Oligopolistic competition in power networks: A conjectured supply function approach

IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 597-607

  Day, Christopher J ^b   Hobbs, Benjamin F ^a,c   Pang, Jong Shi ^d  

^a IEEE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c The Johns Hopkins University   (United States)

^d JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Complementarity; Electricity competition; Electricity generation; Market models; Strategic pricing; Supply function models

Indexed keywords

CONJECTURED SUPPLY FUNCTION; OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; POWER MARKET; PRICE ELASTICITY; STRATEGIC PRICING; SUPPLY FUNCTION MODEL;

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; ELECTRIC GENERATORS; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; ELECTRIC LOAD FLOW; ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION; ELECTRIC RATES; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION NETWORKS;

EID: 0036699873     PISSN: 08858950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2002.800900     Document Type: Article

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