Open versus closed loop capacity equilibria in electricity markets under perfect and oligopolistic competition

Mathematical Programming

Volumn 140, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 295-322

  Wogrin, S ^a   Hobbs, B F ^b   Ralph, D ^c   Centeno, E ^a   Barquin J ^a  

^a Universidad Pontificia Comillas   (Spain)

^b The Johns Hopkins University   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Capacity pre commitment; Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC); Generation expansion planning; Noncooperative games

Indexed keywords

CAPACITY PRE-COMMITMENT; EQUILIBRIUM CONSTRAINT; EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM WITH EQUILIBRIUM CONSTRAINT (EPEC); GENERATION EXPANSION PLANNING; INTENSITY OF COMPETITION; LIBERALIZED ELECTRICITY MARKET; NONCOOPERATIVE GAME; OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION;

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS (INFORMATION THEORY); COMPETITION; COSTS; INDUSTRY; INVESTMENTS; PROFITABILITY;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84883598541     PISSN: 00255610     EISSN: 14364646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10107-013-0696-2     Document Type: Article

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