Interpreting initiatives

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 97, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 1621-1653

  Gilbert, Michael D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878940351     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (93)

1. See Rachel Weiner, Issue 2 Falls, Ohio Collective Bargaining Law Re-pealed, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2011, 9:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/the-fix/post/issue-2-falls-ohio-collective-bargaining-law-repealed/2011/ 11/08/gIQAyZ0U3M-blog.html.
2. See Catherine Candisky, Health-Care Mandate Liberty or Lawsuit 'Orgy'? Issue 3 Debaters Differ, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 2011, at 1A
3. Jim Provance, Obama Health Care Opponents File Petitions in Co-lumbus, TOLEDO BLADE, July 6, 2011, http://www.toledoblade.com/State/2011/07/06/Obama- healthcare-opponents-file-petitions-in-Columbus.html.
4. OHIO SEC. OF STATE, ISSUE 3: PROPOSED BALLOT INITIATIVE (2009), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/ballotboard/2011/3-language.pdf
5. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. 2011).
6. See Andy Kroll, The Ohio Tea Party's Big "Obamacare" Fail, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 3, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/ 11/ohio-issue-3-obamacare-tea-party
7. OHIO SEC. OF STATE, VOTE YES ON ISSUE 3 (2011), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/ballotboard/2011/3-argument-for.pdf.
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
9. See Press Release, Innovation Ohio, IO Report: Why Conservatives Should Oppose Issue 3 (Oct. 26, 2011), http://innovationohio.org/press/io-report-why- conservatives-should-oppose-issue-3.
10. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN ET AL., INNOVATION OHIO, BAD MEDICINE: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF OHIO'S ISSUE 3, at 3-4 (Sept. 1, 2011), http://69.195.124.74/ ~innovby5/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/IOReport-BadMedicine-0901.pdf;
11. See Election 2011 Preview, BALLOTWATCH (Initiative & Referendum Inst., L.A., Cal.), Oct. 2011, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202011- 1%20Preview.pdf.
12. 17 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, The Right of the People to Rule, in THE WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 151, 152 (Hermann Hagedorn ed., 1926).
13. See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bar-gains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992)
14. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 22-40 (2009)
15. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent:" Interpretive Dilem-mas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).
16. See, e.g., Sean Pager, Is Busing Preferential? An Interpretive Analysis of Proposition 209, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 12 (1999)
17. Glenn C. Smith, Solving the "Initiatory Construction" Puzzle (and Improving Direct Democracy) by Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor In-tent, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 261 (2007)
18. But see Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons from the Drug Treatment Initia-tives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 283 (2003)
19. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 357-69 (2005)
20. Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclo-sure Plus", 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1145-46, 1151-54, 1157-59 (2003)
21. Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 296-99 (2005) (same);
22. http://www.sos.wa.gov/office/news-releases.aspx
23. See Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An Assessment of Proposals to Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 487, 497 (1998)
24. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 16 (1997)
25. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
26. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
27. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 921 (1995)
28. See People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 753 (Cal. 1985).
29. 583 P.2d 1318, 1329 (Cal. 1978)
30. (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719.
31. See Skinner, 704 P.2d at 754.
32. Chris Chambers Goodman, Examining "Voter Intent" Behind Proposi-tion 209: Why Recruitment, Retention, and Scholarship Privileges Should Be Permissible Under Article I, Section 31, 27 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 59, 72 (2008).
33. Cathy R. Silak, The People Act, the Courts React: A Proposed Model for Interpreting Ini-tiatives in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 4 (1996)
34. Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Can-ons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 488-89 n.67.
35. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 433-35 (2003);
36. Ethan J. Leib, Interpreting Statutes Passed Through Referen-dums, 7 ELECTION L.J. 49, 49-51 (2008)
37. Evan C. Johnson, Comment, People v. Floyd: An Argument Against Intentionalist Interpretation of Voter Initiatives, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 981, 983 (2005).
38. See generally D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, Interpreting the Products of Direct Democracy, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 223, 224 (2009).
39. See Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748, 2766-68 (2005);
40. See also Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democra-cy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 35 (1997)
41. Stephen Salvucci, Note, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: The Interpretation of Initiatives in California, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 884 (1998).
42. John Copeland Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 535, 536;
43. J.W. SULLIVAN, DIRECT LEGISLATION BY THE CITIZENSHIP THROUGH THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 7 (1892).
44. See RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PRO-CESS IN AMERICA 28 (2002)
45. WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN, THE PEOPLE'S LAW 10 (1914).
46. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 45 (1989).
47. See generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 101-70, 361-63 (2000)
48. Robert Cooter, Consti-tutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy Versus Median Democracy, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 7 (2002).
49. For the germinal analysis, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965);
50. See also Michael D. Gilbert, Single Sub-ject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 831-36 (2006)
51. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 100 (1982).
52. See, e.g., GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON 329 (2011)
53. Gerald H. Kramer, Some Procedural As-pects of Majority Rule, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 264, 268 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977)
54. Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 994-95 (1989)
55. For an accessible discussion with cites to the original work, see KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALI-TY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 49-102 (1997).
56. For a discussion, see Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, A Problem with Referendums, 12 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 6-8, 10-16 (2000).
57. See PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 162 (1986).
58. See Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 961 (2005)
59. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democ-racy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 704-12 (2010).
60. See Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence From Single Subject Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 345-46 (2011)
61. See, e.g., DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 100-21 (1984)
62. See also Craig M. Burnett et al., The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 307, 312-17 (2010)
63. See, e.g., SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 18 (1998)
64. David Fleischer, Prop. 8 by the Numbers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A15
65. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETA-TION 226 (2d ed. 2006)
66. See, e.g., Outfitter Props., L.L.C. v. Wildlife Conservation Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 316 (Cal. App. 2012)
67. People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d. 752 (Cal.1985).
68. Dan Morain, Court Rewrites Insanity Defense Rule: Prosecution, De-fense Advocates Both Praise Return to Earlier Standard, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1985, at 3.
69. E.g., Judicial Retention Elections, IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.iowacourts.gov/Public-Information/About-Judges/Retention/(last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
70. See, e.g., Judicial Appointments, OFF. OF GOVERNOR MARK DAYTON, http://mn.gov/governor/appointments/judicial-appointments/
71. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 53-54, 59-72 (2003)
72. See, for example, Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explana-tions for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 215 & n.185 (1993)
73. Or they might pay close attention. See, e.g., Gregory A. Huber & San-ford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004)
74. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1513 (1990);
75. See also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1978)
76. State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 181 P. 920, 922 (Wash. 1919).
77. See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993)
78. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
79. See Michael D. Gilbert & Joshua M. Levine, Less Can Be More: Con-flicting Ballot Proposals and the Highest Vote Rule, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 383 (2009)
80. In re Interrogatories Propounded by the Senate Concerning House Bill 1078, 536 P.2d 308, 314 (Colo. 1975).
81. See generally Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democra-cy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17 (2006).
82. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
83. See Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 532 (Mich. 2008).
84. See Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc., 748 N.W.2d at 547-48 (Kelly, J., dissent-ing)
85. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judi-ciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 696-97 (1995)
86. See Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independ-ence and Social Welfare, 112 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract-id=1885104.
87. See, e.g., Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 245 (1997)
88. See also Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial Re-view of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 239 (1999)
89. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Ju-dicial Review of Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373, 375-76 (1996)
90. Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initia-tives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733, 739 (1994)
91. Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 52, 58.
92. See Philip Hager, Kaus Urges Reelection of Embattled Court Justices, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1986, at 3.
93. John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the Single Subject Rule, 9 ELECTION L.J. 399, 401 (2010)