Fisheries law enforcement-A survey of the economic literature

Marine Policy

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 293-300

  Nøstbakken, Linda ^a  

^a Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration   (Norway)

Author keywords

Fisheries; Law enforcement; Non compliance

Indexed keywords

FISHERY ECONOMICS; FISHERY MANAGEMENT; FISHERY POLICY; LAW ENFORCEMENT; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK;

EID: 41549140002     PISSN: 0308597X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2007.06.002     Document Type: Article

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