Creating truth-telling incentives with the Bayesian truth serum

Journal of Marketing Research

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 289-302

  Weaver, Ray ^a   Prelec, Drazen ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian inference; Contingent valuation method; False consensus effect; Survey design; Truth telling incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879220362     PISSN: 00222437     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1509/jmr.09.0039     Document Type: Article

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