Efficiency in the provision of pure public goods by private citizens

Public Choice

Volumn 156, Issue 1-2, 2013, Pages 31-43

  Lindsay, C M ^a   Dougan, William R ^a  

^a CLEMSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Non cooperation; Public goods; Voluntary providing group size; Voluntary provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878944893     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9942-z     Document Type: Article

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