A theoretical and empirical investigation of property rights sharing in outsourced research, development, and engineering relationships

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 34, Issue 9, 2013, Pages 1065-1085

  Carson, Stephen J ^a   John, George ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^c KING ABDULAZIZ UNIVERSITY   (Saudi Arabia)

Author keywords

bargaining; governance; incomplete contracting; outsourced RD E; property rights

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION; ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY; GOVERNANCE; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING; OUTSOURCED RESEARCH; PROJECT EXECUTION; PROPERTY RIGHT;

ECONOMICS; FORECASTING;

CONTRACTORS;

EID: 84880332436     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2053     Document Type: Article

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