Making it mental: In search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversy

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 1-26

  Shani, Itay ^a  

^a Kyung Hee University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Cognitive engagement; Instantiative vehicles of content; Intrinsic content; Mental states externalism; Moderate active externalism; Parity principle; Process externalism; Radical externalism; Synergic coordination; Transformative vehicles of content

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874367925     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-012-9273-z     Document Type: Article

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