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Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 211-220

Composable and efficient mechanisms

Author keywords

Composition; Efficiency; Mechanisms; Smoothness

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM; BUDGET CONSTRAINT; FULL INFORMATIONS; HIGH QUALITY; MARKET CLEARING PRICE; MECHANISM DESIGN; SMOOTHNESS; VICKREY AUCTION;

EID: 84879803107     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2488608.2488635     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (221)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.