The extended mind, the concept of belief, and epistemic credit

The Extended Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 355-369

  Preston, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053104739     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (9)

1. Adams, F., and Aizawa, K. (2001). The bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 14, 43-64
2. Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting, Brain, Body and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
3. Clark, A., and Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58, 7-19. Reprinted as chapter 2 of this volume.
4. Glock, H.-J., and Preston, J. M. (1995). Externalism and first-person authority Monist, 78, 515-533
5. Hacker, P. M. S. (1997). Davidson on first-person authority. Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 285-304
6. Hamilton, A. (2000). The authority of avowals and the concept of belief. European Journal of Philosophy, 8, 20-39
7. McKinsey, M. (1991). Anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis, 51, 9-16 (Reprinted in P. Ludlow and N. Martin [eds.], Externalism and Self-Knowledge [pp. 175-184], Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1998)
8. Preston, J. M. (2002). Introduction. In J. M. Preston and J. M. Bishop (eds.), Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and AI. Oxford: Oxford University Press
9. Preston, J. M. (2006). Is your mobile part of your mind? In K. Nyiri (ed.), Mobile Understanding: The Epistemology of Ubiquitous Communication (pp. 67-77). Vienna:Passagen Verlag