The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 371-392

  Jackson, Matthew O ^a   Kremer, Ilan ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Allocations; Asymptotic analysis; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842606461     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.002     Document Type: Article

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