Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: The effect of accountability

Theory and Decision

Volumn 75, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 497-517

  Lefebvre, Mathieu ^a   Vieider, Ferdinand M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIÈGE   (Belgium)

^b WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

Accountability; Executive compensation; Incentives; Risk taking; Stock options

Indexed keywords

ACCOUNTABILITY; EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES; RISK TAKING; STOCK OPTIONS;

DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS; DECISION THEORY;

SHAREHOLDERS;

EID: 84884701991     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: 15737187     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9335-2     Document Type: Article

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