251. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
252. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
253. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
254. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
255. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
256. John Q. Barrett, Wickard v. Filburn (1942), The Jackson List 4-6 (June 27, 2012), http://www.stjohns.edu/media/3/638cd994e8484fd3bdb841f31b11952f.pdf?d=20120626 (quoting a letter from Justice Jackson, the author of the Court's opinion, to then-Judge (later Justice) Minton).
257. I borrow the term from Professor Thomas Merrill. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 569, 575 (2003) (identifying the Second Rehnquist Court as beginning in 1994 when the Court "altered its agenda... away from social issues to federalism issues" and the conservative majority became "steadfast proponent[s] of limiting congressional power under the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendments, and of erecting new protections for states' rights in the name of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments").
258. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Compare, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
259. Although the provision is popularly referred to as the "individual mandate, " the vast majority of the population satisfies the requirement through either employer-or government-provided insurance. See Kaiser Family Found., Focus on Health Reform: A Guide to theSupreme Court's Affordable Care Act Decision 2 & n.4 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8332.pdf (noting a Congressional Budget Office projection that about 80% of the nonelderly population would have been insured even in the absence of the ACA).
260. Although the provision is popularly referred to as the "individual mandate, " the vast majority of the population satisfies the requirement through either employer-or government-provided insurance. See Kaiser Family Found., Focus on Health Reform: A Guide to theSupreme Court's Affordable Care Act Decision 2 & n.4 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8332.pdf (noting a Congressional Budget Office projection that about 80% of the nonelderly population would have been insured even in the absence of the ACA).
261. Although the provision is popularly referred to as the "individual mandate, " the vast majority of the population satisfies the requirement through either employer-or government-provided insurance. See Kaiser Family Found., Focus on Health Reform: A Guide to theSupreme Court's Affordable Care Act Decision 2 & n.4 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8332.pdf (noting a Congressional Budget Office projection that about 80% of the nonelderly population would have been insured even in the absence of the ACA).
262. Although the provision is popularly referred to as the "individual mandate, " the vast majority of the population satisfies the requirement through either employer-or government-provided insurance. See Kaiser Family Found., Focus on Health Reform: A Guide to theSupreme Court's Affordable Care Act Decision 2 & n.4 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8332.pdf (noting a Congressional Budget Office projection that about 80% of the nonelderly population would have been insured even in the absence of the ACA).
263. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term-Comment: To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 83 (2012).
264. Ceci Connolly, How We Got Here, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New HealthCareLaw and What It Means for Us All 9, 11-62 (2010).
265. John Q. Barrett, Wickard v. Filburn (1942), The Jackson List 4-6 (June 27, 2012), http://www.stjohns.edu/media/3/638cd994e8484fd3bdb841f31b11952f.pdf?d=20120626 (quoting a letter from Justice Jackson, the author of the Court's opinion, to then-Judge (later Justice) Minton).
266. John Q. Barrett, Wickard v. Filburn (1942), The Jackson List 4-6 (June 27, 2012), http://www.stjohns.edu/media/3/638cd994e8484fd3bdb841f31b11952f.pdf?d=20120626 (quoting a letter from Justice Jackson, the author of the Court's opinion, to then-Judge (later Justice) Minton).
267. For some examples, including the notorious "Cornhusker kickback, " see Robert Pear, Buried in Health Bill, Very Specific Beneficiaries, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2009, at A1.
268. Edward M. Kennedy, "The Cause of My Life, " Newsweek, July 27, 2009, at 34, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/07/17/the-cause-of-my-life.html.
269. Shailagh Murray, Both Parties Mourn Loss of Kennedy in Health-Care Debate, Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 2009, at A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content /article/2009/08/26/AR2009082603677.html.
270. For some examples, including the notorious "Cornhusker kickback, " see Robert Pear, Buried in Health Bill, Very Specific Beneficiaries, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2009, at A1.
271. Carl Hulse, A Fail-Safe Works for Legislation, but Not as Expected, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2010, at A25.
272. Peter Baker, Speculation Prompts Obama to Renew Vow of No Tax Increase on Middle Class, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 2009, at A12.
273. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010) (describing the "[s]hared responsibility payment" as a "penalty").
274. See John Kass, Taxing the Patients of America with Semantics, Chi. Trib., June 29, 2012, § 1, at 2 (describing a 2009 interview in which the President told ABC's George Stephanopoulos that "for us to say that you've got to take a responsibility to get health insurance is absolutely not a tax increase, " and when asked, with respect to the individual mandate, whether he "reject[ed] that it's a tax increase, " replied, "I absolutely reject that notion").
275. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
276. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
277. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
278. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
279. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
280. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
281. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
282. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
283. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
284. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
285. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
286. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
287. See generally Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction (2011).
288. E.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
289. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
290. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
291. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
292. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
293. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
294. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
295. 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
296. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
297. See generally Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction (2011).
298. See Paul Gewirtz, The Jurisprudence of Hypotheticals, 32 J. Legal Educ. 120, 122 (1982) ("[I]f a theory is premised on a view about what kind of fact patterns actually will emerge in the real world, the theory cannot be attacked by a question that assumes that other kinds of fact patterns will emerge. These premise-denying hypotheticals represent an abuse of the imagination. "). Moreover, the two hypotheticals offered by the Chief Justice and the dissenters confuse the concepts of analytic limits and policy limits on congressional powers. Any power, even an undoubted one, might be used in absurd or abusive ways. For example, Congress clearly would be using its commerce power if it required any patient who purchased a medical device that had traveled in interstate commerce to pay for the device in pennies. But pointing to the implausible possibility that Congress might pass such a patently daffy statute cannot support an argument that there are Commerce Clause-based limits on Congress's ability to regulate the purchase and sale of medical devices that have moved across state lines. That power remains plenary. Thus, protections against that kind of law stem from a combination of the political process and constitutional constraints outside the commerce power itself.
299. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
300. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
301. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
302. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
303. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
304. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
305. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
306. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
307. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 60 (1904).
308. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 60 (1904).
309. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
310. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
311. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2565 (2012) (Alito, J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
312. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (joint dissent) (citation omitted).
313. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936) (footnote omitted) ("[Alexander Hamilton] maintained the [spending] clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States.... Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouses the Hamiltonian position. We shall not review the writings of public men and commentators or discuss the legislative practice. Study of all these leads us to conclude that the reading advocated by Mr. Justice Story is the correct one. While, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of § 8 which bestow and define the legislative powers of the Congress. It results that the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution. ").
314. See 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
315. President Franklin Roosevelt acknowledged the link between the population's well-being and national commerce in his second inaugural address: But here is the challenge to our democracy: In this nation I see tens of millions of its citizens-a substantial part of its whole population-who at this very moment are denied the greater part of what the very lowest standards of today call the necessities of life.... I see millions denied education, recreation, and the opportunity to better their lot and the lot of their children. I see millions lacking the means to buy the products of farm and factory and by their poverty denying work and productiveness to many other millions. I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937), in Inaugural Addressesof the Presidents of the United States 274, 277 (Bicentennial ed. 1989), available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres50.html.
316. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (upholding a Spending Clause-based statute that required educational institutions receiving federal funds to provide access to military recruiters).
317. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2668 (joint dissent).
318. Cf. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 567-68 (1937) (describing the political dynamic within states that resulted in their participation in the unemployment insurance program).
319. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2668 (joint dissent) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (internal quotation mark omitted).
320. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2668 (joint dissent) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (internal quotation mark omitted).
321. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
322. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2675 (joint dissent) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (Supp. IV 2010).
323. 42 U.S.C. § 1315a.
324. 42 U.S.C. § 1315a.
325. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2668-69 (joint dissent).
326. For some examples, including the notorious "Cornhusker kickback, " see Robert Pear, Buried in Health Bill, Very Specific Beneficiaries, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2009, at A1.
327. For some examples, including the notorious "Cornhusker kickback, " see Robert Pear, Buried in Health Bill, Very Specific Beneficiaries, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2009, at A1.
328. 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
329. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
330. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
331. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731.
332. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1332 (plurality opinion). The provision at issue was subsection (D).
333. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1332 (plurality opinion). The provision at issue was subsection (D).
334. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1332 (plurality opinion). The provision at issue was subsection (D).
335. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1332 (plurality opinion). The provision at issue was subsection (D).
336. See 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
337. Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Comment: Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 182 (1997) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872).
338. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
339. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
340. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
341. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
342. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
343. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
344. Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 299, 313.
345. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).
346. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
347. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (striking down a California statute that forbade distributing violent video games to minors).
348. 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012) (per curiam).
349. 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012) (per curiam).
350. See Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice 358-62 (9th ed. 2007).
351. For additional discussion of the DIG process, see Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG: An Empirical and Institutional Analysis, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1421.
352. One prominent counterexample is Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (per curiam).
353. See Edwards v. First Am. Fin. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 515 (9th Cir. 2010).
354. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2) (2006).
355. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 515.
356. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3935.04, 3935.07 (West 2010).
357. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 516.
358. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
359. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 517.
360. See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2) (2006).
361. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 517.
362. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).
363. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012) (No. 10-708).
364. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012) (No. 10-708).
365. Brief for the Petitioner at 13, First Am., 132 S. Ct. 2536 (No. 10-708).
366. Brief for the Petitioner at 13, First Am., 132 S. Ct. 2536 (No. 10-708).
367. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
368. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
369. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
370. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
371. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
372. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
373. 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).
374. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25-27, First Am., 132 S. Ct. 2536 (No. 10-708) (citing examples of statutory damages authorized by Congress without proof of harm, as in copyright and credit reporting statutes).
375. Kevin Russell, First American Financial v. Edwards: Surprising End to a Potentially Important Case, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/firstamerican-financial-v-edwards-surprising-end-to-a-potentially-important-case/.
376. Kevin Russell, First American Financial v. Edwards: Surprising End to a Potentially Important Case, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/firstamerican-financial-v-edwards-surprising-end-to-a-potentially-important-case/.
377. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
378. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).
379. 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
380. 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
381. But see Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) (holding that when a state court defendant is constrained to bring his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in state collateral proceedings, procedural default will not bar a federal habeas claim if the defendant either received no counsel in that proceeding or his counsel there was ineffective).
382. Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1665 (2012) (quoting Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 409 (1997).
383. This point has long driven the Court's decisions in exclusionary rule cases. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702-03 (2009).
384. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
385. Kevin Russell, First American Financial v. Edwards: Surprising End to a Potentially Important Case, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/firstamerican-financial-v-edwards-surprising-end-to-a-potentially-important-case/.
386. Kevin Russell, First American Financial v. Edwards: Surprising End to a Potentially Important Case, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/firstamerican-financial-v-edwards-surprising-end-to-a-potentially-important-case/.
387. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
388. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
389. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
390. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586-87 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
391. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586-87 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
392. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586-87 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
393. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
394. In this respect, consider Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
395. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
396. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), for example, all nine members of the Court saw serious constitutional difficulties with partisan gerrymandering.
397. For discussions of the Court's skeptical approach to the adequacy of the legislative process, see generally William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 87 (2001).
398. See 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
399. See generally Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It's Even Worse ThanIt Looks (2012).
400. In a related vein, Professor Kramer identifies as a background factor in the decline of popular constitutionalism and the acceptance of judicial supremacy in the latter half of the twentieth century "the general skepticism about popular government that came to characterize western intellectual thought after World War II" given the "seeming eagerness with which mass publics in Europe had embraced fascism and communism. " Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves221-22 (2004).
401. See generally, e.g., Jane Mayer & Jill Abramson, Strange Justice (1994) (discussing Justice Thomas's contentious confirmation hearings).
402. See generally, e.g., Jane Mayer & Jill Abramson, Strange Justice (1994) (discussing Justice Thomas's contentious confirmation hearings).
403. Justice Thomas served briefly as Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights at the Department of Education before spending eight years as Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Justice Kagan spent two years as Deputy Director of the Domestic Policy Council. A short biography of each Justice is available on the Court's website. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court of the United States, http:// www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
404. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Oath 84-85 (2012) (describing Justice Breyer's favorable experience with Congress during his stint with the Judiciary Committee).
405. Many of these cases involve resolving conflicts among the circuits, see, e.g., Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2012).
406. In a related vein, Professor Kramer identifies as a background factor in the decline of popular constitutionalism and the acceptance of judicial supremacy in the latter half of the twentieth century "the general skepticism about popular government that came to characterize western intellectual thought after World War II" given the "seeming eagerness with which mass publics in Europe had embraced fascism and communism. " Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves221-22 (2004).
407. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox 24 (1953).
408. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 519, 535-36 (2012). Judge Posner noted: Modern constitutional theory gives the theorists the required certitude, emboldening them to ignore Holmes's dictum that certitude is not the test of certainty. So "Scalia and Thomas insist that the apparent tension between their sharp demands for restraint in some areas and their sweeping exercise of activism in others is resolved by the written Constitution itself. " Their motto should be: the Constitution made me do it. They make prudence seem a cop-out.
409. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("The Framers created a Federal Government of limited powers, and assigned to this Court the duty of enforcing those limits. ").
410. In a related vein, Professor Kramer identifies as a background factor in the decline of popular constitutionalism and the acceptance of judicial supremacy in the latter half of the twentieth century "the general skepticism about popular government that came to characterize western intellectual thought after World War II" given the "seeming eagerness with which mass publics in Europe had embraced fascism and communism. " Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves221-22 (2004).
411. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
412. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
413. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728-29 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
414. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728-29 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
415. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524, 527 (1997).
416. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
417. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act violates the First Amendment). First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is designed to respond to the chilling effect such statutes might have even if they are not enforced.
418. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act violates the First Amendment). First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is designed to respond to the chilling effect such statutes might have even if they are not enforced.
419. For an example of the Roberts Court's hostility to structural reform litigation, see Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579 (2009).
420. I borrow this formulation from Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essayson Liberty 118, 122-34 (1969).
421. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
422. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in The Spirit of Liberty 189, 189-90 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
423. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in The Spirit of Liberty 189, 189-90 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
424. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).