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Volumn 95, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 590-605

Conservation auctions: Should information about environmental benefits be made public?

Author keywords

Agri environmental policy; Conservation auctions; Conservation contracting; Information asymmetry; Multidimensional bid scoring

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; MICROECONOMICS;

EID: 84879751637     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: 14678276     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aas120     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (25)

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