Thinking things and feeling things: On an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 703-725

  Phelan, Mark ^a   Arico, Adam ^b   Nichols, Shaun ^b  

^a LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective intentionality; Experimental philosophy; Group minds; Linguistic pragmatics; Methodology; Phenomenal consciousness; Philosophy of sociology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84889247073     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-012-9278-7     Document Type: Article

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