Transaction costs and environmental markets: The role of entrepreneurs

Review of Environmental Economics and Policy

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 259-275

  Anderson, Terry L ^a   Parkery, Dominic P ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENTREPRENEUR; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; TRANSACTION COST;

EID: 84880655496     PISSN: 17506816     EISSN: 17506824     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/reep/ret011     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. Allen, Douglas W. 1991. What are transaction costs? Research in Law and Economics 14: 1-18.
2. Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill. 1975. The evolution of property rights: A study of the American West. Journal of Law and Economics 18 (1): 163-79.
3. Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill. 2004. The not so wild, wild West: Property rights on the frontier. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
4. Anderson, Terry L., and Donald Leal. 2001. Free market environmentalism. Rev. ed. New York: Palgrave.
5. Anderson, Terry L., and Ronald N. Johnson. 1986. The problem of instream flow. Economic Inquiry 24 (4): 535-54.
6. Anderson, Terry L., Brandon Scarborough, and Lawrence R. Watson. 2012. Tapping water markets. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future Press.
7. Banzhaf, H. Spencer, Timothy Fitzgerald, and Kurt Schnier. 2013. Non-regulatory approaches to the environment: Coasean and Pigouvian perspectives. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 7 (2): 238-58.
8. Barzel, Yoram. 1987. The entrepreneur's reward for self-policing. Economic Inquiry 25 (1): 103-16.
9. Barzel, Yoram. 1997. An economic analysis of property rights. New York: Cambridge University Press.
10. Baumol, William J. 1992. Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive. Journal of Political Economy 98 (5): 893-921.
11. Boyd, James, Kathryn Cabellero, and R. David Simpson. 2000. The law and economics of habitat conservation: Lessons from an analysis of easement acquisitions. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 19 (January): 209-55.
12. Child, Brian. 2004. Building the campfire paradigm: Helping villagers protect African wildlife. PERC Reports 22 (2): Summer.
13. Coase, Ronald N. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica 4 (16): 386-405.
14. Coase, Ronald N. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44.
15. Costello, Christopher, Steven Gaines, and John Lynham. 2008. Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science 321 (5896): 1678-81.
16. Deacon, Robert T., and Dominic P. Parker. 2009. Encumbering harvest rights to protect marine environments: A model of marine conservation easements. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 53: 37-58.
17. Demsetz, Harold. 1967. The evolution of property rights. American Economic Review 57: 347-59.
18. Dennen, Taylor R. 1976. Cattlemen's associations and property rights in land in the American West. Explorations in Economic History 13 (4): 423-36.
19. Ellickson, Robert C. 1989. A hypothesis of wealthmaximizing norms: Evidence from the whaling industry. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5 (1): 83-97.
20. Elmendorf, Christopher S. 2004. Securing ecological investments on other people's land: A transaction-cost perspective. Natural Resources Journal 44 (2): 529-61.
21. Ferraro, Paul J. 2008. Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services. Ecological Economics 65 (4): 810-21.
22. Fletcher, Robert. 1960. Free grass to fences: The Montana cattle range story. Helena, MT: Historical Society of Montana.
23. Grainger, Corbett, and Dominic P. Parker. Forthcoming. The political economy of fishery reform. Annual Review of Resource Economics.
24. Haddock, David D. 2004. When are environment amenities policy-relevant? Natural Resources Journal 44 (2): 383-424.
25. Haddock, David D. 2008. Why individuals provide public goods. In Accounting for mother nature: Changing demands for her bounty, ed. Terry L. Anderson, Laura E. Huggins, and Thomas Michael Power. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
26. Hornbeck, Richard. 2010. Barbed wire: Property rights and agricultural development. Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (2): 767-810.
27. Kaffine, Daniel. 2009. Quality and the commons: The surf gangs of California. Journal of Law and Economics 52 (4): 727-43.
28. Kotchen, Matthew J. 2013. Voluntary-and information-based approaches to environmental management: A public economics perspective. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 7 (2): 276-95.
29. La Croix, Sumner J. 1992. Property rights and institutional change during Australia's gold rush. Explorations in Economic History 67 (2): 257-52.
30. Libecap, Gary D. 1981. Bureaucratic opposition to the assignment of property rights: Overgrazing on the western range. Journal of Economic History 41 (1): 151-58.
31. Libecap, Gary D. 2007. The assignment of property rights on the western frontier: Lesson for contemporary environmental and resource policy. Journal of Economic History 67 (2): 227-52.
32. Libecap, Gary D., and Dean Lueck. 2011. The demarcation of land and role of coordinating property institutions. Journal of Political Economy 119 (3): 426-67.
33. Libecap, Gary D., and Steven N. Wiggins. 1984. Contractual responses to the common pool: Prorationing of crude oil production. American Economic Review 74 (1): 87-98.
34. Lindsay, C. M., and William R. Dougan. 2012. Efficiency in the provision of pure public goods by private citizens (May 2012). Public Choice, doi: 10.1007/s11127-012-9942-z.
35. Lueck, Dean. 2002. The extermination and conservation of the American bison. Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2): 609-52.
36. Medema, Steven G. 2009. The hesitant hand: Taming self-interest in the history of economic ideas. Princeton University Press.
37. North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press.
38. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39. Parker, Dominic P. 2004. Land trusts and the choice to conserve land with full ownership or conservation easements. Natural Resources Journal 44 (2): 483-518.
40. Parker, Dominic P., and Walter N. Thurman. 2011. Crowding out open space: The effects of federal land programs on private land trust conservation. Land Economics 87 (2): 202-22.
41. Pigou, A. C. 1912. Wealth and welfare. London: Macmillan.
42. Pigou, A. C. 1932. The economics of welfare. 4th ed. London: Macmillan.
43. Rowley, Charles K., Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds. 1988. The Political Economy of Rent Seeking. Boston,MA: Kluwer Academic Publishing.
44. Salzman, James E. 2010. Designing payments for ecosystem services. PERC Policy Series No. 48. Bozeman, MT: Property and Environment Research Center.
45. Samuelson, Paul A. 1954. The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 36 (4): 387-89.
46. Scarborough, Brandon. 2010. Environmental water markets: Restoring streams through trade. PERC Policy Series 46.
47. Scarborough, Brandon, and Hertha Lund. 2007. Saving our streams: Harnessing water markets. Bozeman, MT: PERC.
48. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1934. The theory of economic development. Leipzig; Duncker and Humblot, 1912. English ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
49. Spulber, Daniel. 2009. The theory of the firm: Microeconomics with endogenous entrepreneurs, firms, markets, and organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
50. Stavins, Robert N. 1998. What can we learn from the grand policy experiment? Lessons from SO2 allowance trading. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (3): 69-88.
51. Stigler, George. 1988. Memoirs of an unregulated economist. New York: Basic Books.
52. Taylor, M. Scott. 2011. Buffalo hunt: International trade and the virtual extinction of the North American bison. American Economic Review 101: 3162-95.
53. Umbeck, John. 1977. The California gold rush: A study of emerging property rights. Explorations of Economic History 14: 197-226.
54. Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Macmillan.