Nonregulatory approaches to the environment: Coasean and pigouvian perspectives

Review of Environmental Economics and Policy

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 238-258

  Banzhaf, H Spencer ^a,b,c   Fitzgeraldy, Timothy ^d   Schnier, Kurt ^a,c  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c Property and Environment Research Center   (United States)

^d MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; PROPERTY RIGHTS; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 84880650355     PISSN: 17506816     EISSN: 17506824     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/reep/ret013     Document Type: Article

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