Adverse Selection and Security Design

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 287-300

  Rahi, Rohit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000526390     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297853     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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