Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: A field experiment

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 59-

  Ostrovsky, Michael ^a   Schwarz, Michael ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

ad auctions; auction design; field experiments; market design; mechanism design; online advertising; optimal auctions; reserve prices; sponsored search

Indexed keywords

AD AUCTIONS; AUCTION DESIGN; FIELD EXPERIMENT; MARKET DESIGN; MECHANISM DESIGN; ONLINE ADVERTISING; OPTIMAL AUCTION; RESERVE PRICE; SPONSORED SEARCHES;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; EXPERIMENTS; MACHINE DESIGN; MARKETING; OPTIMIZATION;

COSTS;

EID: 79959630230     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993574.1993585     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (7)

1. Brown, J., and J. Morgan (2009), "How Much Is a Dollar Worth? Tipping Versus Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites," Journal of Political Economy, 117.
2. Edelman, B., M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz (2007), "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," American Economic Review, 97.
3. Myerson, R. (1981), "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, 6.
4. Reiley, D. (2006), "Field Experiments on the Effects of Reserve Prices in Auctions: More Magic on the Internet." RAND Journal of Economics, 37.
5. Riley, J., and W. Samuelson (1981), "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, 71.
6. Varian, H. (2007), "Position Auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25.
7. Walsh, W., D. Parkes, T. Sandholm, and C. Boutillier (2008), "Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-World Auctions with Market Disruptions," Proceedings of the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.