The Political Economy of Clientelism*

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 115, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 260-291

  Robinson, James A ^a   Verdier, Thierry ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Income redistribution; Political competition; Public policy

Indexed keywords

CLIENTELISM; EMPLOYMENT; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 84876081095     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12010     Document Type: Article

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