Withholding investments in energy only markets: Can contracts make a difference?

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 159-179

  Murphy, Frederic ^a   Smeers, Yves ^b  

^a TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Contracts; Energy only markets; Profits; Withholding investments

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864434664     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-012-9184-5     Document Type: Article

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