Information acquisition and research differentiation prior to an open-bid auction

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 18, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 723-746

  Moresi, Serge ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

D44; D82; Information acquisition; Open auction; Research differentiation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034422855     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00043-5     Document Type: Article

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