Thinking is Believing

Inquiry (United Kingdom)

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 55-96

  Mandelbaum, Eric ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890924969     PISSN: 0020174X     EISSN: 15023923     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2014.858417     Document Type: Article

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