China's reaction to the color revolutions: Adaptive authoritarianism in full swing

Asian Perspective

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 5-51

  Chen, Titus C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

China; Color revolutions; Communist parties; East Asian politics

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957998610     PISSN: 02589184     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/apr.2010.0022     Document Type: Article

References (194)

1. Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," Perspective on Politics, vol. 5, No. 2 (2007), pp. 261, 269-70.
2. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy, vol. 13 (April, 2002), pp. 51-65.
3. Lucan A. Way, "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave," World Politics, vol. 57, No. 2 (2005), pp. 231-61.
4. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, No. 3 (2005), pp. 20-34.
5. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: The Emergence and Dynamics of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (unpublished ms., 2005).
6. Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 39, No. 3 (2006), pp. 387-410.
7. Lucan A. Way, "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions," Journal of Democracy, vol. 19, No. 3 (July, 2008), pp. 55-69.
8. Lucan A. Way, "A Reply to My Critics," Journal of Democracy, vol. 20, No. 1 (2009), pp. 90-97.
9. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 38.
10. Yongding, "China's Color-Coded Crackdown," Yale Global, October 18, 2005, online at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-color-codedcrackdown.
11. Paul Mooney, "How to Deal with NGOs: Part I, China," Yale Global, August 1, 2006, at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/howdeal-ngos-%E2%80%93-part-i-china.
12. Jeanne L. Wilson, "Color Revolutions: The View from Moscow and Beijing," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 25, No. 2 (2009), p. 372.
13. Defining the precise relationship between China's establishment intellectuals and the interests of the party leadership is challenging. Simply examining scholarly work in publicly available sources does not necessarily determine whether it was the interpretations and policy recommendations of establishment scholars that influenced the policy preferences of national power holders, or if it was the policy parameters and ideological guidelines set by top policy makers that conditioned the situation definitions and policy prescriptions submitted by establishment scholars. My intention here is to suggest that attention be drawn to the significance of this symbiotic, if asymmetric, relationship between the party-state and intellectuals in China.
14. The party regime coopted and domesticated scholars by dictating the distribution of academic-professional goods, such as professorships, fellowships, national research grants, periodic work evaluations, and publication licences and permits. By official censorship and pervasive self-censorship, the party-state was able to assure the compatibility, if not uniformity, of scholarly publication with the party line, especially on sensitive issues such as the Color Revolutions. It then follows that what eventually appeared in the Chinese academic press (such as core journals) on the Color Revolutions may be understood as scholarly discourses that reflected and were consistent with the party-state's convictions about order and stability.
15. Mark Blyth, "Powering, Puzzling, or Persuading? The Mechanisms of Building Institutional Orders," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 51, No. 4 (2007), pp. 763-64.
16. Wesley W. Widmaier, "Constructing Foreign Policy Crises: Interpretive Leadership in the Cold War and War on Terrorism," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 51, No. 4 (2007), p. 780.
17. Huasheng Zhao, "Yuan Sulian diqu 'yanse geming' langchao de chengyin fenxi" (Analyzing the Causes of the "Color Revolutions" in the Former USSR Areas), Guoji guancha (International Observation), No. 3 (2005), pp. 1-8.
18. See also Wang Cunkui, "Zhongya diqu 'yanse geming' de xingzhi yu yuanyin tanjiu" (Examining the Nature and Causes of the "Color Revolutions" in Central Asia), Guoji guanxi xueyuan xuebao (Journal of the University of International Relations), No. 4 (2006), pp. 67-71.
19. Ru Yanxia and Ren Zhongping, "'Yanse geming' gei Zhongguo gongchandang jianquan zhizheng hefaxing de qishi" (Lessons of the "Color Revolutions" for Improving the Legitimacy of Rule by the Chinese Communist Party), Neijiang shifan xuebao (Journal of Neijiang Teachers College), vol. 21, No. 1 (2006), pp. 34-5.
20. Wang Dongying, "Zhengtan budaoweng bei jietou zhengzhi zhuchu zhengtan" (A Political Tumbler Was Expelled by Street Politics), in Liu Ming, ed., Jietou zhengzhi yu "yanse geming" (Street Politics and the "Color Revolutions") (Beijing: Zhongguo chuanmei daxue chubanshe, 2006), pp. 162-63.
21. Zhao, "Yuan sulian diqu 'yanse geming' langchao de chengyin fenxi," pp. 3-4.
22. Min Qinqin, "'Yujinxiang geming' ganpaole Ji zongtong" (The "Tulip Revolution" Forced Out the Kyrgyzstani President), in Liu Ming, ed., Jietou zhengzhi, pp. 184-85.
23. Pan Zhiping and Shi Lan, "Jirjisi: 'yanse geming' de dishan" (Kyrgyzstan: Evolution of the "Color Revolutions"), in Pan Zhiping, ed., "Yanse geming" xiji xia de zhongya (Central Asia Under Assault of the "Color Revolutions") (Urumqi: Xingjiang renmin chubanshe, 2006), pp. 53-55.
24. Zhao Huasheng, "Yuan Sulian diqu," p. 6.
25. See also Li Silin, "Guanyu 'yanse geming' de fansi" (Reflections on the "Color Revolutions"), Yunnan xingzheng xueyuan xuebao (Journal of Yunnan Academy of Public Administration), No. 6 (2006), pp. 123-24.
26. Ji Jun, "Jingji zhuangui yu 'yanse geming'" (Economic Transition and the "Color Revolutions"), Shichang jingji zongheng (Market Economy), No. 3 (2006), pp. 21-22.
27. Dong Yuqun and Yu Min, "'Yanse geming' jingshi he jianchi shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan jiben jingji zhidu xueshu yanyao hui shuyao" (Summary of Seminar on Warnings of the "Color Revolution" and Adherence to the Basic Economic Institution of the Primary Stage of Socialism), Gaoxiao lilun zhanqian (University Theory Frontline), October 2005, pp. 62-63.
28. Ji Jun, "Jingji zhuangui yu 'yanse geming'," p. 21.
29. Ma Zhenchao and Zhou Liang, "Zhuanxing qi woguo zhengzhi anquan mianlin de weixie yu tiaozhan" (Threats and Challenges that Confront Our Country's Political Security During Transition), Xinxiang shifan gaodeng zhuanke xuexiao yuanbao (Journal of Xinxiang Teachers College), No. 1 (2007), pp. 35-37.
30. Establishment scholars endorsed the party-sanctioned ideological revisionism that defines China's current developmental status as the primary stage of socialism. While the primary stage tolerated private sectors and market forces for the sake of uplifting overall productivity and facilitating socioeconomic transition toward the final stage of communism, the fundamental socialist order-the public ownership of major productive forces and the "people's democratic dictatorship"-should never be forsaken.
31. See Dong and Yu, "'Yanse geming' jingshi," p. 63.
32. Zhu Nianfeng and Wang Qunying, "Zhuanjia xuezhe yantao 'yanse geming', 'jietou zhengzhi' ji Meiguo xihua, fenhua Zhongguo zhanlue" (Experts and Scholars Discussed the "Color Revolutions," "Street Politics," and the U.S. Strategy of Westernizing and Dividing China), Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian (University Theory Frontline), June 2005, pp. 63-64.
33. Ru and Ren, "'Yanse geming' gei Zhongguo gongchandang," pp. 35-37.
34. Ma and Zhou, "Zhuanxing qi woguo zhengzhi anquan," pp. 35-36.
35. Ji, "Jingji zhuangui yu 'yanse geming'," p. 20.
36. Zhu and Wang, "Zhuanjia xuezhe yantao 'yanse geming'," pp. 63-64.
37. Ru and Ren, "'Yanse geming' gei Zhongguo gongchandang," p. 36.
38. Zhu and Wang, "Zhuanjia xuezhe yantao 'yanse geming,'" pp. 63-64.
39. Li, "Sudong jubian he 'yanse geming,'" p. 46.
40. Kuang Xiaoyang and Liu Yu, "'Yanse geming,' Meiguo de minzhu zhanlue, Duice" ("'Color Revolutions,' the U.S. Democracy Strategy, and Our Policy"), Yangzhou daxue xuebao (Journal of Yangzhou University) No. 3 (2006), p. 27.
41. Ru and Ren, "'Yansse geming' gei Zhongguo gongchandang," pp. 35-37.
42. Ma and Zhou, "Zhuanxing qi woguo zhengzhi anquan," p. 36.
43. Hongchao Liu, "Jietou zhengzhi yu 'yanse geming' jiexi" (Analyzing Street Politics and the "Color Revolutions"), in Liu Ming, ed., Jietou zhengzhi yu "yanse geming," p. 8.
44. Zhang Zhongyun, "Jietou zhengzhi yu zhengquan gengdie" (Street Politics and Regime Change).
45. Ma Yuezhou, "Milosevic zai jietou zhengzhi mianqian fanchuan luoma" (Street Politics Dislodged Milosevic).
46. Wang, "Zhengtan budaoweng," p. 164.
47. Zhang Chongfang, "Yushchenko kao jietou zhengzhi fanpan chenggong" (Yushchenko Rebounded by Street Politics), in Liu Ming, ed., Jietou zhengzhi yu "yanse geming," pp. 171-72.
48. Liu, "Jietou zhengzhi yu 'yanse geming' jiexi," pp. 11-13.
49. Zhang, "Jietou zhengzhi yu zhengquan gengdie," pp. 33-34.
50. Zhang, "Yushchenko kao jietou zhengzhi," pp. 168-9.
51. Li Fusheng, "Sudong jubian he 'yanse geming' dui dang de xianjinxing jianshe de qishi" (Seismic Political Changes in the Former USSR Areas and Eastern Europe, the "Color Revolutions," and the CCP's Advanced-Nature Campaigns), Wenshi buolan (Culture Zhang, "Yushchenko kao jietou zhengzhi," p. 177.
52. Liu, "Jietou zhengzhi yu 'yanse geming' jiexi," pp. 16-17.
53. Ma, "Milosevic zai jietou zhengzhi mianqian fanchuan luoma," pp. 156-60. 29.
54. Wang, "Zhengtan budaoweng," pp. 164-65.
55. Zhang, "Yushchenko kao jietou zhengzhi," pp. 175-7.
56. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena," pp. 261-68.
57. Joshua A. Tucker, "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Color Revolutions," Perspectives on Politics, vol. 5, No. 3 (2007), pp. 539-43.
58. Li, "Sudong jubian he 'yanse geming'," p. 45.
59. Zhu and Wang, "Zhuanjia xuezhe yantao," p. 64.
60. The Four Cardinal Principles refer to the Chinese party-state's adherence to the socialist road, the proletarian dictatorship, the leadership of the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.
61. Ma and Zhang, "Xifang chuanmei zai sudong jubian," pp. 326-35.
62. Tang Xiuzhe, "Gorbachev shiqi de jietou zhengzhi" (Street Politics during the Gorbachev Era), in Liu Ming, ed., Jietou zhengzhi yu "yanse geming," pp. 120-28.
63. Wen Youren, "Rangchu yulun zhendi jishi diushi zhengquan de kaishi" (Giving Away the Position of Public Opinion Signifies the Beginning of Losing Power).
64. Liu Ming and Ma Yuezhou, "Dazhong chuanmei yu zhengquan gengdie" (Mass Media and Regime Change), in Liu Ming, ed., Jietou zhengzhi yu "yanse geming," pp. 292-93.
65. Among numerous sources, see Liu Jianfei, "Cong 'yanse geming' kan Meiguo de minzhu tuijin zhanlue" (From the "Color Revolutions" Analyzing the U.S. Strategy of Democracy Promotion), Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu luntan (China Forum for Party Cadres) August 2005, pp. 42-43.
66. Sun Zhuangzhi, "Meiguo zai Dulianti guojia tuidong 'yanse geming' de zhuyao celue he zuofa" (Tactics and Approaches Employed by the United States to Promote the "Color Revolutions" in the CIS States).
67. Zhao Huasheng, "'Yanse geming' hou Ouya diqu xingshi de bianhua" (Eurasia after the Color Revolutions), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Mondern International Relations), No. 11 (2005), pp. 31-33.
68. Jin Biao, "Shixi Zhongya 'yanse geming' zhong waiguo feizhengfu zuzhi de zuoyong" (A Preliminary Analysis of the Functions of Foreign NGOs in the "Color Revolutions" in Central Asia), Feiyingli zuzhi yanjiu (Non-Profit Organization Studies), No. 4 (2008), pp. 7-11.
69. Ji, "Jingji zhuangui yu 'yanse geming'," p. 22.
70. Li, "Guanyu 'yanse geming' de fansi," p. 124.
71. Zhang, "Jietou zhengzhi yu zhengquan gengdie," pp. 34-35.
72. See also Sun Lingyun, "'Yanse geming' yu guoji guanxi zhuanti yantaohui" (Seminar on the "Color Revolutions" and International Relations), Guoji guancha (International Observation), No. 3 (2005), pp. 15-19.
73. I appreciate Edward Friedman's insightful comments, indicating that the U.S. strategic imperatives on energy security and global terrorism also were among China's strategic pursuits.
74. See the speech of Huasheng Zhao during a special forum held in Shanghai in April 2005, in Sun, "'Yanse geming' yu guoji guanxi zhuanti yantao hui," pp. 18-19.
75. Qian Wenrong, "Feizhengfu zuzhi," pp. 48-51.
76. Among other sources see Pan Rulong and Dai Zhengqin, "'Yanse geming' yu guoji feizhengfu zuzhi" ("Color Revolutions" and International NGOs), Dianzi keji daxue xuebao (Journal of UESTC), December 2005, pp. 78-79.
77. He Zhilong and Zhao Xinggan, "Zhongya 'yanse geming' de genyuan jiqi dui Zhongguo de yingxiang" ("Color Revolutions" in Central Asia and Their Implications for China), Shanxi qingnian ganbu guanli xueyuan xuebao (Journal of Shanxi Academy of Administration for Junior Cadres), No. 2 (2005), p. 47.
78. Those U.S.-based NGOs that were frequently marked out by Chinese scholars as colluding with the U.S. government's hegemonic strategy are the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Ford Foundation, the Eurasia Foundation, the Soros Foundation, and the Open Society Institute (OSI).
79. Kuang Xiaoyang and Liu Yu, "'Yanse geming,' Meiguo de minzhu zhanlue, Duice," pp. 24-25.
80. Pan, "Meiguo de 'dazhanlue'," pp. 34-35.
81. Liu, "Jietou zhengzhi yu 'yanse geming' jiexi," pp. 19-21.
82. Zhang, "Jietou zhengzhi yu zhengquan gengdie," pp. 35-36.
83. Ma, "Milosevic zai jietou zhengzhi," pp. 155-57.
84. Among the many sources, see Liu and Ma, "Dazhong chuanmei yu zhengquan gengdie," pp. 288-89, 291-92.
85. Zhang Zhongyun, "Dazhong chuanmei shi Sulian jieti he zhengquan gengdie de cuihuaji" (Mass Media Catalyzed Soviet Dissolution and Regime Change), in Liu Ming, ed., Jietou zhengzhi yu "yanse geming," pp. 298-300.
86. Liu, "Jietou zhengzhi yu 'yanse geming' jiexi," p. 17.
87. Kuang and Liu, "'Yanse geming,' Meiguo de minzhu zhanglue, Duice," pp. 24-26.
88. Liu, "Jietou zhengzhi yu 'yanse geming' jiexi," p. 17.
89. Ma, "Milosevic zai jietou zhengzhi," p. 158.
90. Pan and Shi, "Jirjisi: 'yanse geming' de dishan," pp. 45-49.
91. Pan and Xu, "Feizhengfu zuzhi yu dulianti guojia de 'yanse geming,'" p. 203.
92. Ding Zhitao, "Andijan shijian de lailong qumai" (The Andijan Incident), in Liu Ming, ed., Jietou zhengzhi yu "yanse geming," pp. 217-23.
93. Zhao Xuebo, "Kazakhstan dui 'yanse geming' shuo 'bu'" (Kazakhstan Said "No" to "Color Revolution").
94. Wan Chengcai, "Eluosi ruhe duifu 'yanse geming'" (How Did Russia Deal with the "Color Revolutions").
95. In fact, a majority of the journal articles and book chapters cited in this article appeared either in tandem with or a little while after the Chinese government adopted the "counter-revolution" measures.
96. Lucan A. Way, "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave," pp. 232-23.
97. Levitsky and Way, "Competitive Authoritarianism," p. 4.
98. Levitsky and Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," pp. 52-54.
99. Way and Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War," pp. 389-97.
100. Levitsky and Way, "Competitive Authoritarianism," p. 49.
101. Lucan A. Way, "The Real Causes of Color Revolutions," pp. 59-62.
102. On rising urban unemployment, see Merle Goldman, From Comrade to Citizen: Struggle for Political Rights in China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), chap. 8.
103. On official corruption, see Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), chaps. 3-4.
104. On China's fragmented authoritarianism manifested in various governing sectors, read Kenneth Lieberthal, "Introduction: The 'Fragmented Authoritarianism' Models and its Limitations," in Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992).
105. Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
106. Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), chaps. 2 and 4.
107. Dorothy J. Solinger, "Path Dependency Reexamined: Chinese Welfare Policy in the Transition to Unemployment," Comparative Politics, vol. 30, No. 1 (2005), pp. 83-96.
108. See, for example, Kevin O'Brien and Li Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
109. Dorothy J. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 61-71.
110. Jae Ho Chung, "Assessing the Odds Against the Mandate of Heaven: Do the Numbers (on Instability) Really Matter?," in Chung, ed., Charting China's Future: Political, Social, and International Dimensions (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. 107-28.
111. Albert Keidel, China's Social Unrest: The Story Behind the Stories (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
112. Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
113. Yongshun Cai, "Civil Resistance and Rule of Law in China: the Defense of Homeowners' Rights," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, eds., Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 174-95.
114. Ching Kwan Lee, "Is Labor a Political Force in China?," in Perry and Goldman, eds., Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China, pp. 228-52.
115. Murray Scott Tanner, "China Rethinks Unrest," Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, No. 3 (2004), pp. 137-56.
116. Zhou Zhongwei, Quntingxing Shijian ji Chuzhi (Managing Mass Incidents) (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chuban she, 2006).
117. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), chap. 2.
118. Xinhua News Agency, September 19, 2004, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-09/19/content_1995366.htm.
119. "Chinese Party Document Vows to Uphold Marxism, Retain Control of Media," Xinhua News Agency, LexisNexis Academic, September 26, 2004.
120. "Chinese Communist Party Launches Advanced-Nature Education Drive," Xinhua News Agency, LexisNexis Academic, October 22, 2004, (accessed May 7, 2008).
121. Lin Chufang, "30 wan dangyuan sixiang dadiaocha zhendong zhongyang" (Ideology Survey on 300,000 Party Members Shook Up the Party Center), Liaowang Dongfang Weekly, November 23, 2004, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xjxjy/753416.htm (accessed February 16, 2009).
122. In fact, the Advanced-Nature Campaign originated from the disturbing findings of a national inspection conducted in 2000 that surveyed the state of political values of 300,000 party cadres. This unprecedented survey exposed disquieting signs of party atrophy: individualism, materialism, ignorance of ideology, eroding party discipline, decaying basic-level party organization, and growing alienation between the party and society.
123. The CCP Central Organization Department (CCPCDC) in late 2000 proposed an intra-party ideological campaign to promote the "Three Representations" thinking, which was approved by the top leadership.
124. In January 2003, the CCPCDC carried out pilot projects of the Advanced-Nature Campaign at seven state agencies and twelve provincial and municipal government units. 52,000 party cells and 1.03 million party cadres participated in these experimental projects that laid the groundwork for the following nationwide campaign.
125. "'Baochi dangyuan xianjinxing jiaoyu' huodong de lailong qumai" (On the Genesis of the "Advanced-Nature Education" Drive) Xinxi Daokan, January 11, 2005, www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xjxjy/753458.htm.
126. Jiang Zemin's "Three Representations" thinking refers to the discourse that the Chinese Communist Party, in order to continue its rule, must strive to represent: China's advanced productive forces, China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. Jiang proposed the Three Representations in May 2000.
127. At the 16th CCP Congress in November 2002 the Three Representations was incorporated into the CCP Constitution and became one of the party's authoritative political guidelines.
128. "Introduction and Development of the 'Three Representations' as an Important Thinking," Xinhua News Agency, July 1, 2003, at www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/xcrc/xgc/xxzl/200307010864.htm.
129. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zai quandang zhankai yi shijian 'sange daibiao' zhongyao sixiang wei zhuyao neirong de baochi gongchandangyuan xianjinxing jiaoyu huodong de yijian" (Circular of CCP Center on Carrying out Campaign Activities of Retaining the Advanced Nature of Communist Party Members, Based upon Practicing the Important Thinking of the "Three Representations" as the Major Content), Xinhua News Agency, November 7, 2004, at www.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/751762.htm.
130. Li Fusheng, "Sudong jubian he 'yanse geming.'".
131. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era, pp. 34-42, 108-27.
132. For instance Yu Yunyao, the vice chancellor of the Central Party School and an influential socialist theorist, faulted what he labelled as the Bush administration's unilateralist and expansionist foreign policy for creating a sense of uncertainty and instability in international relations.
133. Yu, "Wei shenma yao jiaqiang dangde zhizheng nengli jianshe?" Banyue Tan, September 2004, at www.southcn.com/nflr/llzhuanti/zznl/zhizzl/200409270425.htm.
134. "Hu Warns against Aping Western Politics," Straits Times (Singapore), LexisNexis Academic, September 24, 2004.
135. David Shambaugh, China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), pp. 129-31.
136. Wei Xiao and Shiyu Lin, "Quanguo zhengfa xitong zhuanti yantao ban jiti guankan yanse geming jingshi lu" (Members of All-Nation Study Workshop of Political and Legal Affairs Systems Watched Warnings of Color Revolutions), Jiancha ribao (Prosecution Daily), CNKI, June 20, 2008.
137. Wei Xu, "Yanmi fangfan yanli daji gezhong dianfu pohuai huodong" (Preventing and Striking Harshly on All Kinds of Subversive and Disruptive Acts), Fazhi ribao (Legal Daily), CNKI, June 20, 2008.
138. Can Xu, "Baochi gaodu jingjue weihu changzhi jiuan" (Maintaining High Alert, Sustaining Order and Security), Renmin gongan bao (People's Public Security Daily), CNKI, June 20, 2008.
139. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2005 (Washington, D.C.: CECC, October), 2005, p. 60.
140. CECC, Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2006 (Washington, D.C.: CECC, September), 2006, pp. 30-31.
141. On the one hand, the MOCA functions as a clearinghouse and administrator of national NPO registry. The Ministry's Bureau of Civil Organization Administration holds the power to review and (dis)approve the application of NPO registration, to issue the non-profit, tax-exempt license to NGOs, to carry out annual inspection on legally registered NPOs, and to renew or revoke the license, 1999.
142. On the other hand, in order to register and obtain the NPO license, an NGO must secure the professional sponsorship of another bureaucracy whose administrative specialty relates to the said NGO's agenda. This bureaucracy monitors and supervises the NGO's daily operations, and reviews the NGO's annual report prepared for license renewal by the MOCA, 1999.
143. Interview with a professor of law of Wuhan University, Wuhan, China, September 28, 2007; interview with a lawyer affiliated with a major regional legal aid NGO, Wuhan, China, September 29, 2007.
144. Liu Yiyi, "NGOs in China: Development Dynamics and Challenges," Zheng Yongnian and Joseph Fewsmith, eds., The Non-State Sector and Governance For an updated discussion of Chinese government's NGO policies, read also, (London: Routledge), 2008, pp. 90-93.
145. Wilson, "Color Revolutions: The View from Moscow and Beijing,", 1999, pp. 374-75.
146. Liu, "NGOs in China,", 1999, pp. 92-3.
147. Ironically, slack law enforcement created a breathing space for relatively independent civil society to grow and spread, especially among the urban population. Liberal intellectuals, critical youth, rights-defending lawyers, and public interest advocates adroitly employed various communicative approaches (such as the Internet and cell phones) to disseminate their agendas and mobilize concerned citizens into informal interest groups.
148. In 2005 the MOCA approved registration licenses of 319,762 existing civil organizations (minjian zuzhi), an umbrella category that consisted of 171,150 social organizations (shehui tuanti), 975 foundations (jijin hui), and 147,437 private non-profit organizations (minban feiqiye). National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2006, at www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata.
149. Yongding, "China's Color-Coded Crackdown.".
150. All China Lawyers Association (ACLA), "Zhonghua quanguo lushi xiehui guanyu lushi banli quntixing anjian zhidao yijian" (ACLA Directive Concerning Lawyers Handling Mass Incident Cases), at www.acla.org.cn/pages/2006-5-15/s34852.html.
151. Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2006, p. 34.
152. The other major case was the forced closure of the Chinese Development Brief by the Beijing public security bureau in July 2007.
153. The reputable newsletter had operated since 1995 and provided reliable information of China's social-economic development and public policy to foreign aid community in China.
154. Joseph Kahn, "China Shut Down Western-Run Newsletter," New York Times, July 11, 2007, online ed.
155. Dui Hua Foundation, "More Official Statistics Point to Increasing Crackdown on Political Dissent in China," December 3, 2007, at www.duihua.org/2007/12/more-official-statistics-point-to.html.
156. National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1994-2008), at www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/#.
157. Dui Hua Foundation, "More Official Statistics.".
158. Joshua Rosenzweig, "Increased Rate of Political Arrests in China is Troubling," JURIST, November 30, 2007, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hotline/2007/11/increased-rate-of-political-arrests-in.php/.
159. Yongding, "China's Color-Coded Crackdown.".
160. Paul Mooney, "How to Deal with NGOs.".
161. Yongding, "China's Color-Coded Crackdown"; interview with a senior research fellow of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, September 20, 2007; interview with three program officers of a major U.S.-headquartered NGO, Beijing, China, September 20, 2007; interview with a former official of the U.S. embassy in China, Beijing, China, September 7, 2007.
162. Interviews with a senior manager of a major U.S.-headquartered NGO, Hong Kong, August 28, 2007; interview with a professor of law of Hong Kong University who managed legal aid projects in China, Hong Kong, August 31, 2007.
163. The tightened supervision over foreign NGOs and foundations since 2004 was confirmed as well during an interview with a senior research fellow of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, September 20, 2007.
164. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena," p. 269.
165. Tucker, "Enough!" p. 541.
166. Wilson, "Color Revolutions," pp. 380-81.
167. The fear that the West might instigate a "Color Revolution" in China is exemplified by two news reports.
168. See Wang, "'Yanse geming' cedongzhe yinmou Zhongguo" (Instigators of the "Color Revolutions" Conspired Against China), at www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=124328.
169. Shen Benqiu and Ni Shixiong, "Meiguo jieru Xianggang 'yiguo liangzhi' de xianzhuang yu qushi" (The State of Affairs and Trend of the U.S. Intervention in Hong Kong's "One Country, Two Systems" Policy), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Modern International Relations), No. 11 (2008).
170. Zhao Huasheng, "'Yanse geming' hou Ouya diqu xingshi de bianhua," pp. 31-32.
171. Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" (remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York City, September 21, 2005), at www.ncuscr.org/recent-remarksand-speeches.
172. Hak Yin Li and Yongnian Zheng, "Re-interpreting China's Non-Intervention Policy towards Myanmar: Leverage, Interest, and Intervention," Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 18, No. 61 (2009), pp. 630-33.
173. Quentin Peel, "China Tested by Unstable Neighbour," Financial Times, September 27, 2007.
174. Morton Abramowitz and Jonathan Kolieb, "Why China Won't Save Darfur," Foreign Policy, June 2007, at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3847.
175. Tan Banyue, "Huajie Darfur wenti de Zhongguo yuansu" (The China Factor in the Solution for the Darfur Problem), Xinhua News Agency, June 25, 2007, online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-06/25/content_6287115.htm.
176. Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: the Private Sector in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007).
177. Marc Lanteigne, "The Developmentalism/Globalization Conundrum in Chinese Governance," in Andre Laliberte and Marc Lanteigne, eds., The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century: Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 162-83.
178. Beissinger, Mark R. "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," Perspective on Politics, vol. 5, No. 2 (June, 2007), pp. 259-76.
179. Blyth, Mark. "Powering, Puzzling, or Persuading? The Mechanisms of Building Institutional Orders," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 51, No. 4 (September, 2007), pp. 761-77.
180. Bunce, Valerie J. and Sharon L. Wolchik. "International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 39, No. 3 (2006), pp. 283-304.
181. Diamant, Neil J., Stanley B. Lubman, and Kevin J. OBrien, eds. Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005.
182. Laliberte, Andre and Marc Lanteigne, eds. The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century: Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy. London: Routledge, 2008.
183. Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe 2006.
184. Liu, Ming, ed. Jietou zhengzhi yu "yanse geming" (Street Politics and the "Color Revolutions"). Beijing: Zhongguo chuanmei daxue chubanshe, 2006.
185. O'Brien, Kevin and Li Lianjiang. Rightful Resistance in Rural China. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
186. Peerenboom, Randall. China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
187. Perry, Elizabeth J. and Merle Goldman, eds. Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007.
188. Shambaugh, David. China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008.
189. Solinger, Dorothy J. Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999.
190. Tanner, Murray Scott and Eric Green. "Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control over Policing and Obstacles to 'Rule of Law' in China," China Quarterly, No. 191 (September, 2007), pp. 644-70.
191. Tucker, Joshua A. "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Color Revolutions," Perspectives on Politics, vol. 5, No. 3 (September, 2007), pp. 535-51.
192. Way, Lucan A. "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave," World Politics, vol. 57, No. 2 (January, 2005), pp. 231-61.
193. Way, Lucan A. and Steven Levitsky. "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 39, No. 3 (2006), pp. 387-410.
194. Wilson, Jeanne L. "Color Revolutions: The View from Moscow and Beijing," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 25, No. 2 (June-September, 2009), pp. 369-95.