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Volumn 88, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 421-425

Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China

Author keywords

China; Incentives of local government; Relative performance evaluation

Indexed keywords


EID: 22144438661     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.003     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (433)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.