Output sharing in partnerships as a common pool resource management instrument

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 697-711

  Schott, Stephan ^a   Buckley, Neil J ^b   Mestelman, Stuart ^c   Muller, R Andrew ^c  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c MCMASTER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Collective action; Common pool resources; Experimental economics; Natural resource management; Partners and strangers

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; COMMON POOL RESOURCES; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT;

NATURAL RESOURCES;

COLLECTIVE ACTION; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; INCENTIVE; NATURAL RESOURCE; PARTNERSHIP APPROACH; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; RESOURCE USE;

EID: 34447548570     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9062-7     Document Type: Article

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