Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 351-368

  Mandelbaum, Eric ^a   Ripley, David ^b,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873179068     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-012-0106-3     Document Type: Article

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