Special interests versus the public interest in policy determination

The Political Economy of Agricultural Price Distortions

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 105-125

  Rausser, Gordon C ^a   Roland, Gérard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84879670701     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778964.006     Document Type: Chapter

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