Making Fishery Agreements Work: Post-Agreement Bargaining in the Barents Sea

Making Fishery Agreements Work: Post-Agreement Bargaining in the Barents Sea

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Hønneland, Geir ^a  

^a FRIDTJOF NANSEN INSTITUTE   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874360245     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9780857933638     Document Type: Book

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