A Strawsonian look at desert

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 133-152

  Roskies, Adina L ^a   Malle, Bertram F ^b  

^a Dartmouth College   (United States)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

blame; desert; determinism; folk concepts; free will; responsibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879630704     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2013.787439     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Baiasu, S. 2006. The normative pluralism of desert. Journal of Political Philosophy, 14: 226-37. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00248.x)
2. Chisholm, R. M. 1964. Human freedom and the self. The Lindley lecture, Lawrence, KS: Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas.
3. Clarke, R. 2009. Dispositions, abilities to act, and free will: The new dispositionalism. Mind, 118: 323-51. (doi:10.1093/mind/fzp034)
4. Fara, M. 2008. Masked abilities and compatibilism. Mind, 117: 843-65. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzn078 (doi:10.1093/mind/fzn078)
5. Feinberg, J. 1970. " Justice and personal desert ". In Doing and deserving: Essays in the theory of responsibility, 55-94. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
6. Feldman, F. 1995. Desert: Reconsideration of some received wisdom. Mind, 104: 63-77. (doi:10.1093/mind/104.413.63)
7. Feldman, F. 1996. Responsibility as a condition for desert. Mind, 105: 165-8. (doi:10.1093/mind/105.417.165)
8. Fincham, F. D., and, Bradbury, T. N. 1992. Assessing attributions in marriage: The relationship attribution measure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62: 457-68. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.62.3.457
9. Fincham, F. D., and, Jaspars, J. M. 1980. Attribution of responsibility: From man the scientist to man as lawyer. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 13: 81-138. (doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60131-8)
10. Freiman, C., and, Nichols, S. 2011. Is desert in the details?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82: 121-33. (doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00387. x)
11. Gailey, J. A., and, Falk, R. F. 2008. Attribution of responsibility as a multidimensional concept. Sociological Spectrum, 28: 659-80. doi: 10.1080/02732170802342958
12. Guglielmo, S., Monroe, A. E., and, Malle, B. F. 2009. At the heart of morality lies folk psychology. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 52: 449-66.
13. Hamilton, V. L. 1986. Chains of command: Responsibility attribution in hierarchies. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 16: 118-38. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1986.tb02283.x
14. Hart, H. L.A. 1968. Punishment and responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.
15. van Inwagen, P. 1986. An essay on free will, New York: Oxford University Press.
16. Kane, R. 1999. Responsibility, luck, and chance: Reflections on free will and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy, 96: 217-40. (doi:10.2307/2564666)
17. Kershnar, S. 2008. Desert tracks character alone. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22: 71-88. (doi:10.5840/ijap20082216)
18. Kleinig, J. 1971. The concept of desert. American Philosophical Quarterly, 8: 71-8.
19. Malle, B. F. 2008. " The fundamental tools, and possibly universals, of social cognition ". In Handbook of motivation and cognition across cultures, Edited by: Sorrentino, R. M. and Yamaguchi, S. 267-96. New York: Elsevier/Academic Press.
20. Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., and, Monroe, A. E. 2012. " Moral, cognitive, and social: The nature of blame ". In Social thinking and interpersonal behaviour, Edited by: Forgas, J., Fiedler, K. and Sedikides, C. 313-31. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
21. McLeod, O. 2008. Desert. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/desert/%3E
22. Miller, D. 1976. Social justice, Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
23. Monroe, A.E., K.D. Dillon, and B.F. Malle. 2013. Developing a model of the folk concept of free will and its impact on moral judgment. Paper presented at the symposium on big questions in Free Will, Jan. 13, 2013, in Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
24. Monroe, A. E., and, Malle, B. F. 2010. From uncaused will to conscious choice: The need to study, not speculate about, people's folk concept of free will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 211-24. (doi:10.1007/s13164-009- 0010-7)
25. Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., and, Turner, J. 2006. Is incompatibilism intuitive?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 28-53. (doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x)
26. Nichols, S., and, Knobe, J. 2007. Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions. Nous, 41: 663-85. (doi:10.1111/j.1468- 0068.2007.00666.x)
27. O'Connor, T. 2003. " Agent causation ". In Free will, 2, Edited by: Watson, G. 257-84. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28. Oshana, M. 2001. " Responsibility: Philosophical aspects ". In International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences, Edited by: Smelser, N. J. and Baltes, P. B. 13279-83. Oxford: Pergamon.
29. Parfit, D. 2011. On what matters, New York: Oxford University Press.
30. Pereboom, D. 2001. Living without free will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31. Quigley, B. M., and, Tedeschi, J. T. 1996. Mediating effects of blame attributions on feelings of anger. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22: 1280-8. doi: 10.1177/01461672962212008
32. Roskies, A. L., and, Nichols, S. 2008. Bringing moral responsibility down to earth. Journal of Philosophy, 105: 371-88.
33. Sadurski, W. 1985. Giving desert its due: Social justice and legal theory, Dordrecht: Reidel.
34. Scanlon, T. M. 2010. Moral dimensions: Permissibility, meaning, blame, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
35. Sher, G. 1989. Desert, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
36. Shultz, T. R., Schleifer, M., and, Altman, I. 1981. Judgments of causation, responsibility, and punishment in cases of harm-doing. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 13: 238-53. doi: 10.1037/h0081183
37. Sie, M. 2005. Justifying blame: Why free will matters and why it does not, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
38. Smith, M. 2003. " Rational capacities, or: How to distinguish recklessness, weakness, and compulsion ". In Weakness of will and practical irrationality, Edited by: Stroud, S. and Tappolet, C. 17-38. New York: Clarendon Press.
39. Sousa, P. 2009. A cognitive approach to moral responsibility: The case of a failed attempt to kill. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 9: 171-94. doi: 10.1163/156770909×12489459066183
40. Stillman, T. F., Baumeister, R. F., and, Mele, A. R. 2011. Free will in everyday life: Autobiographical accounts of free and unfree actions. Philosophical Psychology, 24: 381-94. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.556607
41. Strawson, G. 1986. Freedom and belief, Oxford: Clarendon.
42. Strawson, G. 1994. The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 75: 5-24. (doi:10.1007/BF00989879)
43. Strawson, G. 2008. " Free agents ". In Real Materialism and Other Essays, 359-386. New York: Oxford University Press.
44. Strawson, P. F. 1993. " Freedom and resentment ". In Perspectives on moral responsibility, Edited by: Fischer, J. M. and Ravizza, M. 45-66. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
45. Vilhauer, B. 2009. Free will skepticism and personhood as a desert base. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 39: 489-512. (doi:10.1353/cjp.0.0052)
46. Wallace, R. J. 1998. Responsibility and the moral sentiments, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.