Evidentiary instructions and the jury as other

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 407-456

  Sklansky, David Alan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 84875603932     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (365)

1. Travison v. Jones, 522 F. Supp. 666, 670 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); see also, e.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) ("Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions.").
2. The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264, 267 (1966)
3. Noting the common argument "that limiting instructions are one of the expressions of trust that American jurisprudence places in the jury system".
4. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted), quoted in, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968), and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388 n.15 (1964); see also, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 267 (observing that "many learned jurists and scholars... entertain no doubt that limiting instructions are useless").
5. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1987).
6. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1491-1492 (2007).
7. Note, supra note 1, at 267.
8. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 12-13, 56 (2008) (italics omitted).
9. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 453.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he law recognizes a strong presumption that juries follow limiting instructions."). Trial judges, who actually administer evidentiary instructions, may have more faith than lawyers or appellate judges in their efficacy.
11. Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. &' SOC. PROBS. 215, 218 (1968). 8.
12. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
13. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 184 (1930).
14. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.); see also, e.g., United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J.) (casting doubt on the effectiveness of limiting instructions).
15. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d 1041, 1056 n.19 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Taveras, 584 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); People v. Rivera, 661 N.E.2d 429, 434 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Higham, 865 A.2d 1040, 1046 (R.I. 2004); Abbott v. State, 196 S.W.3d 334, 349 n.6 (Tex. App. 2006); State v. White, 678 S.E.2d 33, 40 n.6 (W. Va. 2009).
16. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1144-1145 (2001).
17. Craig R. Callen, Rationality and Relevancy: Conditional Relevancy and Constrained Resources, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243, 1276 n.160.
18. Elizabeth M. DiPardo, Note, Caught in a Web of Lies: Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements to Impeach Witnesses Before the ICTY, 31 B.C. INT'L &' COMP. L. REV. 277, 297 &' nn.162-163 (2008).
19. Paul Varnado, Note, Books as Weapons: Reading Materials and Unfairly Prejudicial Character Evidence, 31 WASH. U. J.L. &' POL'Y 257, 272 &' n.71 (2009).
20. Roselle L. Wissler &' Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
21. Joel D. Lieberman &' Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &' L. 677, 677 (2000).
22. Concluding from empirical research that limiting instructions are at best "relatively ineffective" and may actually backfire.
23. Another of Learned Hand's descriptions. See United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (Hand, J.), aff'd, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), overruled by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
24. Smith, supra note 4, at 1450-1452.
25. Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1933) (noting that, even with a limiting instruction, "[t]he reverberating clang" of wrongly admitted hearsay "would drown all weaker sounds").
26. Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1976).
27. Dunn, 307 F.2d at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Note, supra note 1, at 267; see also, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1968) ("A jury cannot 'segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes.'" (quoting People v. Aranda, 407 P.2d 265, 271-72 (Cal. 1965) (en banc))).
29. John C. Reinard &' Rodney A. Reynolds, The Effects of Inadmissible Testimony Objections and Rulings on Jury Decisions, 15 J. AM. FORENSIC ASS'N 91, 91 (1978).
30. "[F]ew are willing to deny the commonly accepted dictum that it is impossible for an individual to 'forget' something which has been comprehended. Hence, it would be difficult to believe that jurors could disregard testimony once heard.".
31. Mirjan Damaška, Free Proof and Its Detractors, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 352 (1995).
32. Suggesting that rules of evidentiary exclusion often "ring... hollow in bench trials" because of "the apparent difficulty for any person-lay or professional-to 'unbite' the apple of knowledge".
33. An analogy drawn repeatedly by Judge Frank. See United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 865 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 656 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting). Frank attributed the illustration to "the story, by Mark Twain, of the boy told to stand in the corner and not think of a white elephant." Antonelli Fireworks, 155 F.2d at 656; see also Leviton, 193 F.2d at 865. But as far as I can tell Twain wrote no such story. Frank appears to have conflated Twain's short story, The Stolen White Elephant, with an anecdote related by Tolstoy, about a game invented by his older brother. The game required one "to stand in a corner and not to think of a white bear"; Tolstoy recalled trying to do so, "but without success." PAUL BIRUKOFF, THE LIFE OF TOLSTOY 15 (trans., Cassell &' Co. 1911). Twain's story has nothing to do with a boy standing in a corner or anyone trying to suppress an idea.
34. MARK TWAIN, The Stolen White Elephant, in THE COMPLETE SHORT STORIES OF MARK TWAIN 199 (Charles Neider ed., 1957).
35. Today, the impossibility of intentionally blocking a thought is often illustrated by appealing to the difficulty of following a direction not to think of an elephant, or an elephant of a particular color, but it is hard to say whether this particular trope predates Frank or was accidentally originated by him.
36. GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE 3 (2004).
37. Linda J. Demaine, In Search of an Anti-Elephant: Confronting the Human Inability to Forget Inadmissible Evidence, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 105 (2008).
38. Reid Hastie et al., INSIDE THE JURY 22-23 (1983).
39. Nancy Pennington &' Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 192-203 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
40. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 560-561 (2004).
41. Demaine, supra note 21, at 133 n.96.
42. Paula L. Hannaford et al., The Timing of Opinion Formation by Jurors in Civil Cases: An Empirical Examination, 67 TENN. L. REV. 627, 630 (2000).
43. Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 737 &' n.18.
44. D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and "Legitimate Moral Force": Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 440-442 &' n.96 (1998).
45. Simon, supra note 22, at 563-565.
46. Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants' Post-Crime State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 975, 980-82 (2008).
47. Michael S. Pardo, Comment, Juridical Proof, Evidence, and Pragmatic Meaning: Toward Evidentiary Holism, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 399, 404-406 (2000).
48. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187-89 (1997).
49. Richard O. Lempert, Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries, and a Supreme Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 19 (2002).
50. Risinger, supra note 23, at 454-457.
51. Swift, supra note 23, at 984-985.
52. Pardo, supra note 23, at 406-409.
53. Simon, supra note 22, at 518, 522.
54. Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 559 (1991).
55. Shari Seidman Diamond &' Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW &' SOC'Y REV. 513, 520 (1992).
56. "[I]nformation-processing models that focus on attribution and the search for coherent stories may explain jurors' inability to use the information in the prescribed limited fashion.".
57. Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 469, 488 (2006)
58. "It can be argued that once a coherent story has been generated..., instructions to disregard elements of that story may have little impact. Additionally, the more inferences that emerge from a given piece of evidence, the more difficult it will be to negate that effect." (citations omitted).
59. Hastie et al., supra note 22, at 231.
60. Lieberman &' Arndt, supra note 13, at 703.
61. Aviva Orenstein, Honoring Margaret Berger with a Sensible Idea: Insisting that Judges Employ a Balancing Test Before Admitting the Accused's Convictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1291, 1304 n.50 (2010).
62. David A. Sonenshein &' Robin Nilon, Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful Convictions: Let's Give Science a Chance, 89 OR. L. REV. 263, 290 (2010).
63. J. Alexander Tanford, Thinking About Elephants: Admonitions, Empirical Research and Legal Policy, 60 UMKC L. REV. 645, 646 (1992).
64. Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 34, 34 (1994).
65. Regarding the empirical support for this intuition, see infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
66. Or maybe not. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 142 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) ("It is a common experience of all men to be informed of 'facts' relevant to an issue requiring their judgment, and yet to disregard those 'facts' because of sufficient grounds for discrediting their veracity or the reliability of their source.").
67. 378 U.S. 368, 388-89 (1964).
68. 391 U.S. at 137 (majority opinion).
69. David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 18.
70. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the "Grotesque" Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741, 741-43 (2008).
71. Simon, supra note 22, at 568.
72. Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1242-1246 (2001)
73. For a helpful summary of this research and a thoughtful discussion of its implications for evidentiary instructions, see Demaine, supra note 21. On debiasing and jury decisionmaking more generally, see Simon, supra note 22, at 543-44, 548-49, 569-74.
74. FRANK, supra note 9, at 184.
75. Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 248-49 (1976)
76. Calling evidentiary instructions "talismans".
77. John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621 (2010).
78. Sanchirico, supra note 34, at 1259-1264.
79. Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 495, 497, 506 (1987).
80. For a skeptical assessment of this rationale.
81. Dan M. Kahan, The Economics- Conventional, Behavioral, and Political-of "Subsequent Remedial Measures" Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1616 (2010).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2320-21 (2011) (discussing the purposes of the attorney-client privilege); Swidler &' Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (same).
83. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981); accord Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393).
84. Leubsdorf, supra note 37, at 1656-1661.
85. William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW &' SOC. INQUIRY 243, 280-281 (1998).
86. Pennington &' Hastie, supra note 22, at 192-203.
87. Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 604-605 (1994).
88. John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1087 n.115 (2007).
89. Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models of Juror Decision Processes, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 84, 84 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
90. Pennington &' Hastie, supra note 22, at 213-217.
91. Simon, supra note 22, at 559-564.
92. Simon, supra note 22, at 518, 522.
93. Lempert, supra note 25, at 559
94. Suggesting that if jurors "try to make sense of the evidence they receive by fitting it to some story pattern," they are also likely to give special weight to "the evidence that best fits [their] preferred story" and to discount or disregard contradictory evidence.
95. See sources cited supra note 23. The "relative plausibility theory" developed by Ron Allen, and the set of arguments that Dan Simon has advanced about "coherence-based reasoning" in jury trials, are both versions of the story model in this looser sense, although both depart in certain ways from the ideas of Hastie and Pennington-largely by downplaying the importance of narrative structure and giving relatively greater emphasis to the claim that jurors assess evidence holistically rather than atomistically.
96. Allen, supra note 45
97. Simon, supra note 22.
98. Pennington &' Hastie, supra note 22, at 203-217.
99. Simon, supra note 22, at 511-513, 562.
100. It can be important to distinguish the story model, which is a descriptive theory of jury decisionmaking, from the philosophical or normative claim that narratives are, at bottom, what trials are really about-that stories are not loose, roundabout ways of getting at the truth, but are themselves the best or only kind of truth we can access. On this broader claim-less common today than fifteen years ago.
101. Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 61 (Peter Brooks &' Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
102. Diamond &' Casper, supra note 26, at 519-520.
103. Steblay et al., supra note 26, at 488.
104. Much as judges or advocates need to select the facts pertinent to a dispute before arguing for a legal outcome.
105. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 593 (1981).
106. Diamond &' Casper, supra note 26, at 519.
107. Suggesting that instructions to disregard may be futile because "the encoding and recall of other information are affected by the very testimony that the juror is supposed to ignore".
108. Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?: The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1269 (2005).
109. Explaining that "[t]he rapid integration of information into a coherent story" creates hindsight bias, making it difficult for juries to disregard their knowledge of an outcome in assessing previous events.
110. Simon, supra note 22, at 551-553.
111. Discussing evidence that jurors process evidence during the trial, before the judge's legal instructions.
112. Allen, supra note 45, at 629-630.
113. Blume et al., supra note 45, at 1088.
114. Paul H. Robinson &' Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1141 (2005).
115. Swift, supra note 23, at 981-982.
116. Jessica L. Bregant, Note, Let's Give Them Something to Talk About: An Empirical Evaluation of Predeliberation Discussions, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1213, 1226-1227.
117. Pennington &' Hastie, supra note 22, at 203-217.
118. Simon, supra note 22, at 520-549.
119. Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281 (2013).
120. Dan Simon is careful to note that "coherence effects have their limits," and that "[c]oherence shifts are mediated by task-specific factors"-for example, the ambiguity of the evidence, and whether jurors are explicitly asked to "take some time to seriously consider the possibility that the opposite side has a better case." Simon, supra note 22, at 544, 548 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Hastie et al., supra note 22, at 231.
122. Michael T. Nietzel et al., Juries: The Current State of the Empirical Literature, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 23, 33-34 (Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 1999).
123. Gavin Phillipson, Trial by Media: The Betrayal of the First Amendment's Purpose, 71 LAW &' CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 25-27 (2008).
124. DiPardo, supra note 12, at 297.
125. Varnado, supra note 12, at 272-273.
126. Sources cited supra note 13. There are far fewer studies of the ability of judges to disregard inadmissible evidence.
127. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 188-189 (2006).
128. Wistrich et al., supra note 51, at 1270.
129. I have excluded studies of the effects of judicial admonitions that do not instruct juries to disregard evidence or to limit its use but instead simply warn them that it may be unreliable or that it should be treated with caution.
130. Eugene Borgida, Legal Reform of Rape Laws, 2 APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. ANN. 211, 228-231 (1981).
131. Reporting that mock jurors were more likely to vote for conviction in a rape trial if cautioned about the use of evidence of complainant's past sexual history.
132. Ann Cavoukian &' Ronald J. Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 117, 121, 130-131 (1980).
133. Finding that mock jurors gave less weight to polygraph evidence if they received a judicial warning that polygraphs were only 80% accurate and that jurors should be cautious when weighing the evidence.
134. Richard J. Harris, The Effect of Jury Size and Judge's Instructions on Memory for Pragmatic Implications from Courtroom Testimony, 11 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 129, 129 (1978).
135. Finding no significant effect of a judicial instruction "about the pitfalls of interpreting implied information as if it were asserted fact"). I have also excluded studies that involved mock jurors instructed to disregard evidence but did not test for, or draw conclusions about, the effect of those instructions.
136. Eugene Borgida &' Roger Park, The Entrapment Defense: Juror Comprehension and Decision Making, 12 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 19, 19 (1988).
137. Testing combined effect of limiting instruction and alternative substantive instructions on entrapment.
138. Gregory E. Lenehan &' Patrick O'Neill, Reactance and Conflict as Determinants of Judgment in a Mock Jury Experiment, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 231, 231 (1981).
139. Testing the combined effect of evidentiary rulings and biased judicial comments.
140. Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959).
141. F. Gerald Kline &' Paul H. Jess, Prejudicial Publicity: Its Effect on Law School Mock Juries, 43 JOURNALISM Q. 113, 114-115 (1966).
142. Rita James Simon, Murder, Juries, and the Press, TRANS-ACTION, May-June 1966, at 40, 41-42.
143. A.N. Doob &' H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 95 (1972).
144. W.R. Cornish &' A.P. Sealy, Juries and the Rules of Evidence: L.S.E. Jury Project, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208, 222.
145. Stanley Sue et al., Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 351 (1973).
146. Valerie P. Hans &' Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 240, 251 (1976).
147. Sharon Wolf &' David A. Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205, 216 (1977).
148. Reinard &' Reynolds, supra note 20, at 101, 105-107.
149. William C. Thompson et al., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY &' SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 460 (1981).
150. Sarah Tanford &' Steven Penrod, Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with Multiple Offenses, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 465 (1982).
151. Carol M. Werner et al., Conviction Proneness and the Authoritarian Juror: Inability to Disregard Information or Attitudinal Bias?, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 629 (1982).
152. Hastie et al., supra note 22, at 231.
153. But the researchers cautioned that "it would be unwise to generalize from these observations to actual jury behavior," because "experimental juries may be abnormally well-behaved when dealing with the inadmissibility issue while under observation by social scientists," and because "research has repeatedly shown that jurors do not or cannot disregard biasing extralegal testimony.".
154. Thomas R. Carretta &' Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 305 (1983).
155. Sarah Tanford &' Steven Penrod, Social Inference Processes in Juror Judgments of Multiple-Offense Trials, 47 J. PERSONALITY &' SOC. PSYCHOL. 749, 756 (1984).
156. Edith Greene &' Elizabeth F. Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at Trial, 9 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 193, 205 (1985).
157. Sarah Tanford et al., Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 319, 335 (1985).
158. Wissler &' Saks, supra note 13, at 37, 43-44.
159. Sarah Tanford &' Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The Impact of Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 SOC. BEHAV. 165, 178 (1987).
160. Sarah Tanford &' Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 477, 484-489, 494-496 (1988).
161. Russell D. Clark, III, The Role of Censorship in Minority Influence, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 335-336 (1994).
162. Jeffrey Kerwin &' David R. Shaffer, Mock Jurors Versus Mock Juries: The Role of Deliberations in Reactions to Inadmissible Testimony, 20 PERSONALITY &' SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 153, 159-60 (1994).
163. Stephan Landsman &' Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. &' L. 113, 122-23 (1994).
164. Edith Greene &' Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 19 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 67, 76 (1995).
165. Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 407, 422 (1995).
166. Bruce Rind et al., Effect of Crime Seriousness on Simulated Jurors' Use of Inadmissible Evidence, 135 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 417, 419-420, 422 (1995).
167. Steven Fein et al., Can the Jury Disregard That Information? The Use of Suspicion to Reduce the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Publicity and Inadmissible Testimony, 23 PERSONALITY &' SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1215, 1223-1224 (1997).
168. Saul M. Kassin &' Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY &' SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046, 1050 (1997).
169. Saul M. Kassin &' Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the "Harmless Error" Rule, 21 LAW &' HUM. BEHAV. 27, 44 (1997).
170. Jonathan L. Freedman et al., Pretrial Publicity: Effects of Admonition and Expressing Pretrial Opinions, 3 LEGAL &' CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 255, 267, 269 (1998).
171. Monique A. Fleming et al., Procedural and Legal Motivations to Correct for Perceived Judicial Biases, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 186, 193, 197-99 (1999).
172. Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 23, at 734, 753-754.
173. Demaine, supra note 21, at 127.
174. th ed. 2009).
175. Stefan Schmidt, Shall We Really Do It Again? The Powerful Concept of Replication Is Neglected in the Social Sciences, 13 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 90, 95-96 (2009).
176. Hans &' Doob, supra note 64, at 242.
177. Doob &' Kirshenbaum, supra note 61.
178. Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 23, at 742.
179. Wissler &' Saks, supra note 13.
180. Tanford et al., supra note 74, at 332, 334-335.
181. Failing to replicate some of the results of Tanford &' Penrod, supra note 68, and Tanford &' Penrod, supra note 72); Thompson et al., supra note 67, at 454 (noting failure of an unpublished study to duplicate the results of Sue et al., supra note 63).
182. Kerwin &' Shaffer, supra note 79, at 154;
183. Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 23, at 734;
184. Reinard &' Reynolds, supra note 20, at 92;
185. Rind et al., supra note 83, at 417-18;
186. Tanford &' Cox, supra note 77, at 481;
187. Thompson et al., supra note 67, at 453;
188. Wistrich et al., supra note 51, at 1272-75;
189. Wolf &' Montgomery, supra note 65, at 207. 94.
190. Greene &' Dodge, supra note 81, at 70;
191. Hastie et al., supra note 22, at 231;
192. Borgida &' Park, supra note 57, at 32;
193. Greene &' Dodge, supra note 81, at 76;
194. Lieberman &' Arndt, supra note 13, at 677;
195. Nietzel et al., supra note 56, at 33-34;
196. Wissler &' Saks, supra note 13, at 47.
197. Phillipson, supra note 56, at 25-26.
198. DiPardo, supra note 12, at 297.
199. Lisa Eichhorn, Note, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 LAW &' CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 342-343 (1989).
200. Varnado, supra note 12, at 272-273.
201. Larry Laudan &' Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. &' CRIMINOLOGY 493, 500, 502-203 (2011).
202. Noting that the results of mock jury experiments involving evidence of a defendant's prior conviction "are all over the map," but nonetheless concluding from those results that "at least among mock jurors, the instruction to draw no conclusions from known priors about a defendant's propensity to crime is flagrantly ignored".
203. Cornish &' Sealy, supra note 62, at 216-218, 222.
204. Rind et al., supra note 83, at 418, 422.
205. Stating that inadmissible evidence influenced the decision in the theft case but not the rape case.
206. Thompson et al., supra note 67, at 454.
207. Wissler &' Z Saks, supra note 13, at 38.
208. Stating that the LSE study had "mixed results depending upon the crime with which the defendant was charged"). This is also the impression given of the LSE study in Laudan &' Allen, supra note 95, at 500.
209. Theodore Eisenberg &' Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1358-59 (2009).
210. Tanford &' Cox, supra note 77, at 479, 494.
211. Simon, supra note 22, at 512-513.
212. "Coherence-based reasoning posits that the mind shuns cognitively complex and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding strong, confident conclusions.".
213. Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Legal Factfinders: Real and Mock, Amateur and Professional, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511, 512-17 (2005).
214. Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046, 1046 (1989).
215. The major exceptions are studies that monitored and analyzed the deliberations of mock juries to see whether jurors discussed and relied on evidence they had been instructed to disregard.
216. Hastie et al., supra note 22, at 51.
217. Kline &' Jess, supra note 59, at 114.
218. Hans &' Doob, supra note 64, at 240.
219. Kline &' Jess, supra note 59, at 113-114, 116.
220. Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 23, at 739-741.
221. Rind et al., supra note 83, at 419-420.
222. Wissler &' Saks, supra note 13, at 39-40.
223. Laudan &' Allen, supra note 95, at 502.
224. Clark, supra note 78, at 335;
225. Demaine, supra note 21, at 119-20;
226. Doob &' Kirshenbaum, supra note 61, at 92-93;
227. Fein et al., supra note 84, at 1218;
228. Fleming et al., supra note 88, at 192;
229. Freedman et al., supra note 87, at 259;
230. Greene &' Dodge, supra note 81, at 72;
231. Greene &' Loftus, supra note 73, at 196;
232. Kassin &' Sommers, supra note 85, at 1048;
233. Kassin &' Sukel, supra note 86, at 31;
234. Landsman &' Rakos, supra note 80, at 122;
235. Pickel, supra note 82, at 413;
236. Reinard &' Reynolds, supra note 20, at 96;
237. Rind et al., supra note 83, at 420;
238. Simon, supra note 60, at 41;
239. Sue et al., supra note 63, at 347;
240. Tanford &' Cox, supra note 76, at 169;
241. Tanford &' Cox, supra note 77, at 483;
242. Tanford &' Penrod, supra note 68, at 460;
243. Tanford et al., supra note 74, at 326;
244. Wissler &' Saks, supra note 13, at 41;
245. Wolf &' Montgomery, supra note 65, at 211.
246. Steblay et al., supra note 26, at 488
247. ("By far the majority of studies [of the effects of evidentiary instructions on mock jurors] have examined jurors' predeliberation disposition toward defendant culpability.").
248. A point made, for example, in Demaine, supra note 21, at 120 n.72. Even outside the context of research on evidentiary instructions, though, there is reason to be cautious in extrapolating from studies of mock jurors who do not deliberate to the behavior of actual jurors, who do-notwithstanding the fact that the verdicts of real jurors, like the verdicts of mock jurors, probably track, on average, the inclinations of the jurors going into deliberations.
249. HARRY KALVEN, JR. &' HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 487-489 (1966).
250. Broeder, supra note 58, at 747.
251. The problem is that the cases in which we care most deeply about the behavior of juries may be precisely the hard and ambiguous cases where jurors are most apt to change their minds during deliberations.
252. Borgida, supra note 57, at 218;
253. Kerwin &' Shaffer, supra note 79, at 154. 109.
254. Carretta &' Moreland, supra note 71, at 307.
255. The experimental evidence about deliberation is not uniformly positive. There is evidence that deliberations within a group of jurors or other decisionmakers can lead in some circumstances to "groupthink,".
256. Daniel W. Shuman et al., The Health Effects of Jury Service, 18 LAW &' PSYCHOL. REV. 267, 277-279 (1994).
257. DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 201-202 (2012).
258. But there is no evidence suggesting that deliberation makes it less likely that evidentiary instructions will be followed.
259. Other studies-for example, Reinard &' Reynolds, supra note 20-do not report the language of the evidentiary instruction provided to the mock jurors.
260. Greene &' Dodge, supra note 81, at 71.
261. Tanford &' Penrod, supra note 68, at 459.
262. Wolf &' Montgomery, supra note 65, at 210-211.
263. I will return to this point in Part III.A.
264. Doob &' Kirshenbaum, supra note 61, at 93.
265. Wissler &' Saks, supra note 13, at 41.
266. Kerwin &' Shaffer, supra note 79, at 160.
267. Greene &' Dodge, supra note 81, at 73.
268. Tanford et al., supra note 74, at 328.
269. Tanford &' Penrod, supra note 68, at 465.
270. John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED. 696, 696-698 (2005), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124.
271. Neal S. Young et al., Why Current Publication Practices May Distort Science, 5 PLOS MED. 1418, 1418 (2008), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0050201.
272. Anthony N. DeMaria, Publication Bias and Journals as Policemen, 44 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1707, 1707 (2004).
273. Philippa J. Easterbrook et al., Publication Bias in Clinical Research, 337 LANCET 867, 870-871 (1991).
274. Fotini K. Kavvoura et al., Selection in Reported Epidemiological Risks, 4 PLOS MED. 456, 457 (2007), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0040079
275. Monika K. Krzyzanowska et al., Factors Associated with Failure to Publish Large Randomized Trials Presented at an Oncology Meeting, 290 JAMA 495, 495, 499 (2003).
276. Nikolaos P. Polyzos et al., Publication Bias in Reproductive Medicine: From the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology Annual Meeting to Publication, 26 HUM. REPROD. 1371, 1371 (2011).
277. Lakshmi Sridharan &' Philip Greenland, Editorial Policies and Publication Bias: The Importance of Negative Studies, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1022, 1022-1023 (2009).
278. Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 252 (2008).
279. Ioannidis, supra note 121, at 698.
280. Robert J. MacCoun, Conflicts of Interest in Public Policy Research, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 233, 234 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005).
281. Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 281 (1998).
282. Hastie et al., supra note 22, at 87.
283. Doob &' Kirshenbaum, supra note 61, at 89, 95-96.
284. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
285. Nietzel et al., supra note 56, at 33-34.
286. Tanford et al., supra note 74, at 335.
287. Wissler &' Saks, supra note 13, at 39, 43.
288. Wissler &' Saks, supra note 13, at 39, 43.
289. Freedman et al., supra note 87, at 260.
290. Simon, supra note 60, at 41.
291. Lisa A. Bero, Evaluating Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses, 14 J.L. &' POL'Y 569, 570 (2006).
292. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meta-Analysis: A Primer for Legal Scholars, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 202 (2007).
293. Bero, supra note 130, at 580.
294. Blumenthal, supra note 130, at 217-218.
295. Steblay et al., supra note 26, at 469.
296. There are statistical techniques that can allow a meta-analysis to take reporting and publication biases into account, see Blumenthal, supra note 130, at 217-18, and they were used by Steblay et al. to calculate a "fail-safe N" for each of the hypotheses they tested-that is, "the number of studies averaging null results... that would be needed in order to bring the average probability of a type I error to a desired level of significance, in this case, a value of p =.05," see Steblay et al., supra note 26, at 475. These calculations produced numbers sufficiently large to suggest that the effects found by the meta-analysis were not spurious, but they do not provide the basis for any straightforward estimate of the extent to which reporting or publication biases may have distorted the size of the effects.
297. Steblay et al., supra note 26, at 487.
298. Noting that the impact of the ability of "courts to 'contract' with jurors not to use" inadmissible evidence remains untested); id. At 488 (stating that "very few [of the studies] address pretrial instruction"). For reasons to think that it may help to give evidentiary instructions at the beginning of the trial, see also Simon, supra note 22, at 554-58.
299. Smith, supra note 4, at 1491-1492.
300. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
301. United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 668 (10th Cir. 1989).
302. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325 n.9 (1985).
303. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The "Kettleful of Law" in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1603-1604 (2012).
304. Conversation with Shari Seidman Diamond (Nov. 1, 2010). Some of the juries received instructions to disregard or to limit their use of evidence of insurance coverage. Those instructions appeared to be only partially effective, but jurors often speculated about insurance even in cases where it was never mentioned during the trial.
305. Shari Seidman Diamond &' Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1875-1895 (2001).
306. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 382 n.10, 388-89 (1964).
307. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192 (1998); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
308. See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 730 (Wyo. 1986).
309. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 424-425 (2012).
310. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 211 (3d ed. 2005).
311. Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1133, 1139 (2011).
312. Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judicial Evaluation of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 595, 620 n.185 (1985).
313. Stephen C. Yeazell, Book Review, 13 LAW &' HIST. REV. 444, 445-446 (1995).
314. MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING CONCEPTS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994).
315. Arguing that by the late 1700s, the jury had evolved into "a fact-finding (rather than... law-declaring) body," and that even medieval juries "exercised their lawmaking powers at the margins".
316. NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW 319-337 (1995).
317. It might be thought that suspending faith in evidentiary instructions would necessarily mean suspending faith in all jury instructions, including those addressing substantive law-under reasoning that if we cannot believe in the one, we cannot believe in the other. Many discussions of evidentiary instructions seem to proceed on this assumption. The presumption that juries follow evidentiary instructions is often treated as inseparable from the broader presumption that they follow all of their instructions. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4, at 1450-52. But the questions are in fact distinguishable. Some of the arguments for doubting the efficacy of evidentiary instructions apply less strongly, if at all, to substantive instructions. (As we have seen, the arguments are largely unpersuasive even for limiting instructions, but put that to one side for the moment.) The common-sense worries about the impossibility of "unringing the bell" do not apply to substantive instructions. Neither do the concerns about evidentiary instructions supposedly raised by the story model. The efficacy of evidentiary instructions and the efficacy of substantive instructions are separate issues, and nothing requires that they be resolved in the same way. Cf. Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Cases doubting jurors' ability to put out of their minds events vividly described in court have not expressed equivalent doubts about jurors' ability to follow instructions on the law.").
318. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (governing limited admissibility of evidence); see also United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing testimony admitted as evidence of knowledge, not for the truth of the matter asserted).
319. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing for trial judge's balancing of evidence's probative value against its risk of unfair prejudice). On the broad delegation of this balancing to the trial judge under modern evidence law.
320. Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer's Triumph, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2437, 2442-2445, 2461-2471 (2000).
321. Under federal law, for example, a tort plaintiff who consults a physician for an expert opinion can ask the physician to testify about what the plaintiff told him in the course of the examination. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4). The thinking is that the statement is admissible to explain the basis for the expert's conclusion, and juries are unlikely to follow an instruction not to use the statement as "substantive evidence" (that is, to prove the truth of what the statement asserts), so the statement might as well be allowed in without limitation. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note. California law treats prior statements by a testifying witness in a similar manner. If the statement is inconsistent with the witness's in-court testimony, and therefore admissible for purposes of impeachment, it is also admissible as substantive evidence. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (Deering 2012). The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed a similar rule, but Congress limited its scope to situations involving a prior statement under oath. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1); FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note; H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 10 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
322. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968).
323. KALVEN &' ZEISEL, supra note 107, at 219-297, 497.
324. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. For similar findings regarding nonevidentiary instructions, see, for example, Diamond &' Casper, supra note 26, at 534 (reporting that mock jurors deciding a price-fixing case reduced their damage awards when told that the awards would automatically be tripled, despite being admonished not to do so, but that awards were not reduced if the judge explained why the law provided for automatic trebling of damages, and how reducing compensatory damages in light of the trebling would frustrate the purpose behind the statutory provision).
325. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388-89 (1964) (discussed supra text accompanying note 31).
326. The available evidence tends to support that intuition. See supra notes 33, 82, 133, and accompanying text.
327. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
328. The Court also thought it significant that the trial judge had taken "pains to ascertain, out of presence of the jury, that the target of the question was an actual event, which would probably result in some comment among acquaintances if not injury to defendant's reputation.".
329. They were not, alas, unique in this regard. Here is another example. When a witness in a federal trial is impeached with evidence that he or she has a motive to fabricate, a prior consistent statement by the witness can be introduced for purposes of rehabilitation. But unless the statement was made before the motive to fabricate arose, the jury is instructed that the prior statement can be used only for assessing the witness's credibility, not to prove the truth of what the witness asserts. See, e.g., United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Gluzman, 154 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1998). This has been described, with understatement, as a distinction that "may well be meaningless to jurors." Simonelli, 237 F.3d at 27.
330. Frank W. Bullock, Jr. &' Steven Gardner, Prior Consistent Statements and the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509, 540 (1997).
331. Some state evidence codes avoid this problem by making any prior statement that is admissible for rehabilitation also admissible to prove the truth of what it asserts. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1236 (Deering 2012); MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (2012). Consideration has also been given to amending the Federal Rules of Evidence so that they would operate similarly. See Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter, on Possible Amendment to Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (Oct. 1, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2011-10%20Meeting.pdf. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) already provides a hearsay exception for certain prior consistent statements of a testifying witness, but the Supreme Court has interpreted that exception to apply only to statements that were made before the motive to fabricate arose. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995). Note.
332. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
333. Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 637, 663-664 (1991).
334. H. Richard Uviller, Essay, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 813-815 (1993).
335. KALVEN &' ZEISEL, supra note 107, at 128.
336. Calling this instruction "one of [the law's] most heroic".
337. In Michelson, the Supreme Court described the whole set of rules governing character evidence as "archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other"-a view the Court plausibly called "the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the profession." 335 U.S. at 486. The best the Court could say for these rules was that they had "somehow... proved a workable even if clumsy system" when administered by "wise and strong" trial judges, and that upsetting the balance might well make things worse. Id. 168. See supra notes 64, 75-76, 81, 89, and accompanying text.
338. Eisenberg &' Hans, supra note 99, at 1356-1357.
339. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (2005).
340. Wissler &' Saks, supra note 13, at 37.
341. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note ("In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.").
342. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968).
343. Simon, supra note 22, at 550-559.
344. Demaine, supra note 21, at 133.
345. Steblay et al., supra note 26, at 486, 488.
346. Demaine, supra note 21, at 117-118, 127-130.
347. Compare Demaine, supra note 21, at 127-128.
348. Finding that elaborate instructions are more likely to be followed), and Tanford et al., supra note 74, at 333-34 (same), with Tanford &' Penrod, supra note 72, at 761 (concluding that a "very strong set of judges' instructions designed to eliminate joinder effects had no influence").
349. Pickel, supra note 82, at 407.
350. Regarding the extraordinary obstacles faced by criminal defendants who wish to challenge their convictions based on new evidence, see, for example.
351. Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1021 (2011-2012).
352. See, e.g., United States v. Mundy, 539 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2008); Krasity, supra note 145, at 595-608.
353. Renée Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM. &' MARY L. REV. 195, 197-198 (2000).
354. Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 161 (1988).
355. John H. Langbein et al., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 431-433, 513-522 (2009).
356. Krasity, supra note 145;
357. Lerner, supra note 182, at 201-202.
358. Langbein et al., supra note 183, at 433.
359. Lerner, supra note 182, at 200 n.17.
360. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2551, at 557 (2d ed. 1923). Wigmore's view was hardly idiosyncratic.
361. Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302, 316 (1915).
362. "[N]o single reform would have so wide-reaching and wholesome an effect in promoting the efficiency of courts and improving the quality of justice obtainable there, as a return to the sensible and effective rule of the common law permitting, and in its spirit requiring, that judges should generously aid juries in reaching just conclusions on matters of fact.".
363. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); see also id. at 289 (quoting Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899)).
364. Weinstein, supra note 182, at 163.
365. Based on questionnaires completed by judges after actual trials, the University of Chicago Jury Project found evidence that judicial summarizing or commenting on the evidence dramatically reduced the number of cases in which the judge would have decided the case differently from the jury, but that the effect occurred only in cases where the evidence was clear, not in close cases. See KALVEN &' ZEISEL, supra note 107, at 426-27. It is hard to know what to make of this finding, though. Kalven and Zeisel thought it showed that when juries departed from the law they did so "under the guise of resolving issues of evidential doubt," concealing from themselves the role that "sentiment" played in their decision, and that "the momentum of the jury's revolt is never enough to carry the jury beyond both the evidence and the judge." Id. at 427. But the study relied on the trial judges themselves to assess whether the evidence was "clear" or "close," and judges may well have provided more emphatic guidance when commenting on the evidence in cases that struck them as clear. Moreover, Kalven and Zeisel assessed the effect of judicial summaries and comments on the evidence by comparing the results obtained by judges who always engaged in one or both of these practices with the results obtained by judges who never did, and it seems likely that the two groups of judges differed in other respects as well. Judges who made use of their power to summarize or comment on the evidence were likely to be judges who took a more active role at trial in many other ways.