The search for sustainable legitimacy: Environmental law and bureaucracy in china

Harvard Environmental Law Review

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 365-440

  Wang, Alex L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCOUNTABILITY; BUREAUCRACY; DEVELOPING WORLD; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; POLLUTION CONTROL; REFORM PROCESS; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT;

CHINA;

EID: 84890914134     PISSN: 01478257     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (342)

1. Public policy research and the media have documented and drawn attention to this crisis. See generally Alex Wang, China's Environmental Tipping Point?, in CHINA IN AND BEYOND THE HEADLINES (Tim Weston & Lionel Jensen eds., 2012)
2. World Bank, Cost Of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages (2007) [Hereinafter Cost Of Pollution]
3. Mun S. Ho & Chris P. Nielsen Clearing the Air: the Health and Economic Damages of Air Pollution in China (2007)
4. Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future (2010)
5. Jun Ma, China's Water Crisis (2004)
6. Todd m. Johnson, Feng Liu & Richard Newfarmer, World Bank, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century (1997) [hereinafter clear water, blue skies].
7. Fine particulate matter concentrations in urban areas are at least four to five times those found in developed countries. 190 Million Chinese Drinking Polluted Water, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Apr. 22, 2011, http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/90001/98649/7359043.html.
8. See Green GDP Accounting Study Report 2004 Issued, XINHUA, Sept. 12, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-09/12/content-5080599.htm
9. GDP [Xie Zhenhua Sorrowfully States: Ecological Damage "Eats Up" 15% of GDP Each Year], [JING BAO], Apr. 29, 2005, http://tech.sina.com. cn/d/2005-04-29/1430598439.shtml (citing 2003 Chinese Academy of Sciences study)
10. United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP"), Tongji University, Green Accounting Practice in China (Draft Report), Apr. 2008, at 2-10.
11. Jin Wang, China's Green Laws are Useless, CHINA DIALOGUE, Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3831.
12. Five-year plans are created by Chinese government and approved by the Chinese Communist Party and the National People's Congress. China's first five-year plan was implemented in 1953. JONATHAN SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 514 (1999).
13. Hongwei Yang, Hitting Green Targets, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-12/01/content-21458373-2.htm. In 2006, China had about 115 GW of small thermal (under 100 megawatts) capacity, out of roughly 391 GW overall of thermal-fired power plant capacity.
14. Jing Cao et al., China's 11th Five-Year Plan and the Environment: Reducing SO2 Emissions, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL. 231, 240 n.10 (2009).
15. See, e.g., Angang Hu, Green Light for Hard Targets, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-03/28/content-12234557.htm
16. Deng Yuwen, [How Powerful Will Environmental "Veto" Targets Be?], [XINHUA], Dec. 5, 2007, http://env.people.com.cn/GB/6613692.html.
17. Hu Jintao's Speech on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23hu.text.html
18. Carbon Intensity Reduction of 40-45% is a Voluntary Action, [THE CENT. PEOPLE'S GOV'T OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] , Nov. 26, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/wszb/zhibo356/content-1474280.htm.
19. PM2.5 Readings Vital for Political Careers, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-02/17/content-14634482.htm.
20. See Yuan Xu, The Use of a Goal for SO2 Mitigation Planning and Management in China's 11th Five-Year Plan, 54 J. ENVTL. PLANNING & MGMT. 769, 783 (2011)
21. ANNUAL REVIEW OF LOWCARBON DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, CLIMATE POL'Y INITIATIVE (2010), summary available at http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/ china-annual-review-2011-2012
22. Lynn Price et al., Assessment of China's Energy-Saving and Emission-Reduction Accomplishments and Opportunities During the 11th Five-Year Plan, 39 ENERGY POL. 2165, 2178 (2011).
23. A notable exception is Dan Guttman & Yaqin Song, Making Central-Local Relations Work: Comparing America and China Environmental Governance Systems, 1 FRONTIERS OF ENVTL. SCI. & ENGINEERING IN CHINA 418, 433 (2007) [hereinafter Central-Local Relations]
24. see also Wyatt Golding, Incentives for Change: China's Cadre System Applied to Water Quality, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 399 (2011).
25. The exceptions are Carl Minzner, Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in China, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 53 (2009-10) [hereinafter Minzner, Riots & Cover-Ups] (identifying how target incentives lead to principal-agent problems and exacerbate public instability);
26. Mayling Birney, Objective-Maximizing Authoritarianism: Evidence from China (June 2012) (setting forth a theory of the "rule of mandates" that treats "laws" and "regulations" as secondary, subordinate norms to cadre evaluation targets)
27. See, e.g., MIRANDA SCHEURS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE U.S. (2003), available at http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam033/ 2002067372.pdf.
28. Mark Beeson, The Coming of Environmental Authoritarianism, 19 ENVTL. POL. 276, 276 (2010) ("The dispiriting reality may be that authoritarian regimes .may even prove more capable of responding to the complex political and environmental pressures in the region than some of its democracies.")
29. Bruce Gilley, Authoritarian Environmentalism, 21 ENVTL. POL. 287 (2012) (citing to a number of works on "authoritarian environmentalism").
30. See Pollution Law Enforcement in Emerging Markets, 32 L. & POL'Y. (SPECIAL ED.) (Benjamin van Rooij et al. eds., No. 1, 2010) for several examples of interesting recent academic work in this area.
31. See MAO'S INVISIBLE HAND: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE Inc CHINA (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011) for one of the best recent discussions in a line of literature on China's adaptive approach to governance in the post-Mao era.
32. How to Build Quality, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1989, at 121-22.
33. see also Minzner, Riots & Cover-Ups, supra note 20.
34. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 898 (2011) (discussing symbolic compliance)
35. Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996)
36. see also Terrence Halliday & Bruce Carruthers, How Countries Resist Global Institutions, CENTER ON LAW AND GLOBALIZATION, http://clg.portalxm.com/ library/keytext.cfm?keytext-id=30.
37. See [Sun Youhai], [Strengthening Rule of Law is a Fundamental Safeguard for Realizing Energy-Saving, Emissions-Reduction Targets], [GROUP TALK] (July 2007).
38. See, e.g., Carl Minzner, China's Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011).
39. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 3 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 2008).
40. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 46 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Bruce Gilley & Heike Holbig, The Debate on Party Legitimacy in China: a Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis, 18:59 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 339 (Mar. 1, 2009).
42. See generally RICHARD REVESZ, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY (2000).
43. Dan Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG 59 (1992)
44. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULPHUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 3 (1981).
45. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 64 (1983).
46. Weber's seminal framing of components of regime legitimacy (traditional, charismatic, and politico-legal bases of legitimacy) has been particularly influential. See, e.g., T.H. Rigby, Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-organisational Systems, in POLITICAL LEGITIMATION IN COMMUNIST STATES 1, 2-10 (T.H. Rigby & Ferenc Fehér eds., 1982).
47. States also use coercion to maintain power. However, as He Baogang notes, "the role of coercion is very limited in achieving effective legitimacy. It may produce unintended consequences: decreasing legitimacy rather than increasing it, obtaining a very limited superficial compliance rather than winning free support from the masses .[T]he legitimate state has lower transaction costs in managing society than the coercive state." BAOGANG HE, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF CHINA 195 (David S.G. Goodman ed., 1996).
48. See Andrew Nathan, Authoritarian Impermanence, 20 J. DEMOCRACY 37, 38 (2009).
49. But see THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012) (describing problems in the U.S. political system and political party actions that have stymied the sort of political renewal referenced above).
50. See, e.g., Bruce Gilley, Legitimacy and Institutional Change: The Case of China, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 259 (2008)
51. see also Heike Holbig & Bruce Gilley, Search of Legitimacy in Post-revolutionary China: Bringing Ideology and Governance Back In, GIGA WORKING PAPERS No. 127, at 5, 27 Mar. (2010).
52. See Heike Holbig & Bruce Gilley, Reclaiming Legitimacy in China, 38 POL. & POL'Y 395, 405-08 (2010)
53. Dingxin Zhao, The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China, 53 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 416, 422 (2009)
54. HUNTINGTON, supra note 38, at 46. 49 Max Weber, The Nature of Charismatic Domination, in MAX WEBER: SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION 226, 226-27 (1978).
55. See, e.g., SUISHENG ZHAO, A NATION-STATE BY CONSTRUCTION: DYNAMICS OF MODERN CHINESE NATIONALISM (2004)
56. see also REGIME LEGITIMACY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY (Thomas Heberer & Gunter Schubert eds., 2009).
57. See Andre Laliberté & Marc Lanteigne, The Issue of Challenges to the Legitimacy of CCP Rule, in THE CHINESE PARTY-STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ADAPTATION AND THE REINVENTION OF LEGITIMACY (Andre Laliberté & Marc Lanteigne eds., 2008) [hereinafter Legitimacy of CCP Rule]. Nationalism is a third pillar of Chinese state legitimacy.
58. FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 10-13 (1999) (discussing output legitimacy in the European context).
59. Willy Lam, Beijing's 'Wei-Wen' Imperative Steals the Thunder at NPC, CHINA BRIEF (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no-cache=1&tx- ttnews[tt-news]=37630.
60. See State Council White Paper, China's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://news.xinhuanet. com/english/2008-02/28/content-7687418.htm.
61. See, e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 63-91, 103-09 (2002) [hereinafter CHINA'S LONG MARCH] (setting forth a range of "thick" notions of rule of law in China).
62. Thomas Heberer & Gunter Schubert, Political Reform and Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China, 99 ASIEN 9, 17 (2006).
63. A number of scholars have assessed various aspects of the cadre evaluation system in general. See, e.g., John Burns & Zhiren Zhou, Performance Management in the Government of the People's Republic of China: Accountability and Control in the Implementation of Public Policy, 2 OECD J. BUDGETING (2010), Vol. II
64. SUSAN WHITING, POWER AND WEALTH IN RURAL CHINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2001) [hereinafter POWER AND WEALTH]
65. Susan Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule, in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG ERA 101-19 (Dali L. Yang & Barry Naughton eds., 2004) [hereinafter Whiting, Cadre Evaluation]
66. Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective, CHINA Q. 173: 35-52 (2003)
67. Pierre Landry, DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA: THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S CONTROL OF LOCAL ELITES IN THE POST-MAO ERA (2008).
68. As of 1998, by one Party estimate, there were up to 40.5 million cadres in China: 7 million in government and Party organs; 19.2 million in the so-called shiye danwei (or public service units); 14.3 million in state-owned enterprises. Other estimates put the number of cadres in government and Party organs as high as 10 million. Kjed Erik Brodsgaard, Cadre and Personnel Management in the CPC, 10 CHINA: AN INT'L J. 69, 73-74 (Aug. 2012). Of these, 508,025 were "leading cadres," of which 92 percent worked at the provincial level or below. Id.
69. see also David Shambaugh, CHINA'S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION 141, 143-44 (2008) (noting 40.51 million Party and state cadres nationwide).
70. John Burns, Civil Service Reform in China, 7 OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2007, at 4 (noting that some 69.2 million people were employed in China's public sector in 2002, with 35.4 million of these working in the general government and 33.8 million in state-owned enterprises). As will be discussed in Parts IV and V, the difficulty of managing a bureaucracy of this size is exacerbated by the top-down orientation of China's governance system, coupled with a lack of diversity in effective channels for bottom-up or horizontal supervision.
71. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 209 (1995).
72. RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA'S COMMUNIST RULERS 72 (2010). The bureaucracy would also include the staffs of each of these entities.
73. See Birney, supra note 20. U.S. civilian-military control is more analogous to Chinese cadre evaluation governance than management of other U.S. agencies. The civilian-military hierarchy is characterized by stronger executive power over personnel matters and fewer civil service protections. It is not subject to many of the constraints and protections set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. The military is subject to more limited judicial review than other agencies. These are all characteristics of Chinese bureaucratic governance, including strong, centralized "executive" authority and limited independent supervision whether through the judiciary, legislature, or the public. John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2279-81, 2292 (2009).
74. Leading cadres at each level of government (that is, the top party and government officials at the provincial, municipal, and county-levels) are evaluated by their superiors at the next level up - what is known as "one-level down" supervision. Maria Edin, Remaking the Communist Party-State: The Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China, 1 CHINA: AN INT'L J. 1, Mar. 2003, at 6 [hereinafter Remaking the Communist Party-State]
75. Susan Whiting, Growth, Governance, and Institutions: The Internal Institutions of the Party-State in China, Report for the World Bank Research Project on the Rise of China and India (Governance) (July 28, 2006), at 5
76. see also Ye Chen et al. Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China, 88 ECON. LETTERS 421 (2005)
77. Hongbin Li & Li-An Zhou, Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1743 (2005).
78. But see Victor Shih et al. Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 166 (Feb. 2012).
79. Minzner, Riots & Cover-Ups, supra note 20, at 57.
80. Edin, Remaking the Communist Party-State, supra note 66, at 10.
81. Minzner, Riots & Cover-Ups, supra note 20, at 68.
82. Kenneth Lieberthal, China's Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental Policy Implementation, WILSON CTR. CHINA ENVT. SERIES (1997), at 4-5 [hereinafter China's Governing System], available at http://www. wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Lieberthal%20article.pdf [emphasis in original].
83. See Minzner, Riots & Cover-Ups, supra note 20, at 61-64.
84. Whiting, Cadre Evaluation, supra note 60, at 102-04.
85. See, e.g., STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 130 (1999) (discussing the "instrumental use of law").
86. See Tom Ginsburg, The Judicialization of Administrative Governance, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 1 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2008).
87. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, chs. 5 & 6 (2011) (discussing how planning and hierarchy develop as a solution to achieving collective objectives).
88. See, e.g., William Alford & Ben Liebman, Clean Air, Clear Processes? The Struggle over Air Pollution Law in the People's Republic of China, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 705 (2001).
89. See Minzner, Riots & Cover-Ups, supra note 20, at 55-59.
90. In studying the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese scholars specifically raised the need for more "scientific," meritocratic cadre management as a way to combat corruption and excessive reliance on guanxi (relationships) in the bureaucracy. See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 61, at 80.
91. See Whiting, Cadre Evaluation, supra note 60. 86 Likewise, if China in the future privatizes to a much more significant degree, cadre evaluation may lose some of its power.
92. YASHENG HUANG, INFLATION AND INVESTMENT CONTROLS IN CHINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS DURING THE REFORM ERA 89 (1996).
93. FRANCES FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER: FROM PREHUMAN TIMES TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 113-14 (2011). Coincidentally, this was also the period from which arose the concept of rule based on the "Mandate of Heaven," a precursor to contemporary notions of performance legitimacy.
94. See DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 7-8 (1973).
95. David Bandurski, The Law Should be a Shield for All, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT, Mar. 21, 2011, http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/03/21/11060
96. citing Chen Youxi, The Law Should be Everyone's Shield, SOUTHERN WEEKEND, Mar. 17, 2011.
97. See We Should Not Copy Western System: Wu, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Mar. 10, 2009, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/6610213.html.
98. Joseph Kahn, Chinese Official Warns Against Independence of Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/03/world/asia/03china.html
99. see also Titus C. Chen, China's Reaction to the Color Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism in Full Swing, 34 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE no. 2. 2010, at 12, 16.
100. KEVIN O'BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA (2006).
101. PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 57, at 399-408.
102. See Minzner, Riots & Cover-Ups, supra note 20, at 58.
103. See, e.g., Abigail Jahiel, Special Issue: China's Environment, The Organization of Environmental Protection in China, 156 CHINA Q. 757 (1998)
104. XIAOYING MA & LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA 182 (2000)
105. BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, REGULATING LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA: LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT, THEORY AND CASES (2006)
106. Canfa Wang, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 159 (2007)
107. Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195 (2006).
108. This is a dynamic not uncommon to resource-poor, developing country contexts. Dara O'Rourke has called this "community-driven regulation." See Dara O'Rourke, COMMUNITYDRIVEN REGULATION: BALANCING DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN VIETNAM (2004).
109. For a good overview of the ways in which fiscal reform has affected cadre evaluation implementation, see Whiting, Growth, supra note 68, at 12-14.
110. The eight "environmental protection systems" are (i) the environmental impact assessment system; (ii) the "three simultaneities" system; (iii) the pollution discharge fee system; (iv) the environmental protection target responsibility system; (v) the urban environment comprehensive restoration quantitative verification system; (vi) the pollution permit system; (vii) the pollution centralized control system; and (viii) the pollution control within a limited time system. See [ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT] ( [Xu Ning] & [Hu Weiguang] eds., 2008) [Xu Ning] & [Hu Weiguang]
111. see also ["Eight Systems" of Environmental Management], [NANNING CITY ENVTL. PROT. BUREAU] (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.nnhb.gov.cn/html/ hbzs/201111/01/46812.html.
112. [State Council Decision Regarding Several Problems in Environmental Protection], [XINHUA] , Aug. 3, 1996, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/ 14/content-2696239.htm.
113. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo & Shui-Yan Tang, Institutional Reform, Economic Changes, and Local Environmental Management in China: the Case of Guangdong Province, 15 ENVTL. POLITICS 190, 202 (2006). The target levels for these specific criteria were typically established through negotiation between local governments and their bureaucratic superiors. The national program of environmental cadre evaluation established in the 11th five-year plan largely followed this structure.
114. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
115. [Guangdong Province Trial Measures on Environmental Protection Target Term of Office Responsibility System], [LAW LIBRARY] (Feb. 6, 1991), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law-view.asp?id=21566 [hereinafter, Guangdong Trial Measures].
116. See Pan Yue, Eco-indicators and Assessment of Officials' Job Performance, in THE THOUGHTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM [sic] 35, 38 (2005).
117. Jianguo Liu & Jared Diamond, Revolutionizing China's Environmental Protection, SCIENCE, Jan. 4, 2008, at 37, 38.
118. [SEPA Links Up with Organization Department Regarding the Incorporation of Green GDP into Cadre Evaluation], [BEIJING NEWS], Sep. 8, 2006, http://env.people.com.cn/GB/4794033.html.
119. UNITED NATIONS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTING: INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING 2003, available at http://unstats.un.org/ unsd/envaccounting/seea2003.pdf.
120. [Pan Hongqi], [Pan Yue: Let's Confirm the Central Place of Green GDP in Government Evaluations], [BEIJING YOUTH DAILY], Mar. 1, 2005, http://news.163.com/05/0301/08/1DOB1ERN0001124T.html.
121. [Peking University Professor: Some Provinces' GDP Actually Reflects Zero Growth], [SHANGHAI SECURITIES NEWS], Aug. 3, 2007, http://finance.people.com.cn/ GB/1045/6065385.html.
122. Id.; Jane Qiu, China's Green Accounting System on Shaky Ground, 448 NATURE 518, 519 (2007).
123. Edward Wong, Cost of Environmental Damage in China Growing Rapidly Amid Industrialization, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/ world/asia/cost-of-environmental-degradation-in-china-is-growing.html
124. Jonathan Watts, China's Green Economist Stirring a Shift Away from GDP, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/sep/16/china- green-economist-gdp.
125. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 38, at 55-57. While Chinese authorities are arguably adopting a number of the approaches Huntington identifies (for example, increased coercion, appeals to nationalism, and invocation of democratic principles), scholars have also begun to examine the ways that Chinese leaders are attempting to adapt to particular problems perceived as threats to state legitimacy, while maintaining a hold on one-party rule. This emerging governance model has been termed "authoritarian resilience" or "adaptive authoritarianism." Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 6 (2003)
126. see also Conference Overview, Harvard University Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Adaptive Authoritarianism: China's Party-State Resilience in Historical Perspective (July 14-16, 2008), http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ conferences/08-china/overview
127. See, e.g., MAO'S INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 26
128. DALI YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND THE POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (2004)
129. Laliberté & Lanteigne, Legitimacy of CCP Rule, supra note 52
130. But see MINXIN PEI, CHINA'S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY (2006).
131. See, e.g., Orville Schell, How Walmart is Changing China, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/how-walmart-is- changing-china/8709/.
132. The practices of local government "stability maintenance" (weiwen) offices and funds reflected this double-edged strategy, with heightened security and use of weiwen funds to "purchase" stability. See, e.g., [Tsinghua University Sociology Department, Social Development Research Project Group], ["Stability Maintenance" New Line of Thinking: Systematization of the Expression of Interests, Realize Long-Term Peace and Stability], [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], Apr. 15, 2010, http://www.infzm.com/content/43853.
133. SHAMBAUGH, supra note 61, at chs. 4 & 5. 138 Jeanne Wilson, Coloured Revolutions: The View from Moscow and Beijing, 25 J. COMMUNIST STUD. & TRANSITION POL. 359, 374-75 (2009).
134. See, e.g., SHAMBAUGH, supra note 61; Heilmann & Perry, supra note 26; Nathan, supra note 134. 140 [Resolution on Strengthening the Construction of the Party's Governing Capacity], approved by the 4th plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee (Sept. 16-19, 2004)
135. translated in Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 180 CHINA Q. 1123, 1153-71 (2004), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2809350. html.
136. The "King's Dilemma" is the risk that autocratic rulers face undermining their own power if reforms that generate good economic performance lead to demands for greater political participation and democracy. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 177 (1968).
137. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2008), 138-44.
138. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-05 (2011) (transcript on file with author); see JIAN ZHANG, BROOKINGS INST., CHINA'S ENERGY SECURITY: PROSPECTS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES (2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/07-china-energy-zhang.aspx
139. Keith Bradsher, Security Tops the Environment in China's Energy Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/business/global/ 18yuan.html.
140. CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES, supra note 1, at 23.
141. [Chen Zhong & Chen Chuyue], [China Calls for an Age of Eco-Civilization], [SOUTHERN WIND WINDOW], Feb. 16, 2005, at 13.
142. Chemical oxygen demand declined by only 2.1 percent, and subsequent data showed these COD statistics to be wildly understated. See [NATIONAL 11TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION] , [PRC CENT. PEOPLE'S GOV'T] (2007), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-11/26/content-815498.htm (Chinese-language version), http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/ thenational-eleventh-five-year-plan-for-environmental-protection.doc (English translation).
143. Miao Hong, China Battles Pollution Amid Full-Speed Economic Growth, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN BULGARIA (Sept. 30, 2006), http://www.chinaembassy.bg/eng/dtxw/t274647.htm.
144. David Lague, China Blames Oil Firm for Chemical Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/24/world/asia/24iht-harbin.html? pagewanted=all.
145. [Pan Yue], [Environmental Targets and Official Government Evaluation], [CHINA ECONOMIC TIMES], Apr. 27, 2004, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/OP-c/ 553498.htm. At about this time, Pan was aggressively promoting the development and piloting of the "green GDP" program discussed in Part II, supra, which ultimately was not adopted as state policy.
146. [Chapter Six: Constructing a Resource-Saving, Environmental-Friendly Society], [PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FIVE-YEAR PLAN OUTLINE] (2007) [hereinafter 11TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN], available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content-268766.htm.
147. Premier Wen Jiabao's statement at the National People's Congress in 2007 was indicative of the official party-state position. The economy was based to an excessive degree on industrial production rather than services ("Contradictions in the economic structure are prominent."). Economic disparity between rural and urban areas and between regions of the country had become too great. Investment, rather than consumption, was the overwhelming engine of economic growth. Moreover, the economy was based on a high level of energy consumption and pollution, overreliance on heavy industry, the persistence of outdated industrial capacity, and weak environmental regulation and compliance ("The style of economic growth is coarse."). These problems were causing social unrest ("Some prominent problems that involve the interests of the masses have not been resolved well enough."). [THE GOVERNMENT WORK REPORT OF PREMIER WEN JIABAO AT THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE TENTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS] (2007) (on file with the Harvard Law School library).
148. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2012-01 (2012) (transcript on file with author).
149. [CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY] , [TRIAL COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION MEASURES FOR LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL TEAMS AND LEADING CADRES ON THE EMBODIMENT OF SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT] (2006).
150. [HEBEI PROVINCIAL GOV'T] , [IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR ESER TARGET VERIFICATION AT 30 KEY COUNTIES (CITIES, DISTRICTS) AND 30 KEY ENTERPRISES IN HEBEI PROVINCE] (2008)
151. [Hebei Province People's Government Office Notice Regarding the Issuance of the "Hebei Province 2008 Annual 'Double Thirties' Unit Enterprise Target Verification Implementation Plan"], [HEBEI PROVINCIAL GOV'T] (2008), available at http://www.chinaacc.com/new/63-74-/2009-2-16- ha542384316161290025376.shtml
152. [Hebei's New Round of "Double Thirties" Projects Storm the Fortifications by Doing ESER Well], [GREAT WALL NET HEBEI CHANNEL SPECIAL REPORT] (2011), available at http://heb.hebei.com.cn/system/2011/05/17/ 011146566.shtml.
153. [Implementation Recommendations for Environmental Supervision and Management of the Operation of Desulfurization Equipment at Coal-Fired Power Plant Power Units in Hebei Province], [HEBEI PROVINCIAL GOV'T, ENVTL. PROT. BUREAU] (2008)
154. [Implementation Recommendations for Environmental Supervision and Management of theOperation of Town-County Wastewater Treatment Plant Equipment], [HEBEI PROVINCIAL GOV'T, ENVTL. PROT. BUREAU] (2011).
155. [Energy Savings, Emissions Reduction Will Become an Important Hook for China's Economic Restructuring], [XINHUA], Dec. 9, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet. com/fortune/2006-12/09/content-5461178.htm
156. see also Ma Kai, The 11th Five-Year Plan: Targets, Paths and Policy Orientation, THE CENT. PEOPLE'S GOV'T OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 19, 2006), available at http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-03/23/content-234832.htm.
157. [Hu Jintao, General Secretary, Speech at the 2007 Central Economic Work Conference] (Dec. 6, 2007).
158. Id.; see also [Shengxian Zhou], [Optimize Economic Development Through Environmental Protection], [CHINA ENVTL. NEWS], Jun. 5, 2012, http://www.cenews.com.cn/xwzx/zhxw/ybyw/201206/t20120605-718628.html.
159. See, e.g., [PRC NAT'L DEV. & REFORM COMM'N], [THE OUTLINE OF THE PLAN FOR THE REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEARL RIVER DELTA (2008-2020)] (2008), available at http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/8644751.html.
160. [STATE COUNCIL REPLY REGARDING THE 11TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN NATIONAL KEY POLLUTANT TOTAL EMISSIONS CONTROL PLAN], http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/ content-394866.htm.
161. [Notice Regarding the Distribution of "Guiding Opinions on the Allocation of Sulfur Dioxide Volume"] [PRC MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT.], [ENVTL. DEV. REPORT] (2006) No. 182 (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/ zj/wj/200910/t20091022-172430.htm.
162. Ackerman and Stewart have criticized this aspect of the U.S. system for increasing the cost of environmental compliance and have called for regional variation in pollution reduction standards according to cost-benefit analysis. Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1355-56 (1984-85). Moreover, an approach that allocates environmental protection burdens based on perceived economic development needs is not uncommon in developing country contexts.
163. ALLEN BLACKMAN, Colombia's Discharge Fee Program: Incentives for Polluters or Regulators? (Oct. 2007) 1-2, available at www.rff.org/rff/ Documents/RFFDP-05-31-REV.pdf
164. see also GEORGE YU & ROB ELLSWORTH, SANDBAG CLIMATE CAMPAIGN, TURNING THE TANKER: CHINA'S CHANGING ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES AND ITS TENTATIVE LOOKS TO EMISSIONS TRADING 24 (2012) (noting the European Union Emissions Trading System's practice of "giving countries with lower than average GDP a more generous target (and those with higher GDP a correspondingly higher target) so that money can flow to these regions").
165. See generally David S. G. Goodman, The Campaign to "Open Up the West": National, Provincial-level and Local Perspectives, 178 THE CHINA QUARTERLY (June 2004).
166. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 628-37 (1996).
167. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-01 (2011), and interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (2011) (transcripts on file with author); see, e.g., [SEPA Specific Plan for Implementing the "Comprehensive Work Plan on Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction"], in [KEY POLLUTANT REDUCTION WORK REPORT] (2007), http://bit.ly/uy0Ggr
168. Hunan Vigorously Implements in a Unified Way Engineering, Structural, and Management Pollution Reductions], [HUNAN PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOV'T] (Jul. 30, 2007), http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-07/30/content-1379465.htm.
169. See Xu, supra note 18, at 780; [China Electricity Council], [ 2010 Summary of the Development of the Power Industry: CEC Releases Summary of the "Annual Development Report of China's Power Industry 2011"] (June 6, 2011), http://tj.cec.org.cn/niandufazhanbaogao/2011-06-27/58873.html.
170. Municipal Wastewater Treatment Rate Up to 75%, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 16, 2011, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-03/16/content-12180396.htm.
171. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-13 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
172. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-11 (2011) (transcript on file with author). An official in a wealthier eastern province noted that the volume of wastewater treated per day in the province had doubled during the 11th five-year plan.
173. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-15 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
174. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-13 (2011) (30 percent) (transcripts on file with author)
175. see also interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (transcript on file with author).
176. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (2011)
177. interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-06 (2011)
178. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-12 (2011)
179. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-15 (2011) (transcripts on file with author).
180. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (transcript on file with author). For example, if the efficiency of a flue gas desulfurization unit at a power plant is increased from 80 to 90 percent, or if concentration standards for COD emissions are tightened, credit for pollution reduction can be granted.
181. Willy Lam, Beijing Plays Up the Carrot While Still Wielding the Stick, CHINA BRIEF, Jul. 19, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/ single/?tx-ttnews[tt-news]=39644&tx-ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash= 6fffcf5baba735bd025e1fa81a355b94.
182. Hongjun Zhu, Xiamen Calls an Abrupt Halt to the PX Project to Deal with the Public Crisis, SOUTHERN WEEKEND, May 28, 2007, English translation posted at EASTSOUTHWESTNORTH, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20070601-1.htm
183. Poison Protests: A Huge Demonstration Over a Chemical Factory Unnerves Officials, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21526417
184. Royston Chan & Sophie Taylor, Hundreds Protest Shanghai Maglev Rail Extension, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/12/us- china-maglev-protest-idUSPEK32757920080112
185. Jonathan Kaiman, China Closes Solar-Panel Plant After Protests, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/20/world/la-fg- china-solar-20110920
186. China: Villagers Protest at Zhejiang Solar Panel Plant, BBC, Sept. 18, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asiapacific-14963354.
187. See Kai, supra note 170. 197 [A Look Back: Heavy Metal Pollution Incidents Occur in Succession], [FIRST.CN] (Jul. 9, 2010), http://www.thefirst. cn/1366/2010-07-09/373800.htm.
188. Another Smelter Shut Down Amid Lead Poisoning Fears, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-08/20/content-8595036.htm.
189. Jonathan Watts, Lead Poisoning Cases Spark Riots in China, THE LANCET, Sept. 12, 2009, http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140- 6736%2809%2961612-3/fulltext.
190. Government actions include planning and inspections, among other activities. See ["Implementation Plan for the Comprehensive Handling of Heavy Metal Pollution" Passes], [PRC MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT.] (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.cnmn.com.cn/ShowNews.aspx?id=24025
191. Notice Regarding Thoroughly Carrying Out Special Inspections of Heavy Metal Polluting Enterprises, [PRC MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT.] , [ENVTL. DEV. REPORT] (2009) No. 112 (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgt/ 200910/t20091022-174813.htm.
192. Qian Wang, [State Council Formally Replies on "12th Five-Year Plan for Comprehensive Prevention and Treatment of Heavy Metals"], [SOUTHERN WEEKEND] (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.infzm.com/content/55538.
193. Michael Martina, China Plans to Rein in Heavy Metal Pollution, REUTERS, Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/22/us-china-metal- pollution-idUSTRE71L2IC20110222.
194. Only the broad outlines of heavy metal measures have been publicly released. See, e.g., [Zhou Shengxian: Vigorously Prevent and Control Heavy Metal Pollution, Earnestly Resolve This Prominent Problem], [PRC MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT] (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-09/03/content-1407999.htm.
195. "PM2.5" or "fine particulate" refers to particulate matter pollution less than 2.5 microns in diameter. PM2.5 partices are believed to cause the greatest health risk because of their ability to lodge deeply in the lungs, due to their small size. See U.S. EPA, Fine Particle (PM2.5) Designations, http://www.epa.gov/pmdesignations/faq.htm.
196. Hourly readings from this monitor are posted on Twitter at the address: http://twitter.com/beijingair.
197. See Embassy Air Quality Tweets Said to "Confuse" Chinese, U.S. State Department cable, WIKILEAKS, July 10, 2009, available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09BEIJING1945.html [hereinafter July 10 cable].
198. Edward Wong, Outrage Grows Over Air Pollution and China's Response, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/world/asia/beijing- journal-anger-grows-over-air-pollution-in-china.html.
199. See July 10 cable, supra note 207; Hazardous Air Days in Beijing, U.S. State Department cable, WIKILEAKS, Nov. 27, 2009, available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09BEIJING3179.html [hereinafter Nov. 27 cable]. This is also based on the author's personal observations in Hebei Province.
200. Beijing Air Pollution 'Hazardous': U.S. Embassy, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 30, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iJTkt3- cVITDVI6xipFX4aAyYjpw?docId=CNG.d957d0999e1088b0ce61729ec5b6c9f1.5f1. Note that Chinese data could be misleading in three ways. (i) For the same concentration of pollution, the description in the Chinese system was more euphemistic. For example, a U.S. Air Quality Index ("AQI") rating of 151 to 200 is described as "Unhealthy." A score of 151 to 200 in the Chinese system is described as "Lightly Polluted." (ii) A given score in the Chinese AQI might constitute a significantly greater level of pollution than the equivalent score on the U.S. AQI, reflecting less stringent ambient air quality standards in China. The scores in the two countries are not comparable without conversion. (iii) Moreover, public and government concern about Chinese data manipulation is widespread.
201. Pressure Builds Up for Tighter Air Quality Monitoring in Beijing, XINHUA, Nov. 7, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/07/c- 122243130.htm.
202. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-12 (2011)
203. interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-15 (2011) (transcripts on file with author).
204. The MEP used this tool against twelve cities for failure to properly operate wastewater treatment, and six major state-owned enterprise groups (jituan). Interview with anonymous source, no. 2012-01 (2012) (transcript on file with author).
205. [THE CENT. PEOPLE'S GOV'T OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], [NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TWELFTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN] (2011), available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content-2034724.htm [hereinafter 12TH FIVE-YEAR ENVTL. PROT. PLAN].
206. See Allen Blackman, Introduction: Small Firms and the Environment, in SMALL FIRMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COLLECTIVE IMPACTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION 1, 6-9 (Allen Blackman ed., 2006).
207. See, e.g., China's "implement the large, crush the small" campaign (shangda, yaxiao). [Head of NDRC National Energy Administration: How to "Implement the Large, Crush the Small" in the Power Industry], [ECON. DAILY], Feb. 25, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-02/25/content- 5768734.htm.
208. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-01 (2011)
209. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-02 (2011)
210. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-03 (2011)
211. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-05 (2011)
212. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-06 (2011)
213. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-10 (2011)
214. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-15 (2011)
215. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-16 (2011)
216. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-17 (2011) (transcripts on file with author).
217. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-12 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
218. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-14 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
219. It is less clear how local officials motivated non-SOEs to act since the leaders of those enterprises were not under the cadre evaluation system. However, one interviewee noted that all enterprises have "original sin" - that is, existing violations that the government can use to apply pressure when necessary. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-15 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
220. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (2011)
221. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-15 (2011)
222. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2012-01 (2012) (transcripts on file with author).
223. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2012-01 (2012)
224. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-09 (2011) (transcripts on file with author).
225. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2012-04 (2012) (transcript on file with author)
226. see also Genia Kostka & William Hobbs, Energy Efficiency in China: The Local Bundling of Interests and Policies, FRANKFURT SCHOOL - WORKING PAPER SERIES (2010), http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/zbwfsfmwp/151.htm.
227. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-01 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
228. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-02 (2011)
229. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-05 (2011)
230. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-06 (2011) (transcripts on file with author).
231. Id. Media have also reported that these lists are sometimes larded with facilities that do not exist, went bankrupt, or were shut down long ago. See, e.g., [ Falsification Amidst the Retirement of Backward Enterprise Capacity], [ECON. DAILY], Mar. 22, 2012, http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2012/03/22005212547637. shtml.
232. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2012-04 (2012) (transcript on file with author).
233. See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINANCIAL ECON. 305 (1976).
234. Whiting, Cadre Evaluation, supra note 60, at 113.
235. Jonathan Watts, China's Family Planning Policy Enforced with Heavy-Handed Tactics, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/ 2011/oct/25/china-familyplanning-policy-heavy-handed?newsfeed=true.
236. Andrew Jacobs, China Investigates Company Linked to "Black Jails", N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/ world/asia/28china.html.
237. Kevin O'Brien, Neither Transgressive Nor Contained: Boundary-Spanning Contention in China, 8 MOBILIZATION 51, 60 (2003)
238. Murray Scot Tanner & Eric Green, Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control Over Policing and Obstacles to 'Rule of Law' in China, 191 CHINA Q. 644, 646-47 (2007)
239. Lily Tsai, Understanding the Falsification of Village Income Statistics, 196 CHINA Q. 805, 809 (2008)
240. Thomas Rawski, What is Happening to China's GDP Statistics?, 12 CHINA ECON. REV. 347 (2001)
241. Thomas Scharping, Hide-and-Seek: China's Elusive Population Data, 12 CHINA ECON. REV. 323 (2001).
242. See, e.g., Roland Strausz, Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship, 99 SCAND. J. ECON. 497 (1997)
243. Sandeep Baliga, Decentralization and Collusion, 83 J. ECON. THEORY 196 (1998)
244. Kouroche Vafai, Collusion and Organization Design, 72 ECONOMICA 17 (2005).
245. Interviewees suggested that the verification process could catch this sort of shirking. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2012-01 (2012)
246. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-06 (2011)
247. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (2011) (transcripts on file with author). But this leaves open the question of whether top-down verification teams have the capacity to catch all (or even a significant amount) of such problems, given staffing and time constraints. Moreover, collusion incentives suggest that verification teams might purposely overlook such problems even if they were technically able identify them.
248. For example, ambient air quality standards under the U.S. Clean Air Act ("CAA") are required for pollutants considered harmful to human health and the environment. The CAA provides various avenues for initiating review of the need for new or revised standards. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (2006).
249. [Wen Jiabao: Grab 7 Pieces of Work, Ensure the Realization of the '11th Five-Year Plan' Energy Savings, Emissions Reductions Targets], [XINHUA] , May 5, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-05/05/c-1275546.htm] [hereinafter Grab 7 Pieces]
250. Jing Li, 'Iron Hand' to Help Realize Green Goals, CHINA DAILY, May 6, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-05/06/content-9814122.htm.
251. See Grab 7 Pieces, supra note 250.
252. [Forced Power Outages Flourishing Everywhere, Five Major Unresolved Questions], [RED NET] , Nov. 11, 2010, http://hlj.rednet.cn/c/2010/11/11/ 2108956.htm.
253. Jim Bai & Tom Miles, China County Institutes Blackouts to Save Energy - Media, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 2010, http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/ idAFTOE68502L2010090.
254. Dahuan Bohai Region: Energy Savings Verification Shows "Danger" and "Success", [CHINA ECON. TIMES], Nov. 22, 2010, http://green.sohu.com/20101122/n277813330.shtml [hereinafter Dahuan Bohai].
255. Energy Reduction Policies Causes [(sic)] Unexpected Diesel Shortage in China, XINHUA, Nov. 7, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010- 11/07/c-13594922.htm.
256. Henan province is in central China. [ Investigation of the Linzhou Heating Stoppage Incident: Power Plants Can Enjoy Preferential Policies for Closing as Soon as Possible], 21 [21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD], Jan. 17, 2011, http://green.sohu.com/20110117/n278911498.shtml
257. Henan Linzhou Failed to Complete Pollution Reduction Tasks and Stopped Heating, Won't Restore This Winter], [BEIJING NEWS], Jan. 12, 2011, http://green.sohu.com/20110112/n278816841.shtml.
258. Zhejiang province is in eastern China. [ Wenzhou Emissions Reduction Faces into the Wind, Shows a "Power Outage Storm," Operate for a Day, Stop Power for 4 Days], [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], Sept. 27, 2010, http://green.sohu.com/20100927/n275286183.shtml
259. Zhejiang and Other Provinces in a Diesel Frenzy, [BEIJING NEWS], Jan. 12, 2011, http://green.sohu.com/20110112/n278830546.shtml
260. Zhejiang Energy Savings Emissions Reduction's 100 Day Spring High Energy-consuming Enterprises Take a Holiday for 15 Days [ECON. TIMES], Sept. 28, 2010, http://green.sohu.com/20100928/n275317323.shtml.
261. Shandong province is in eastern China. Dahuan Bohai, supra note 255
262. [Many Places That Failed to Complete the Energy Savings Target Instituted Forced Power Outages, Intensifying Tight Supplies of Diesel], [BEIJING NEWS], Nov. 5, 2010, http://green.sohu.com/20101105/n277171140.shtml.
263. Joe McDonald, China Suffers Diesel Shortage, Disrupting Industry, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/11/ 08/china-suffers-diesel-shortage-disrupting-industry.
264. [NDRC Issues Emergency Notice Requiring Standardized Energy Savings, Emissions Reduction Work], [XINHUA], Sept. 19, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/ 2010-09/19/content-1706054.htm
265. NDRC Issues "Emergency Notice Regarding Taking a Step Forward and Doing Well Current Energy Savings, Emissions Reduction Work," Directing Each Locale to Correctly and Properly Carry Out Energy Savings, Emissions Reduction Work, [PRC NAT'L DEV. & REFORM COMM'N] Sept. 17, 2010,://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt/t20100917-371741.htm.
266. [NDRC, Electricity Supervision Council: Energy Savings, Emissions Reduction Cannot Rely on Forced Power Outages], [BEIJING NEWS], Sept. 8, 2010, http://energy.people.com.cn/GB/12662958.html
267. Video: MIIT Expresses that Energy Savings, Emissions Reduction Work Cannot Rely on Forced Power Outages, [SINA VIDEO], Jan. 28 (2010), http://video.sina.com.cn/p/news/c/v/2010-10-28/195161169551.html.
268. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-15 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
269. The China Greentech Report 2011, at 37-39, (2011), available at http://www.china-greentech.com/report [hereinafter China Greentech]
270. China Launches Special Supervision in 15 Companiesfor Pollution Control Violations, XINHUA, Aug. 29, 2011, http://english.gov.cn/2011-08/29/content- 1935901.htm.
271. Edward S. Steinfeld et al., Greener Plants, Grayer Skies? A Report from the Front Lines of China's Energy Sector, MIT INDUS. PERFORMANCE CTR., Aug. 2008, at 30, available at web.mit.edu/ipc/publications/pdf/08-003.pdf.
272. see also China Greentech, supra note 266, at 37.
273. [Hebei Province Makes Sudden Concentrated Inspections of 61 City-Town Wastewater Treatment Plants in 11 Districts, Cities], [HEBEI DAILY] , May 25, 2010, http://www.he.xinhuanet.com/news/2010-05/25/content-19876165.htm.
274. [Fuzhou Municipal Project has Been Identified as Using Non-standard Drainage Pipes], [NEW LEGAL REPORT], Apr. 15, 2010, http://jiangxi.jxnews.com. cn/system/2010/04/15/011349990.shtml
275. Piping Network Construction Delayed, Wastewater Discharged Directly into Rivers, [ SOUTHERN METROPOLIS DAILY], Jun. 21 (2011) http://gcontent.oeeee.com/ 5/31/531a7a573b64cf81/Blog/a7b/c5fc6a.html.
276. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-04 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
277. Notice on Issuing Supervisory Monitoring Result of National Key Monitored Wastewater Treatment Plants in Violation of Discharge Standards, Public Announcement 2011, No. 71, [PRC MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT.], Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/201109/t20110929-217868.htm.
278. Personal communications with province-level monitoring officials in a southwestern province.
279. For discussion of China's data problems in the environmental and energy areas, see Dabo Guan et al., The Gigatonne Gap in China's Carbon Dioxide Inventories, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (June 10, 2012), available at http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v2/n9/full/nclimate1560.html
280. J.E. Sinton, Accuracy and Reliability of China's Energy Statistics, 12 CHINA ECON. REV. 373 (2001)
281. J.E. Sinton & D.G. Fridley, What Goes Up: Recent Trends in China's Energy Consumption, 28 ENERG. POLICY 671 (2000)
282. G. Marland, Uncertainties in Accounting for CO2 from Fossil Fuels, 12 J. INDUSTR. ECOL. 136 (2008).
283. Air Pollution Exposes Public Distrust, GLOBAL TIMES, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/682078/Air-pollution-exposes- publicdistrust.aspx.
284. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-06 (2011)
285. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (2011) (transcripts on file with author). This approach has similarities to the "self-assessed valuation" approach developed by Saul Levmore in 1982 to achieve more accurate assessments of property tax base values, tort damages, and securities valuations in the U.S.
286. See generally Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771 (1982).
287. Interviewees indicated that documents verifying operational efficiency, hours in service, energy use, and other factors were used to counter the possibility of pollution reduction credits being given for equipment installed, but not used. However, other interviewees questioned whether such a verification process could truly avoid falsification. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2012-01 (2012)
288. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-06 (2011)
289. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (2011)
290. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-01 (2011)
291. interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-02 (2011)
292. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-03 (2011) (transcripts on file with author).
293. In principle, this is analogous in some cases to the requirement for emissions offsets in the New Source Review Program under the U.S. Clean Air Act. See, e.g., THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 180-81 (Robert J. Martineu & David P. Novello eds., 2004).
294. [Has the MIIT Backward Industrial Capacity Namelist "Been Flooded?"], 21 [21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD], Aug. 8, 2010, http://green.sohu.com/20100810/n274105418.shtml.
295. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-01 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
296. Xuehua Zhang & Jeremy Schreifels, Continuous Emission Monitoring Systems at Power Plants in China: Improving SO2 Emission Measurement, 39 ENERGY POL'Y 7432, 7435 (2011).
297. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-15 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
298. See, e.g., Art. 46, [Law on Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 29, 2000, effective Sept. 1, 2000), available at http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/wp- content/uploads/2008/03/air-pollution-control-law.doc
299. Art. 70, [Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008), available at http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/ water-pollution-prevention-and-control-law.pdf.
300. Junguo Liu & Hong Yang, Letter to the Editor, China Fights Against Statistical Corruption, SCIENCE, 7 Aug., 2009, at 675-76, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/325/5941/675.
301. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-01 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
302. China Says Water Pollution Double Official Figure, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-02/10/content-9457182.htm.
303. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-01 (2011)
304. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-19 (2011) (transcripts on file with author).
305. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-01 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
306. See, e.g., Steven Q. Andrews, Seeing Through the Smog: Understanding the Limits of Chinese Air Pollution Reporting, in WILSON INT'L CTR. CHINA ENVT. SER. 2008/2009 5 (2009) [hereinafter Andrews, Seeing Through the Smog]
307. Steven Q. Andrews, Inconsistencies in Air Quality Metrics: 'Blue Sky' Days and PM10 Concentrations in Beijing, 3 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS (2008)
308. Steven Q. Andrews, Beijing's Hazardous Blue Sky, CHINA DIALOGUE, Dec. 5, 2011, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4661 [hereinafter Beijing's Hazardous Blue Sky].
309. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Officially Lifts Filter on Staggering Air Pollution Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 14, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/14/ world/china-officially-lifts-filter-onstaggering-pollution-data.html.
310. See Andrews, Seeing Through The Smog, supra note 294, at 6.
311. See Austin Ramzy, Is Beijing Manipulating Air Pollution Statistics?, TIME, Mar. 14, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1722450,00. html.
312. See My Children Have Been Poisoned: A Public Health Crisis in Four Chinese Provinces, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Jun. 15, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/node/ 99451.
313. See Kevin O'Brien, How Authoritarian Rule Works, 36 MOD. CHINA 79, 81 (2010).
314. See, e.g., Ping Jiang, China's Rule of Law in Full Retreat, CHINESE L. PROF. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china-law-prof- blog/2010/03/jiang-ping-chinas-rule-oflaw-is-in-full-retreat.html.
315. For further discussion on this issue, see generally DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF LAW VS. DEMOCRATIZATION (Suisheng Zhao ed., 2006).
316. Wei Pan, Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, in DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF LAW VS. DEMOCRATIZATION 32-40 (Suisheng Zhao ed., 2006).
317. For a book-length treatment of this theme, see PEI, supra note 134. 313 NDRC: Carbon Intensity Goals to be Met, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2011-03/07/content-22073772.htm.
318. 12TH FIVE-YEAR ENVTL. PROT. PLAN, supra note 218, § 3(1). Key industries targeted for shut-down include steel, non-ferrous metals, construction materials, chemicals, power, coal, manufacturing, and dyeing. See id.
319. see also [PRC NAT. DEVEL. & REFORM COMM.] , [INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE ADJUSTMENT GUIDANCE CATALOG] (2011), available at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/ zcfbl/2011ling/W020110520354241732397.pdf
320. Guidance Catalog of Partial Industrial Sectors Elimination of Backward Production Technology Equipment and Products, [PRC MINISTRY OF INDUS. & INFO. TECH.], available at http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n12845605/ 13528159.html.
321. 12TH FIVE-YEAR ENVTL. PROT. PLAN, supra note 218, §§ 3(2), 3(3), 7. 316 Id. § 6(3).
322. For example, at the end of 2011 (the end of the first year of the 12th five-year plan), provincial governors and heads of China's largest state-owned enterprises executed responsibility agreements setting forth plans for the 2011 to 2015 period, which stated that "a total of 1,184 sewage plants will be built in the next five years, with a combined treatment capacity of 45.7 million tons. And nitrogen oxide removal facilities [would] be installed for coal-fired power plants with a total installed capacity of 400 gigawatts." Li Calls for Green Drive to Improve Economy, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 22, 2011, http://english.sepa.gov.cn/News-service/media-news/201112/t20111222-221672.htm.
323. Lan Lan, China's Green Industries Output to Rise, CHINA DAILY, Jul. 4, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-07/04/content-15562415.htm. China's annual GDP in 2011 was roughly US$7.3 trillion, so the direct contribution of such industries to economic output will still be relatively small; however, as stated above, these environmental goals offer a multiplier effect by contributing more broadly to the party-state's overall project of rebalancing the economy, reducing reliance on energy intensive, heavily polluting industry, reducing regional wealth distribution, and limiting the economic costs of environmental pollution. See The World Bank GDP Database, available at data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries.
324. See Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 166 (1984).
325. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-19 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
326. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-15 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
327. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-07 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
328. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 220. But see Hua Wang & David Wheeler, Financial Incen- tives and Endogenous Enforcement in China's Pollution Levy System, 49 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 174 (2005) (arguing that "pollution control through financial incentives has a much greater impact on production processes than on end-of-pipe abatement").
329. 12TH FIVE-YEAR ENVTL. PROT. PLAN, supra note 218, § 8(11).
330. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2005).
331. Carl Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Instititutions, 42 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 103 (2006).
332. See, e.g., Wang, The Role of Law, supra note 104
333. Benjamin L. Liebman, A Populist Threat to China's Courts?, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011).
334. Peter Lorentzen, Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract-id=995330.
335. Richard Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Environmental Law?, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 75 (2005).
336. See, e.g., Tseming Yang & Zhang Xuehua, Public Participation in Environmental Enforcement .with Chinese Characteristics?: A Comparative Assessment of China's Environmental Complaint Mechanism (Vermont Law Sch. Faculty Working Paper No. 11-21, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1920611.
337. See, e.g., Environmental Courts and Public Interest Litigation in China, 43 CHINESE L. & GOV'T 4 (Alex Wang & Jie Gao eds.) (Nov.-Dec. 2010).
338. Highlights of Work Report of China's Supreme People's Court, XINHUA, Mar. 11, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/11/c-13773183.htm (noting 12,018 environmental pollution compensation cases, up 2.83 percent from the previous year).
339. See Alex Wang & Jie Gao, Environmental Courts and the Development of Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China, 3 J. CT. INNOVATION 37 (2010).
340. See Eight Cases that Mattered, CHINA DIALOGUE, July 26, 2011, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4429-Eight-cases-that- mattered.
341. Interview with anonymous source, no. 2011-01 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
342. See, e.g., Baogang He & Mark E. Warren, Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development, 9 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 269 (2011).