Economic efficiency and mixed public/private insurance

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 66, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 505-516

  Blomqvist, Å ^a   Johansson, P O ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Government insurance; Health insurance; Moral hazard; Optimal insurance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031521380     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00038-8     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Besley, T., 1989. Publicly provided disaster insurance for health and the control of moral hazard. Journal of Public Economics 39, 141-156.
2. Blomqvist, Å., Johansson, P.-O., 1995. Optimal non-linear health insurance. Mimeo.
3. Pauly, M.V., 1974. Overinsurance and public provision of insurance: The roles of moral hazard and adverse selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, 44-62.
4. Pauly, M.V., 1986. Taxation, health insurance, and market failure in the medical economy. Journal of Economic Literature 24, 629-675.
5. Selden, T.M., 1993. Should the government provide catastrophic insurance?. Journal of Public Economics 51, 241-247.
6. Zeckhauser, R., 1970. Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives. Journal of Economic Theory 2, 10-26.