Evidence law as a system of incentives

Iowa Law Review

Volumn 95, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 1621-1662

  Leubsdorf, John ^a  

^a Lewis and Clark Law School   (United States)

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EID: 77958122102     PISSN: 00210552     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (440)

1. See generally John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. Rev. 1209 (2006) (discussing the complexities of different norms of evidence law).
2. John Macarthur Maguire, Evidence: Common Sense and Common Law 2 (1947).
3. See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 244-47 (1988) (debating the merits of exclusion of evidence to induce submission of better evidence)
4. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. Rev. 1477, 1487-93 (1999) (discussing adversary system incentives).
5. See generally infra Parts I-II (discussing die general adversary system and the Best Evidence Principle).
6. See, e.g., Model Code of Evidence (1942)
7. William Twining, Theories of Evidence: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 27-28 (1985) (describing Bentham's theory of evidence)
8. see also infra Part II (discussing and analyzing the Best Evidence Principle).
9. George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 Yale L.J. 575, 659 (1997) (describing the downfall of witness competency rules).
10. See generally C.J.W. ALLEN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN Victorian England (1997) (describing similar English reforms).
11. Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1), (2)(D); 803(2), (4), (16), (18); 804(b)(2)-(3) and 807 are among the Federal Rules pressing beyond the limits of die common-law hearsay rule, as the Advisory Committee notes explain.
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
13. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1-.3, 16 (requiring attorneys to take additional procedural steps in investigating and trying a case)
14. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 431-40 (1995) (discussing prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence).
15. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (requiring counsel to investigate).
16. See Fed. R. Evid. 401-402 (allowing introduction of all relevant evidence unless another rule excludes it).
17. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (lawyer-client privilege)
18. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (psychotherapist-patient privilege)
19. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 (1990) (privilege against self-incrimination).
20. Oscar G. Chase et al., Civil Litigation in Comparative Context 226-27 (2007) (quoting in translation from the German civil procedure statute, Zivilprozeßordnung [ZPO], sections 383-84)
21. PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF Stürner, German CIVIL JUSTICE 269-80, 298-306 (2004).
22. FED. R. EVID. 407-11
23. see also Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1227, 1255-57 (2001) (arguing that excluding most character evidence encourages criminals to reform).
24. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 348-49 (2006) (stating diat the exclusionary rule's main purpose is deterring Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations).
25. See infra notes 195-200 (discussing goals of specific evidence rules)
26. FED. R. EVID. 403
27. see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C), (c) (recognizing cost limits on discovery).
28. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L. J. 61 (1995).
29. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (holding that a criminal defendant may exclude lab-test certificate unless its author is produced in court)
30. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 52 cmt. g (expert testimony required in most legal-malpractice cases).
31. Posner, supra note 3, at 1486-87.
32. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 50 (1988).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Lopez, 315 F.3d 1143, opinion withdrawn, 327 F.3d 829, 830 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the government deported potential defense witnesses)
34. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05CV1958-B (BLM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 911 (S.D. Cal. 2008), remanded, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16897 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (explaining that the party did not disclose crucial documents until after trial)
35. see also FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3), (4) (limiting access to work product of another party)
36. Andrew F. Daugherty & Jennifer Reinganum, On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias, 16 J.L. ECON. & Orc. 365, 367 (2000) (arguing diat civil defendants have lower search costs and greater incentives to investigate than plaintiffs).
37. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Litigation, in Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and Culture 110 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993) (showcasing an example of a party overwhelming its opponent).
38. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause usually forbids prosecution use of a "testimonial" statement unless its maker is available for cross-examination)
39. Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 727 (1992) (arguing that the central hearsay issue should be who has die burden of producing die maker of the out-of-court statement)
40. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 636 (1980) (placing the burden of pleading on defendant when facts are "peculiarly within... [ knowledge and control")
41. Burkhard Schafer, Twelve Angry Men or One Good Woman? Asymmetric Relations in Evidentiary Reasoning, in LEGAL EVIDENCE AND PROOF 255, 270-72 (Henrik Kaptein et al. eds., 2009) (analyzing criminal burdens of proof and pretrial disclosure from this perspective).
42. But see Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2179-80 (2008) (declining to place burden of establishing claim preclusion defense on plaintiff with superior access to facts).
43. See, e.g., Ruszcyk v. Sec'y of Pub. Safety, 517 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Mass. 1988) (discussing opponent's use of employee's statements)
44. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 420 (2d ed. 1994) (same).
45. See Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Directions of England and Wales, rule 1.1(2): "Dealing with a case justly includes, so far as is practicable-(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; ... (c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate... (iv) to the financial position of each party...."
46. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 299 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) ("missing witness" instruction)
47. Uttlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337, 1346-47 (7th Cir. 1992) (argument of counsel)
48. Erin Murphy, Inferences, Arguments, and Second Generation Forensic Evidence, 59 Hastings L.J. 1047, 1049 (2008) (discussing inferences from failure to present or obtain expert evidence).
49. See United States v. Valenzuela 458 U.S. 858, 861, 866-73 (1982) (considering asserted violation of Sixth Amendment and denial of due process after an alien witness was deported prior to testifying)
50. Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963,968-69 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,J.) (discussing incentive of party with weak case to use worthless evidence to confuse jury)
51. John Leubsdorf, Using Legal Ethics To Screw Your Enemies and Clients, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 831, 839-41 (1998) (describing how tobacco lawyers manipulated the attorney-client privilege to hide evidence harmful to their clients).
52. See infra Part III.C (describing methods to combat destruction of evidence).
53. See Richard Friedman, Minimizing the Juty Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 Mich. St. L. Rev. 967, 969 (describing the lack of empirical evidence of whether and when juries over-value evidence)
54. Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 1248-49 (describing lack of empirical evidence for this claim).
55. See generally Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Ident Sciences: Advocacy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (2008) (discussing the various ways to present forensic evidence to jurors in criminal trials)
56. Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34J. LEGAL STUD. 395 (2005) (same).
57. AMINA MEMON ET AL, PSYCHOLOGY AND Law: TRUTHFULNESS, ACCURACY AND CREDIBIUTY 162-64 (2d ed. 2003) (citing mixed evidence)
58. Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REv. 1857, 1863-66 (2001) (discussing various ways in which an attempt to withhold information from a jury can fail)
59. Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1270-76 (2005) (citing mixed evidence).
60. But see Kamala London & Narina Nunez, The Effect of July Deliberations on Jurors Propensity to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence, 85 J. APPUED PSYCHOL. 932, 933-34 (2000) (concluding that ju deliberation removes impact of evidence jurors are told to disregard).
61. See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933) (stating that even if deceased's statement that defendant poisoned her was only admissible to show she did not wish to commit suicide, jury would use it to prove what it asserted).
62. See e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180-85 (1997) (requiring the prosecution to accept the defendant's offer to stipulate to facts that prejudicial evidence would prove).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 53-56 (1984) (concluding that the defense witness could be impeached by showing that he and defendant belonged to group whose members were obliged to lie and kill for each other; the trial court excluded evidence of the group's racism).
64. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating exclusion for "prejudice, confusion, or waste of time").
65. E.g., id. 404(b), 407-408 (stating the character evidence rule, the subsequent remedial measures rule, and the compromise rule).
66. See generally, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (rev. ed. 1999) (providing examples of court acceptance of uncharged misconduct evidence).
67. E.g., United States v. Whitney, 524 F.3d 134, 140-41 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying the Rule 403 balancing test)
68. United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1278-80 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing the balancing test lower courts must apply).
69. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (describing the goals behind exclusionary rules).
70. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LMRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 466-73 (4th ed. 2009).
71. Compare United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that defense counsel must ordinarily raise the issue of a defendant's competence to stand trial even against a defendant's wishes), with Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1990) (finding that a defendant may waive appeal of a death sentence). See FED. R. EVID. 614 (stating a judge may call a witness).
72. E.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1967) (allowing intervention to enforce the Court mandates even when the parties settled their case)
73. see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) (discussing the participation rights of crime victims). For instances in which the parties avoided raising a relevant issue, see State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1001-03 (Vt. 2003)
74. and Geoffrey P. Miller, Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable Giving Cases 3-9 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-56, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1495069.
75. Michael L Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REv. 893,916-24 (1992).
76. See infra Part II (discussing the Best Evidence Principle).
77. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 3-4 (1754) (written several decades before its posthumous publication).
78. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PREUMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 484-507 (1898)
79. see also CHARLES McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 195 (1954) (describing Thayer's work).
80. Nance, supra note 3, at 227-30 (introducing Nance's Best Evidence Principle)
81. see also ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 39-40, 154-55 (2005) (same).
82. For further explanation of Nance's dieory, see generally Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 621 (1998) [hereinafter Nance, Evidential Completeness]
83. Dale A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1996) [hereinafter Nance, Verbal Completeness]
84. Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825 (1995) [hereinafter Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness]
85. Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447 (1990).
86. For a survey of the rule, see KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 85-120 (6th ed. 2006).
87. FED. R. EVID. 1001(3)-(4), 1003,1004-1007.
88. More accurately, unavailability allows the use of secondary evidence of a document's contents unless the proponent lost or destroyed the document in bad faith. FED. R. EVID.
89. For authentication requirements, see FED. R. EVID. 901-903.
90. For a similar explanation of the hearsay rule, see generally Friedman, supra note 23.
91. FED. R. EVID. 1004(3), 1007.
92. STEIN A, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 39 (2005) (also relying on ethical and economic concerns).
93. FED. R. EVID. 404-415, 501, 608-613.
94. But see FED. R. EVID. 613(b) (providing that opposing counsel must ordinarily confront a witness with any prior inconsistent statement before the court may consider the statement; this rule can be justified in Best Evidence terms).
95. For proposals to admit hearsay statements by unavailable declarants, see, for example, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 503(a) (1942)
96. James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1962)
97. and Seigel, supra note 44.
98. For a case rejecting such an approach, with the result that the plaintiffs remained in slavery, see Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. 290 (1813).
99. Among the admissible but generally inferior out-of-court statements are coconspirator statements, excited utterances, and statements to a physician retained as an expert witness. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), 803(2), (4).
100. Kg., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 112 (1943) (holding that a party could not introduce as a business report an accident report that was completed by a witness who later died)
101. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 296 (1892) (holding that a party could introduce a statement of an alleged victim under the state-of-mind exception)
102. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948-50 (4th Cir. 1988) (admitting statements of a nontestifying child)
103. United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1975) (admitting an excited utterance made by a victim two months after a crime; a brain injury prevented the victim from testifying).
104. Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 1227-28, 1240-41 (suggesting also that a rule privileging statements by disinterested witnesses might be equally plausible).
105. Friedman, supra note 23.
106. E.g., Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967,975-78.
107. I will not explore here all the rules of evidence that Dale Nance traces to the Best Evidence Principle. See sources cited supra note 48 (discussing, among others, the rules of conditional relevance, verbal completeness, and lay opinions)
108. Nance, Evidential Completeness, supra note 48, at 630 n.25 (collecting decisions holding against parties who failed to introduce important evidence).
109. Eg., FED. R. Evid 702
110. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1999) (holding that courts have flexibility in determining the reliability of expert testimony).
111. For one among many critiques, see DAVID STANLEY CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF SCIENCE IN LAW 15-48 (2006).
112. See Friedman, supra note 61, at 984 (discussing reasons why some expert evidence should be excluded as a matter of law)
113. Roger C. Park, Signature Identification in the Light of Science and Experience, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1101, 1107-08 (2008) (encouraging judges to consider alternative forms of expert testimony when more trustworthy evidence exists).
114. E.g., Suttle v. State, 565 So. 2d 1197, 1199-1200 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
115. People v. Catlin, 26 P.3d 357, 390-92 (Cal. 2001)
116. People v. Rivera, 592 N.Y.S.2d 697, 699-700 (App. Div. 1993).
117. But cases like these, in which courts actually exclude evidence because of breaks in the chain of custody, are very rare.
118. E.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1976) (noting that excluding identifications made at suggestive lineups will encourage better lineup procedures)
119. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262-64 (Mass. 1995) (stating that only unnecessarily suggestive lineups should be excluded).
120. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2009)
121. see also State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 593 (Minn. 1984) (finding suspect's statements inadmissible when police interrogation was not recorded).
122. On the admissibility of depositions and interrogatory answers, see FED. R. Crv. P. 32, 33(c)
123. and FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)
124. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 435-700 (London, Hunt & Clarke 1827). Other obvious examples include birth certificates and motor vehicle registration.
125. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8-28, -30, -40.6 (birth certificate)
126. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 11, 30 (motor vehicle registration).
127. Compare In re Estate of Phillips, 833 N.E.2d 895 (111. App. 2005) (holding that probate was blocked by presumption of destruction and Dead Man's Act), with In re Estate of King, 817 A.2d 297 (N.H. 2003) (holding that probate was allowed).
128. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 305 (2004) (allowing marriage to be proved under the same general rules of evidence as in other cases).
129. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §551.110 (2005) (making a marriage certificate "prima facie evidence" of a marriage)
130. N.Y.DOM.REL. LAW § 14-a(4) (2008) (same).
131. FED. R. EVID. 803(12), 902(4).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2006)
133. 29 C.F.R. § 516.2 (2009).
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(a), 216(a), 217
135. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1941)
136. Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 343-44 (4th Cir. 2005).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
138. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 684 (1946).
139. What is said in the text also applies to the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006), which is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act
140. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C)-(D) (pertaining to admissions and business records)
141. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (excepting records of a regularly conducted activity from hearsay exclusion)
142. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 54 (1948) (rejecting Fifth Amendment objection to introduction of governmentally required records).
143. E.g., 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(1)(B), (b) (2006) (requiring documentation of an employee's employment authorization and identity)
144. C.F.R. §§ 64.9(b), 70.6(a)(3) (2009) (imposing reporting requirements to ensure compliance with laws limiting emission of air pollutants).
145. See, e.g., C. CIV. arts. 1317,1319 (Fr.) (stating that an authentic act can serve as proof of an agreement)
146. MURRAY & STURNER, supra note 12, at 276 (describing documentary proof in Germany)
147. James Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 AM.J. COMP. L. 459, 470-71 (1986) (explaining pre-constituted proof in French law).
148. Louisiana is the predictable exception. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 1833, 1835, 1840 (2008) (stating requirements for an authentic act, its proof between parties, and the acceptability of a copy).
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1)
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 110,131-39 (1981). Other provisions of contract law encourage disclosure, though more for the purpose of informing contracting parties than to create evidence for future use.
151. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Economic Analysis of the Duty To Disclose Information: Lessons Learned from the Caveat Emplor Doctrine, 45 SAN DlECO L. REV. 79, 104-11 (2008) (discussing when Contract law should require a contracting party to disclose information).
152. RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.02[3] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2008).
153. The Uniform Commercial Code's treatment of security interests comparably depends on written security agreements and on a filing system. U.C.C. §§9-203(b)(3), -310, -317(a)(2) (2000).
154. However, the evidence fostered by the filing system (the financing statement) often does not meet by itself the requirements for a valid security agreement. Gibson County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. Greer, 643 N.E.2d 313, 320 (Ind. 1994).
155. FED. R. EVID. 803(5)-(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27, which provides for depositions to perpetuate testimony in the absence of a pending action, is another method of creating evidence that can sometimes be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule.
156. It is cumbersome and rarely used, except in Texas. Lonny Scheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to fustice: The Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MlCH.J.L. REFORM 217, 226-36 (2007).
157. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 9 (6th ed. 2006).
158. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
159. See, e.g., Andrew K. Lee, Keep or Toss ?: Document Retention Policies in the Digital Era, 55 LA. BJ. 240, 247 (2007-2008) (advocating a "'preventative medicine' component" in document-retention policies).
160. See id. at 242-43 (discussing the need for companies to adopt a document-retention policy before litigation arises)
161. Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1355-57 (2006) (same)
162. Amalia R. Miller & Catherine E. Tucker, Electronic Discovery and the Adoption of Information Technology 23-24 (Jan. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421244 (presenting evidence that hospitals are less likely to use electronic records in states facilitating evidentiary use of such records).
163. For a vivid example, see Sara D. Guardino et al., Remedies for Document Destruction: Tales from the Tobacco Wars, 12 VA.J.Soc.POL'Y&L. 1,25-42(2004).
164. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Shedding Some Light on Calls for Hearsay Reform: Civil Law Hearsay Rules in Historical and Modern Perspective, 13 PACE INT'L L. REV. 93, 98-100 (2001)
165. Mirjan Damaška, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425,445-46 (1992).
166. See, e.g., CHASE ET AL., supra note 12, at 222-27 (discussing discovery in the German civil-procedure system)
167. MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 12, at 277-78 (same)
168. Beardsley, supra note 80, at 475-77 (discussing discovery in the French civil-procedure system). Such systems' limitations on discovery may not, however, apply in criminal proceedings.
169. See, e.g., Bron McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527, 564-65 (1997) (discussing the investigative stage in French criminal cases).
170. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2009) (stating that a lawyer may not request that someone other than a client or a client's employee not give relevant information to another party).
171. Williams v. Rene, 72 F.3d 1096, 1102-04 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing an interview with the opposing party's testifying expert)
172. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975) (striking down restrictions on witness interviews). Compare the principles from these cases with the French system, under which lawyers do not speak with potential witnesses.
173. JOHN LEUBSDORF, MAN IN HIS ORIGINAL DIGNITY: LEGAL ETHICS IN FRANCE 45, 86-87 (2001)
174. see also John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 833-35 (1985) (describing the similar German practice). In the French system, however, the parties, rather than the lawyers, gather evidence, and in any event, witness statements are of little use, especially when not made in response to questioning by a judge.
175. Beardsley, supra note 80, at 474,476-80.
176. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (D) (stipulating that an employee's statement used against the employer is not hearsay if the statement concerns a matter within the scope of employment).
177. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (stating that a lawyer shall not speak to a represented party about the subject of the representation without consent of the other party's lawyer).
178. For a discussion of the varying views of how this rule applies to corporate employees, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana Remus Irwin, Toward a Revised 4.2 No-Contact Rule, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 797,831-42 (2009).
179. See, e.g., Saini v. Int'l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913,920 (D. Nev. 2006) (upholding the validity of an employment confidentiality agreement)
180. Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 444-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (providing that a court may infer information contrary to the employer where a noncooperation clause precludes the availability of information without cause).
181. See generally Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers' Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481 (2008) (discussing ethics rules relating to lawyers' contact with non-clients and arguing that lawyers who negotiate noncooperation agreements in settlements violate Rule 3.4(f) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct)
182. Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil: Settlement Agreements Conditioned on Noncooperation Are Illegal and Unethical, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2002) (exploring the use of noncooperation agreements and concluding that courts should not enforce or order noncooperation agreements).
183. Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 302 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[A]n attorney who engages in prohibited communications violates the attorney's ethical duty to obey the obligations of the tribunal.")
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 cmt. d, Reporter's Note (2000)
185. Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 472-74 (1999) ("At the extreme, unauthorized contact with an adverse party's expert may be considered witness tampering....").
186. By contrast, English judges may now direct experts retained by the parties to confer with each other, with or widiout the presence of lawyers. ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 620-22 (2003).
187. But see FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (limiting depositions of nontestifying retained experts)
188. See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNSEL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php? record-id=12589 (addressing the current state gathering and presenting scientific criminal evidence and possible benefits of improving the overall system)
189. Thomas P. Sullivan, Recording Federal Custodial Interviews, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1297, 1336 (2008) (proposing a new evidence-collection program for federal interviews).
190. William Stuntz's work on the incentives affecting the contributions to the criminal justice system of courts and legislators bears at least a distant analogy to what I have in mind.
191. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 74-76 (1997) (discussing "perverse effects" of judicial criminal procedure decisions on other lawmakers).
192. Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 764 N.E.2d 825,833-36 (Mass. 2002) (discussing the relationship between the "no contact" rule
193. FED. R. EVID.801(d)(2)(D)).
194. FED. R. EVID. 502 (discussing when disclosure of privileged information waives the privilege, a problem that typically arises from discovery proceedings)
195. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (rejecting immediate appeal from order rejecting privilege objection to discovery)
196. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (prescribing procedures for adjudicating claim that crime-fraud exception to privilege applies in tax investigation).
197. See supra Parts I, II (discussing the utilization of best evidence rules).
198. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to use an obvious example, restricts discovery from criminal defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (rejecting the use of evidence obtained through a violation of a criminal defendant's Fifdi Amendment rights).
199. ee, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142-48 (2000) (discussing the allocation of the burden of production and a burden-shifting scheme)
200. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928-31 (Cal. 1980) (same)
201. see STEIN, supra note 48, at 154.
202. Somewhat arbitrarily, only the last of these methods, the creation of presumptions, falls within the scope of Evidence law. FED. R. EVID. 301-02.
203. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60-61 (2005) (discussing the inconsistencies in application of allocating burdens)
204. FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 202-04, 420-23 (5th ed. 2001) (describing factors in the allocation of burdens and emphasizing that allocation decisions might not be obvious)
205. see STEIN, supra note 48, at 133-40 (analyzing burdens of proof and presumptions as allocating the risk of error)
206. Nance, Evidential Completeness, supra note 48, at 639-50 (1998) (proposing that judges should make presumptive factual finding against a party with greater access to important evidence that fails, after notice, to introduce it or explain its absence). As these sources indicate, courts have relied on several factors to justify placing a burden on one side or another, but these factors typically point in different directions, and courts invoke them inconsistently.
207. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (disallowing both evidence of victim's engagement in sexual behavior and evidence of victim's sexual predisposition)
208. People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814 (Mich. 1982) (holding that prohibition of cross-examination of eight-year-old rape victim was constitutional).
209. Federal Rule of Evidence 609 restricts to some extent the previous admissibility of felony convictions as impeachment. Some of its supporters hoped that this would encourage defendants to testify. 20 CONG. RE& 2377, 37078-79 (1974) (statements of Rep. Dennis and Sen. Hart). For proposals for further restriction to encourage defendants to testify
210. see John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record-Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5J. EMPIRICAL. LEGAL STUD. 477, 492-97 (2008)
211. Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 689-91 (1991).
212. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968)
213. see also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321 (1999) (finding that defendant's guilty-plea colloquy does not waive her privilege not to testify at sentencing hearing).
214. See, e.g.. United States v. Serrano, 406 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that the Justice Department has the sole power to apply for immunity)
215. United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 232 (1st Cir. 1997) (same).
216. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (2006) (codifying the immunity of witnesses)
217. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000) (stating that immunity for compelled testimony must insure that the testimony does not lead to criminal penalties on the witness)
218. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,453 (1972)(same).
219. As to sexual history, see Sandoval v. Acevedo, 996 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.)
220. McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74, 77-79 (D.C. 1977)
221. and Ann Althouse, Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules Matter?, 25 LOY. LA. L. REV. 757, 760-61 (1992).
222. As to criminal convictions, see Friedman, supra note 108, at 688.
223. For rape-shield laws, see Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 1219-20.
224. For criminal convictions, see Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 303-07 (2008).
225. For holdings that a defendant can appeal the court's decision allowing prior-conviction impeachment only by first taking the stand and being impeached, see Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 757-60 (2000)
226. and Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984).
227. For the rule preventing the defendant's testimony at a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing from being used to prove his guilt, see Commonwealth v. Rivera, 682 N.E.2d 636, 640-41 (Mass. 1997) (allowing use of suppression hearing testimony to impeach defendant who testified inconsistently at trial).
228. See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right To Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game- Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 433-34 (2000) (noting that the right to silence encourages guilty defendants to refrain from making false exculpatory statements).
229. Id. at 466.
230. id. at 468.
231. For criticism of the theory, see, for example, Stephanos Bibas, Response, The Right To Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 421 (2003)
232. and Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925 (2002).
233. Contra Alex Stein, The Right To Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOZOL. REV. 1115 (2008) (refuting critics' arguments).
234. Disincentives of this sort are also possible. See Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (2008) (proposing a mandatory sentence reduction when prosecutors rely on the defendant's confession as a way to encourage prosecutors to seek other evidence).
235. See, e.g.. United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 688-89 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming earlier decision regarding legality of offers of immunity)
236. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that prosecuting attorney did not violate law by offering leniency for "truthful testimony")
237. People v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d 1044, 1120 (Cal. 2000) (declining to find that immunized accomplice testimony "is inherently unreliable"). But cf. Mataya v. Kingston, 371 F.3d 353,359 (7th Cir. 2004) (forbidding cash payment).
238. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2) (2006) (providing criminal sanctions for "promis[ing] anything of value" for testimony)
239. United States v. Blaszak, 349 F.3d 881 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming conviction of witness paid for true testimony in civil action)
240. H. Richard Uviller, No Sauce for the Gander Valuable Consideration for Helpful Testimony from Tainted Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 774 (2002) (discussing the defense's inability to offer immunity in criminal cases).
241. See generally Symposium, The Cooperating Witness Conundrum: Is Justice Obtainable?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 747 (2002) (discussing prosecutorial incentives and their effect on witnesses).
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 (1976).
243. 18 U.S.C. § 1513
244. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)-(3) (2006)
245. Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 122 (1998) (reversing dismissal of complaint in civil case where employee argued he was terminated in retaliation for testifying against employer).
246. Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 610 (1945).
247. United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. 430, 437-39 (1840).
248. Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609.
249. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
250. Fed. R. Evto. 410(4)
251. see United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2009) (extending Mezzanatto to allow use in prosecution's case-in-chief).
252. Mezzanalto, 513 U.S. at 215-15 (Souter.J., dissenting).
253. Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1541,1569 (1998).
254. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussing the use of past criminal convictions to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility).
255. Some older decisions recognize a broader scope for prior-conviction impeachment than FED. R. EVID. 609.
256. See, e.g., Bendelow v. United States, 418 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1969) (allowing the cross-examination of the defendant regarding the existence of prior convictions)
257. Fisher v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954) (same)
258. State v. Hawthorne, 228 A.2d 682 (N.J. 1967) (same).
259. For advocacy of such a rule, see supra note 108. In Pennsylvania, a defendant may not (subject to exceptions) be cross-examined about prior convictions, but the prosecution may introduce them on rebuttal. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 712 A.2d 746, 748-49 (Pa. 1998).
260. FED. R. EVID. 608 (b).
261. FED.R.EVID. 608(a).
262. See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009) (Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule)
263. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule)
264. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (Miranda Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule).
265. It has been said that the introduction of English trial procedures into colonial India reduced the quality of justice, because respectable witnesses would not undergo the shame of having to take an oath to tell the truth. RADHIKA SlNGHA, A DESPOTISM OF LAW: CRIME AND JUSTICE IN EARLY COLONIAL INDIA 46-49 (1998)
266. PYARELAL, MAHATMA GANDHI: THE EARLY PHASE 39-40 (1965).
267. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), 405(a) (discussing character evidence and methods of proving character)
268. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 471-72 (1948) (holding that the prosecution could ask about the defendant's arrest that occurred over twenty years ago).
269. In England, such character evidence may now be admissible even if the defendant does not offer character evidence, thus removing or reducing the disincentive present in the United States. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, pt. 11, c. 1, § 101 (U.K.).
270. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951)
271. see also United States v. Longstreet, 567 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a witness could not refuse to answer cross-examination questions that are within the scope of his testimony).
272. See, e.g., Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that one party waived privilege by not making a timely objection)
273. Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970) (same).
274. On implicit waiver, see Richard L. Marcus, ThePerib of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605,1628-32 (1986).
275. For examples of cases discussing when testimony waives this privilege, see Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 123 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 1997)
276. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988)
277. Handgards v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
278. and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 992 A.2d 65 (Pa. 2010). Cf. Jacobs v. Conn. Cmty. Technical Colls., 258 F.R.D. 192, 196-97 (D. Conn. 2009) (stating that plaintiff waived psychodierapist privilege by claiming emotional injury and providing diagnostic letter in response to discovery request). Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a), adopted by Congress in 2008, may or may not narrow the scope of waivers.
279. See, e.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 63-65 (1954) (holding that defendant's assertion diat he never possessed narcotics opened the door to admission of the fruits of an unconstitutional search and seizure related to another drug transaction).
280. Commonwealth v. Key, 407 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Mass. 1980). Disclosure: die audior of this Article represented die defendant on appeal.
281. Indeed, courts rejecting claims of inadequate assistance of counsel regularly cite fear of "opening die door" to justify defense counsels' failure to explore some evidentiary or argumentative possibility. See, e.g., Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 385 (2009) (stating diat counsel's strategy hinged upon not opening the door to rebuttal evidence)
282. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 700-02 (2002) (same)
283. Smith v. Quarterman, 471 F.3d 565, 574-76 (5th dr. 2006) (same).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 680-81 (5di Cir. 2007) (stating diat misleading insinuations during cross-examination opened die door to rebuttal)
285. Hoyas v. State, 456 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that when defendant testified diat he had told his lawyer diat he was innocent, the prosecution could call defendant's lawyer and elicit die detailed confession defendant had in fact given).
286. FED. R. EVID. 106
287. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171 (1988)
288. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, supra note 48, at 826-27
289. Nance, Verbal Completeness, supra note 48, at 53-58. These articles explore the completeness principle in far more depth than my discussion in the text.
290. At least, there can be no harm to the truth but when the otherwise applicable exclusion pursues goals other than avoiding irrelevance (for example, the protection of privilege) there may be harm to those other goals.
291. See Nance, Verbal Completeness, supra note 48 (noting the proposition that trial courts must both "protect the rights of the parties" and attempt to ascertain the truth (quoting United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1987)))
292. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, supra note 48, at 883 ("[T]he concept of privilege competes with truth finding in its attempt to protect confidentiality or secrecy....").
293. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900) (describing how defendant who took the stand to establish an alibi was subject to cross-examination for all his relevant actions)
294. People v. Harris, 118 P.3d 545, 562-63 (Cal. 2005) (stating that the defense witness's impeachment of the prosecution witness justified cross-examination of the defense witness about context of prosecution witness's statement, including hearsay statements incriminating to defendant)
295. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, supra note 48, at 831-34 (describing the "relevance test" as a measure of wholeness of the evidence).
296. 149. See State v. Mastropetre, 400 A.2d 276, 278-281 (Conn. 1978) (excluding sexual history evidence under common law)
297. see also supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the value of sexual history). Of course, that means that such statutes would be justified even without considering their effect as incentives.
298. See generally JAMIE S. GOREUCK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (1989 & Supp. 2009) (providing an in-depth discussion on the destruction and spoliation of evidence)
299. MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION (2d ed. 2006) (same).
300. See, e.g.. Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1786 (2009) (vacating and remanding a murder conviction because the state prosecutors withheld evidence at trial).
301. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1510-1515 (2006) (rules relating to obstruction of justice and tampering with witnesses and jurors)
302. GOREUCK ET AL., supra note 150, § 5.1-.14 (describing criminal laws prohibiting destruction of evidence)
303. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005) (vacating document-destruction conviction because of improper jury instructions)
304. United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 176-81 (2d Cir. 2006) (same).
305. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4, 8.4(c)-(d) (2009)
306. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 322-25 (6th ed. 2007) (discussing Rule 3.4(a)).
307. See, e.g., Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 766 A.2d 749, 754-758 (NJ. 2001) (discussing civil remedies for spoliation of evidence)
308. Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1919 (1997) (discussing the liability standard for evidential damage).
309. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (rejection of challenge to personal jurisdiction)
310. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (possible dismissal)
311. United States v. Tirado-Tirado, 563 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2009) (new trial)
312. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.Sd 804 (7th Cir. 1995) (dismissal)
313. Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81 (D.NJ. 2006) (facts deemed admitted; evidence excluded; privilege claims denied)
314. United States v. Philip Morris, USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2004) (prohibition from calling certain witnesses; 2.75 million dollar fine)
315. GOREUCK ET AL., supra note 150, § 3.1-.19 (discussing discovery sanctions).
316. See, e.g., Charles R. Nesson, Incentives To Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793 (1991) (discussing need for judges to enforce sanctions).
317. But Sanchirico, supra note 88, at 1375-76 (arguing that increasing sanctions is the wrong approach)
318. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1315-17 (2004) (discussing shortcomings of evidence tampering sanctions).
319. For recent decisions extending the duty to preserve evidence to an earlier stage in the unfolding of a controversy, see generally Phillip M. Adams & Associates v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Utah 2009)
320. and Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 255 F.R.D. 135 (D. Del. 2009).
321. FED. R. EVTD. 804(b) (6)
322. see also State v. Byrd, 967 A.2d 285, 297 (N.J. 2009) (discussing witness intimidation "pandemic" that forfeiture rule will counteract).
323. Giles v. California, 128 S. CL 2678,2693 (2008).
324. FED. R. EVID. 804.
325. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,53-58 (2004).
326. FED. R. EVID. 1004(1)-(2).
327. See generally supra Part II (discussing the Best Evidence Principle).
328. See supra note 56 (listing proponents of diis view).
329. For examples of such reforms, see N.J. R. EVID. 804(b) (6)
330. R.I. R. EVID. 804(c)
331. and see also Evidence Act, 1995, §§ 63,65 (Austl.).
332. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (6)
333. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678,2687 (2008).
334. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2697-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the forfeiture exceptions as applied to those who kill potential witnesses). Indeed, the exclusion of statements by slain victims is one of the major scandals of our evidentiary system.
335. As noted above, this only applies to those who would prefer the evidence against them to be courtroom testimony rather than written substitutes.
336. It is, however, possible that someone with other reasons for procuring the absence of a witness would nevertheless be deterred by its evidentiary consequences.
337. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)
338. United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945,956 (9th Cir. 2007).
339. United States v. Tirado-Tirado, 563 F.3d 117,122 (5th Cir. 2009).
340. FED. R. EVID. 1004(1). Perhaps one should add to this group of rules the traditional one barring impeachment of a witness with extrinsic evidence of her past inconsistent statement when the impeacher has let the witness leave the stand without asking her about the statement, making her relatively inaccessible.
341. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 245-50 (1895) (discussing the unanimity among authorities with respect to die necessity of laying a foundation before impeaching witnesses)
342. Queen's Case, (1820) 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 982-83 (H.L.) (basing the rule on fairness to die witness). Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) has now diluted this rule, but courts still sometimes use it to prohibit the impeachment.
343. See, e.g., United States v. Schnapp, 322 F.Sd 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the procedures dictated by Rule 613(b) are "'not mandatory, but... optional at the trial judge's discretion"1)
344. State v. Martin, 964 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible until specified conditions are satisfied).
345. E.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 620-21 (1896)
346. United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.)
347. Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 29-32 (Ky. 1998)
348. see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 305-08 (2d Cir. 1979) (hiding of documents shown for impeachment purposes).
349. E.g., Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 743 (8th Cir. 2004)
350. Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2001)
351. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1995)
352. see also Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118,121 (1893) (inference from failure to produce witness)
353. Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2000) (shifting burden of persuasion)
354. Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, 895 P.2d 484, 491 (Alaska 1995) (same)
355. Richard D. Friedman, Dealing with Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1967-68 (1997) (discussing the possibility that the burden of production may shift away from its original allocation).
356. See, e.g., Nationwide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st ir. 1982) (Breyer, J.) (discussing the two rationales)
357. 2 CHARLES FREDERIC CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 1070e, 1078a, 1078b (1911) (stating both rationales)
358. John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 230 (1935) (discussing the "evidentiary significance of implied admissions").
359. See, e.g., 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265 (6th ed. 2006) (discussing admissions by misconduct, specifically by obstruction of justice)
360. Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference-Quieting the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 MD. L. REV. 137 (1985) (discussing the difficulty of deciding what to infer from the withholding of evidence whose contents remain unknown).
361. But see Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 1248-49 (noting the ease with which accusations of jury overvaluing can be leveled).
362. Dale A. Nance, Evidentiary Foul Play: The Roles of Judge and Jury in Responding to Evidence Tampering, INT'L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, May 2009, at 7-8, available at http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol7/issl/art5
363. see also Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 245-46 (Tex. 1999) (finding that the judge should decide appropriateness and size of lawyer's fee-forfeiture sanction).
364. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing the incentives created by the hearsay rule and its exceptions).
365. Sanchirico, supra note 88, at 1335-36.
366. Id. at 1382-97.
367. ALLEN, supra note 5
368. Fisher, supra note 5, at 656-58 (discussing the downfall of common-law rules regarding witness credibility).
369. But see Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) (arguing that disclosing expert witnesses' pay incentives makes the problem worse, mainly because it makes the experts feel more free to be partisan).
370. MODEL RULE PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2009). The Rule's main purpose, however, is to avoid the jury confusion that may result from a lawyer's appearing in two different capacities.
371. Arnold B. Enker, The Rationale of the Rule that Forbids a Lawyer To Be Advocate and Witness in the Same Case, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455.
372. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WlS. L. REV. 1113.
373. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 92 at 835-41.
374. Implementing recommendations going back to Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901), Federal Rule of Evidence 706 now permits court-appointed experts, but it is rarely used.
375. ADRIAN A.S. ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 20 (2003) ("[T]he rules seek to promote party co-operation in the employment of experts ....").
376. Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174 (2010).
377. See, e.g.. Person v. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y., 554 F.2d 534, 538-39 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing how the New York legislature passed Disciplinary Rule 7-109C to prevent false testimony which "might result if expert witnesses were paid on a contingent basis")
378. Swafford v. Harris, 967 S.W.2d 319, 321-22 (Tenn. 1998) (discussing the policy reasons behind prohibiting contingency fees for expert witnesses).
379. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (d) (2006)
380. Hamilton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 490 F.2d 223, 229 (7th Cir. 1973)
381. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117 cmt. b (2000).
382. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 92.142 (1999) (setting the fee at $5 per day)
383. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 262, § 29 (2008) ($6 per day)
384. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8001 (1981) ($15 per day)
385. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §22.001 (2009) ($10 per day).
386. See supra Part III.B (discussing some of the incentives and disincentives for the introduction of evidence).
387. See supra Part II (discussing the incentives and disincentives of the Best Evidence Rule).
388. See T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modem Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 551-52 (1999) (discussing rules that limit the testimony that jurors may hear)
389. Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The Reconceptualization of Evidence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1151 (1990) (discussing the development of adversary-system reasoning in Evidence law)
390. John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A Vtewfrom the Ryder Sotmes, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1174-75 (1996) (explaining how the focus of eighteenth-century Evidence law differed from ours)
391. supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing the repeal of rules that disqualified many witnesses from testifying and liberalization of the hearsay rule).
392. Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606,607 (1945)
393. see supra text accompanying note 124 (requiring two witnesses or corroboration to support perjury conviction).
394. See supra notes 87-88 (discussing motives for adopting a "document retention policy").
395. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing rape shield laws and similar provisions).
396. FED. R. EVID. 403
397. see also BROUN ET AL., supra note 49, § 36.
398. FED. R. EVID. 403, 610
399. see also Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (finding that it was a constitutional error to admit irrelevant evidence of the defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood).
400. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that the Confrontation Clause is satisfied when a child testifies to abuse through a one-way circuit television).
401. FED. R. EVID. 501.
402. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (explaining the importance of allowing each party to present a coherent and persuasive story). 200.
403. See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY chs. 1-4 (2006)
404. STEIN, supra note 48.
405. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 41, ch. 5
406. see supra note 192 and accompanying text (arguing that purportedly consequentialist rules often have other foundations).
407. FED. R. EVID. 407.
408. For a brilliant critique of the incentives and other grounds invoked to support this rule, with implications for other rules as well, see Dan M. Kalian, The Economics-Micro-, Behavioral, and Political-of "Subsequent Remedial Measures" Evidence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1561843.
409. FED. R. EVID. 408-10. Many states now also seek to foster apologies by excluding them from evidence.
410. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2009) (limiting the admissibility of statements made by health-care providers and their employees)
411. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2008) (excluding from evidence as admissions of liability benevolent statements, writings, or gestures pertaining to accident victims)
412. WASH. REV. CODE §5.66.010 (2008) (same).
413. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961)
414. see also supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases that discussed various exclusionary rules).
415. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1531, 1540.
416. See Sanchirico, supra note 156, at 1287-303 (concluding that the law of evidence tampering is troublesome and inefficient in terms of deterrence).
417. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1483-84 (discussing the effect of deterrence resulting from admitting character evidence)
418. Sanchirico, supra note 13, at 1259-66 (explaining the argument for the restriction of character evidence). Indeed, allowing bad character evidence might discourage people from committing the first offense.
419. FED. R. Evm 804(b) (2).
420. See Sanchirico, supra note 88, at 1372-82 (suggesting that sanctions against spoliation drive organizations to destroy evidence more thoroughly to prevent detection).
421. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
422. see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 136 (1997) (upholding a trial judge's gatekeeper role when excluding certain expert medical testimony).
423. FED.R.EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
424. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1369-80 (2003)
425. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 622 (2004).
426. FED.R.EVID. 412.
427. Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 46 B.C. L. REV. 949, 1013 (2006).
428. For other critiques of Judge Posner's article, see Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1419 (2001)
429. and Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1691 (2001).
430. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948)
431. see also Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010) (describing the enormous burdens that our law and society place on released convicts).
432. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1483 ("More accurate factfinding increases deterrence of wrongful conduct.").
433. But see Lempert, supra note 214, at 1643-52 (disagreeing with Posner's analysis).
434. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999)
435. supra note 210 and accompanying text (describing the potential effects of applying Daubert in the context of drug manufacturers).
436. Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289,320-22 (2001).
437. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
438. To the extent evidentiary incentives are embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, they could not be invalidated under the Erie doctrine, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), but those who write the Rules could nevertheless decide to defer to state Evidence law in claims governed by state law, as they did with respect to privilege in Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
439. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text (listing factors that should influence evidentiary rules). Whether Evidence law's reconciliation of competing goals is plausible or logical is another question.
440. See Leubsdorf, supra note 1 (noting that current law applies a complex structure of rules with questionable premises).