When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement

Synthese

Volumn 190, Issue 7, 2013, Pages 1293-1316

  Miller, Boaz ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Consensus; Expert testimony; Knowledge; Social epistemology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875520745     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0225-5     Document Type: Article

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