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Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2007, Pages

Optimal design of english auctions with discrete bid levels

Author keywords

Discrete bids; English auction; Optimal auction design

Indexed keywords

CANONICAL AUCTION PROTOCOLS; DISCRETE BID LEVELS; ONLINE AUCTIONS;

EID: 34250178068     PISSN: 15335399     EISSN: 15576051     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1239971.1239976     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (30)

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