Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 387-401

  Clinton, Joshua D ^a   Lewis, David E ^a   Selin, Jennifer L ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84885511253     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12066     Document Type: Article

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