Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

Journal of Financial Markets

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 526-549

  García, Diego ^a   Urošević, Branko ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE   (Serbia)

^c National Cancer Center of Serbia   (Serbia)

Author keywords

Information acquisition; Markets for information; Multi asset markets; Partially revealing competitive equilibria; Share auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880582415     PISSN: 13864181     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2012.07.003     Document Type: Article

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