Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size

Experimental Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 4-14

  Nosenzo, Daniele ^a   Quercia, Simone ^a   Sefton, Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Group size; Voluntary contribution mechanism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886990925     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: 15736938     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-013-9382-8     Document Type: Article

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