Regret minimization for reserve prices in second-price auctions

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 1190-1204

  Cesa Bianchi, Nicolò ^a   Gentile, Claudio ^b   Mansour, Yishay ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILAN   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF INSUBRIA   (Italy)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COSTS; STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS;

ARBITRARY DISTRIBUTION; COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT; REGRET MINIMIZATION; RESERVE PRICE; SECOND-PRICE AUCTION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84876049382     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973105.86     Document Type: Conference Paper

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