Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance

Economic Journal

Volumn 123, Issue 567, 2013, Pages 96-130

  Olivella, Pau ^a   Vera Hernández, Marcos ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); HEALTH INSURANCE; MODELING; PRIVATE SECTOR;

UNITED KINGDOM;

EID: 84874377706     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02520.x     Document Type: Article

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