Erie's suppressed premise

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 95, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1111-1167

  Green, Michael Steven ^a  

^a Dept of Economics and Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy at the College of William and Mary   (United States)

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EID: 79957517567     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (232)

1. E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 402-10 (2d ed. 1997) (advocating the interpretation of the Constitution on the basis of the Framers' original intention )
2. Edwin Meese III, Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985)
3. THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1 (Paul G. Cassel ed., 1986). I ignore here further refinements of the originalist approach. For a short history of the evolution of originalism
4. see Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 927-38 (2009).
5. E.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985) (denying "intentionalism was the original presupposition of American constitutional discourse")
6. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33.
7. see David O. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 121-24 (1988).
8. E.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 (1999) ("Originalism neither depends on the interpretive intent of the founders nor employs that intent.").
9. following Falchetti v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 307 Pa. 203 (1932).
10. (Quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
11. Tyson's name was actually Tysen. It was misspelled in the Supreme Court's opinion. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 204 n.20 (1982)
12. reviewing Tony Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance: The swift & erie cases in American federalism (1981)
13. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 14-15 (1842).
14. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15. See, E.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370 (1893) (holding that the applicability of the fellow-servant rule to a railroad was a matter of general common law)
16. Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 106-07 (1893) (holding that a passenger's right to punitive damages against a railroad was a matter of general common law).
17. Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937).
18. (discussing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), in which a taxi company chose to reincorporate in Tennessee for diversity purposes).
19. In arguing that Congress intended the Act to cover general common law, Brandeis relied heavily upon Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). Warren's reading of the Act has subsequently been questioned
20. Warren's reading of the Act has subsequently been questioned. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 502-03 (1971).
21. William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984).
22. (Quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
23. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) (stating that a principle of Erie is that the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction does not give federal courts the power to develop a "concomitant powbody of general federal law")
24. see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 915-23 (1986).
25. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (1957)
26. Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 247-48 (2008).
27. see Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
28. Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 846-52 (2008) (discussing the sources of federal court's authority over their own procedure). On the scope of this constitutional power
29. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), that recommends uniformity between federal procedural common law and the procedural law of the state where the federal court is located, if this is needed to discourage vertical forum shopping and to avoid the inequitable administration of the laws.
30. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965). The bulk of the cases described as Erie problems by federal courts, as well as the bulk of the Erie cases read in a first-year civil procedure course, concern this nonconstitutional question.
31. E.g., Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001)
32. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426-31 (1996)
33. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 534-38 (1958)
34. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949)
35. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949)
36. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949)
37. Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109.
38. see Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442-44 (2010).
39. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-57 (1978).
40. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
41. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964). For further discussion of the federal interests found sufficient to create federal common law
42. see Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 630-44 (2006).
43. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263 (1992)
44. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985)
45. Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989)
46. Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989).
47. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
48. Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1265 (1985) ("Long before Swift v. Tyson was decided, federal courts recognized the division between general and local law . . . .").
49. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
50. see Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351, 352-67 (1983).
51. See Crisson v. Williamson, 8 Ky. (1 A.K. Marsh.) 454, 455-56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1819)
52. Bradford v. Cooper, 1 La. Ann. 325, 326 (1846) ("It is a fact of which we deem it to be our duty to take judicial notice, that the law-merchant prevails throughout the States of this Union, except so far as the same may be modified in particular States by statute.")
53. Brown v. Ferguson, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 37, 42-44 (1832). I have not been able to find clear evidence from New York courts themselves at the time that Swift was decided, but evidence can be found in later cases.
54. See St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat'l Bank, 27 N.E. 849, 851 (N.Y. 1891).
55. Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N.Y. 413, 418-19 (1880).
56. Tony Freyer claims that New York rejected Swift in Stalker v. M'Donald, 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843)
57. See Stalker, 6 Hill at 95.
58. Pattillo v. Alexander, 105 Ga. 482, 482 (1898)
59. Franklin v. Twogood, 25 Iowa 520, 531 (1868)
60. Roads v. Webb, 91 Me. 406, 412-13 (1898)
61. Fellows v. Harris, 20 Miss. (12 S. & M.) 462, 466-67 (1849)
62. St. Nicholas Bank, 27 N.E. at 851-52
63. Third Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 139 S.W. 665, 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911)
64. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 598 (1958). This Swiftian approach to the common law should be distinguished from state courts' use of a rebuttable presumption that the law of a sister state is the same as the forum's. In the absence of evidence of the sister state's law, a state court employing the rebuttable presumption might apply even its statutory law to the sister state. But this presumption would yield to concrete evidence of the sister state's law. For a discussion of this presumption
65. See, E.g., Pattillo, 105 Ga. at 482.
66. Slaton v. Hall, 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929).
67. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 708 (2008)
68. see also Bradford R. Clark, Erie's Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1292-94 (2007) [hereinafter Clark, Constitutional]
69. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1276-92 (1996). 81.
70. Roe v. Jerome, 18 Conn. 138, 158-60 (1846)
71. Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388, 407 (1836).
72. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 709 (1995).
73. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 534-35 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
74. E.g., Calhoun v. Cullum's Lumber Mill, Inc., 545 S.E.2d 41, 44-45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
75. E.g., Trs. of Jesse Parker Williams Hosp. v. Nisbet, 189 Ga. 807, 811 (1940)
76. Calhoun, 545 S.E.2d at 45.
77. Leavell v. Bank of Commerce, 314 S.E.2d 678, 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)
78. see also John B. Rees, Jr., Choice of Law in Georgia: Time to Consider a Change?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 787, 789-90 (1983)
79. E.g., White v. Borders, 123 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) ("[T]he common law of Georgia rather than that of Tennessee will control in an action brought in Georgia courts even though the injury occurred in Tennessee."). But this is an inaccurate description of Georgia's approach. Under Georgia choice-of-law rules for tort, the lex loci delicti-the law of the place of the accident- applies.
80. Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 413, 418-19 (Ga. 2005)
81. Bagnell v. Ford Motor Co., 678 S.E.2d 489, 492 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). If the accident occurs in a sister state, Georgia law cannot apply. The law applied must instead be the law of the place of the accident. But if the question is not covered by a statute of the sister state, Georgia courts will exercise their own judgment about what the common law applying in that sister state is.
82. For example, in Risdon Enterprises v. Colemill Enterprises, 324 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), the Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the lex loci delicti applied to a tort action concerning an airplane crash in South Carolina.
83. Because Georgia state courts use this Swiftian interpretive approach concerning sister-state law, federal courts in Georgia feel themselves compelled under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), to do the same.
84. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987)
85. In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 677 (N.D. Ga. 2003)
86. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1343-44 (M.D. Ga. 1999)
87. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)
88. (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928)
89. Louise Weinberg has argued that Erie's positivism applies to state as well as to federal courts. Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523, 550-51 (2004).
90. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 241 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
91. Much of my argument in this section echoes Jack Goldsmith and Steven Walt's excellent Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998 (Pubitemid 128443487)
92. see also Steven Walt, Before the Jurisprudential Turn: Corbin and the Mid-Century Opposition to Erie, 2 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 75, 126 (2010).
93. Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1790-91 (1997)
94. see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1, *67 (stating that the common law is derived from "maxims and customs . . . of higher antiquity than memory or history can reach").
95. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 427-28 (1995) ("Federal judges are as competent as state judges in this scientific search for facts.").
96. For example, in Stalker v. M'Donald, 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843), decided one year after Swift, a New York court again denied that a promise to discharge a preexisting debt was valid consideration when purchasing a bill of exchange, and thereby rejected the Supreme Court's interpretation in Swift.
97. The Supreme Court treated Stalker as a mere disagreement, not as a violation of the Supremacy Clause. Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 343 (1857).
98. Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 798-99 (1951).
99. ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW: 1776-1836, at 24 (1964). For a discussion of the reception of the common law in the United States
100. see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132-37 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
101. see also Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day 163, 166 (Conn. 1805).
102. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1027 (2002).
103. See Act of Feb. 25, 1784, in 1 FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 290 (1981).
104. E.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 374 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2004)
105. Fed. Ins. Co. v NCNB Nat'l Bank of N.C., 958 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying Florida common law).
106. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001)
107. W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994).
108. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 194-95 (1994).
109. E.g., Ector v. Grant, 37 S.E. 984, 985 (Ga. 1901) (appealing to the Georgia reception statute to answer the common-law question of intestate succession)
110. E.g., Banco De Sonora v. Bankers' Mut. Cas. Co., 100 N.W. 532 (Iowa 1904) (Mexico)
111. Savage v. O'Neil, 44 N.Y. 298, 300-03 (1871) (Russia)
112. see also Albert Martin Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 HARV. L. REV. 401, 402-04 (1906).
113. Int'l Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 99 N.E. 722, 727 (N.Y. 1912) ("In the absence of proof on the subject [such as a statute abrogating the common law], . . . the common law is presumed to prevail in all the states in which it is the foundation of their jurisprudence, such as New York and Pennsylvania, but not including those states which inherited or adopted the civil law, such as Louisiana.").
114. Davison v. Gibson, 56 F. 443, 444-45 (8th Cir. 1893) (Creek Nation).
115. See, E.g., Udell v. The Ohio, 24 F. Cas. 497, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1851).
116. See Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205-07 (1863) (refusing to recognize the holding of the Iowa Supreme Court invalidating bonds under the Iowa Constitution)
117. Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1841 n.69 (2005)
118. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment "Doctrine" and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1388-89 (1992).
119. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 422 (1964) (attributing to Erie the position "that federal courts must follow state decisions on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states").
120. See Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940)
121. Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 518-19 (1897).
122. E.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 239 n.12 (1998) (holding that a Michigan state court injunction "is not entitled to full faith and credit [in Missouri] . . . because it impermissibly interferes with Missouri's control of litigation brought by parties who were not before the Michigan court")
123. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1909) (stating that a judgment purporting to determine title to real property need not be recognized by a court in the state of the situs).
124. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1908).
125. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1318 (10th Cir. 1997).
126. (quoting Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 161-62 (1949)).
127. Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996) ("State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes.").
128. TransDulles Ctr., Inc. v. Sharma, 472 S.E.2d 274, 275 (Va. 1996) ("[C]ollateral estoppel in Virginia requires mutuality, that is, a party is generally prevented from invoking the preclusive force of a judgment unless that party would have been bound had the prior litigation of the issue reached the opposite result.").
129. Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 237 (Cal. 1999) ("[B]ecause [collateral] estoppel need not be mutual, it is not necessary that the earlier and later proceedings involve the identical parties or their privies.").
130. (quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948)).
131. See, e.g., Hart v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (applying New York's law of nonmutual collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of decision by a court in Texas, even though Texas's law of collateral estoppel requires mutuality).
132. But see Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex FP, Inc., 584 A.2d 1214, 1217-18 (Del. 1991) (holding that a Delaware court must use Kansas law of collateral estoppel, which requires mutuality, to determine the preclusive effect of a decision by a court in Kansas, even though Delaware abandoned the mutuality requirement). For a discussion of the problem
133. see Gene R. Shreve, Judgments from a Choice-of-Law Perspective, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 985, 985-89 (1992).
134. See generally A. John Simmons, Inalienable Rights and Locke's Treatises, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175 (1983).
135. E.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1909) (holding that a Nebraska court is not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize the decree of a Washington court purporting to alter title to land in Nebraska).
136. E.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) ("It is now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered."). The question of the full faith and credit obligations of federal courts with respect to state judgments is complicated by the fact that the obligation is statutory. Congress might expressly or impliedly repeal the Full Faith and Credit Statute. Repeal is a particular concern if the action brought in federal court is under federal law. The application of the rendering state's preclusion law might frustrate federal interests standing behind the federal law.
137. Stephen B. Burbank, Inter jurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 817-29 (1986)
138. Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 996-97 (1998).
139. E.g., 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4468 (2d ed. 2002)
140. Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 749 (1976). It should follow that federal courts cannot release state courts of this duty, nor can they discriminate in their preclusion law on the basis of whether the recognizing court is federal or state. Just what preclusion law will apply to a federal judgment in federal court is a different issue, however, and a complicated one in diversity cases.
141. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506-09 (2001).
142. But this would exist if the defendant was served within New York while on a business trip there, Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990)
143. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981).
144. The Full Faith and Credit Clause applies not just to state statutory law, but also to common law. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (speaking of "legislative measures and common law" as the "laws" to which full faith and credit is due)
145. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943) (referring to full "faith and credit . . . to which local common and statutory law is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States")
146. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 25-27 (1991)
147. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit - The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (1945).
148. Note, Misconstruction of Sister State Law in Conflict of Laws, 12 STAN. L. REV. 653, 653 (1960). In Green
149. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000)
150. Constr. Materials, Inc. v. Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 365, 367 (La. 1980).
151. decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Black v. Rebstock Drilling Co., 837 F. Supp. 200, 204-05 (W.D. La. 1993)
152. Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in a Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. REV. 1369, 1372-76 (1988). As it turns out, however, federal courts follow the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretations of Louisiana statutes and, when the matter is unsettled, attempt to predict how it would resolve the matter.
153. E.g., Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999)
154. Transcon. Gas v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1992)
155. St. Charles Ventures, L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687 (E.D. La. 2003) ("To determine a state law question, we first look to decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. If the Louisiana Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue, it is our duty to determine as best we can what that court would decide.")
156. It might appear that this Article seeks to resurrect an equal protection justification of Erie. E.g., Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 998-99 (1996).
157. One such case is Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), which is commonly understood as holding that a state court may not refuse to entertain an action simply because it is under the law of a sister state. For a discussion of Hughes
158. see Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L. REV. 819, 825-26 (1983)
159. Larry Kramer, Same Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1980-86 (1997). Notice that our nondiscrimination principle is the mirror image of Hughes's. In Hughes, there was discrimination in state jurisdiction concerning sister-state law. We are concerned with discrimination in state law concerning sister-state (and federal) jurisdiction.
160. Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 285-86 (1871).
161. (cited in Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271 n.15).
162. In Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965), it appeared as if the Supreme Court went even further and concluded that a state may never make a cause of action nontransitory
163. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729 (1988).
164. see also Great W. Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U.S. 329, 338-39 (1896) (holding that full faith and credit for the rendering state's judgment does not require the recognizing state to use the rendering state's statute of limitations for enforcing such judgments).
165. Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 729 n.3. In fact, Scalia considered the issue of Texas's power to designate its statute of limitations as procedural in the context of a challenge under the Due Process Clause, rather than the Full Faith and Credit Clause, although it is not clear what rested upon this categorization.
166. see Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904).
167. see City of Philadelphia v. Bauer, 478 A.2d 773, 778-80 (N.J. 1984). In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down a New Jersey statute that prohibited the enforcement of employment wage tax judgments through the sale of realty. The statute was enacted in response to the passage in Philadelphia of a commuter tax.
168. Broderick Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (holding that a state "may not, under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the enforcement of claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and credit clause, when its courts have general jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties"). For a discussion of Broderick
169. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
170. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965). Many characterize the nonconstitutional doctrine as having its source in the Rules of Decision Act.
171. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 707- 18 (1974)
172. Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (1998)
173. Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 361 (1977). Although I do not think that this can be the statutory source of the policy, I will not take on the matter here.
174. But see Lindsey C. Boney IV, Forum-Shopping Through the Federal Rules of Evidence, 60 ALA. L. REV. 151, 173 n.129 (2008).
175. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 249 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
176. Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)
177. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948)
178. see also 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4501 (2d ed. 1996)
179. see Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495-517 (1997).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136(2) (1969).
181. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
182. aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005)
183. Soc'y of Mount Carmel v. Nat'l Ben Franklin Ins. Co. of Ill., 643 N.E.2d 1280, 1293 n.4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
184. Ellerbrake v. Campbell-Hausfeld, No. 01L 540, 2003 WL 23409813, at *2 (Ill. Cir. July 2, 2003).
185. Knieriemen v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15 (App. Div. 1980)
186. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Calhoon, 270 N.Y.S.2d 691, 696 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
187. But see Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding ambiguity as to whether the presumption is still in place under New York law).
188. ROC-Century Assocs. v. Giunta, 658 A.2d 223, 226 (Me. 1995).
189. Am. Honda Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 439 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Neb. 1989).
190. The types of evidence a court should use is catalogued in McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980).
191. E.g., Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1740 (2006).
192. E.g., Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002-05 (2008).
193. Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law as an Impediment to Certifying a National Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 893 (2005)
194. Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class Suits Certified Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(B)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 799, 801-17
195. Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 613 (Tex. App. 6th 1995)
196. Osborn v. Kinnington, 787 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App. 8th 1990).
197. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 673 (Tex. 2004) ("As 'guardian[s] of absent claimants' rights, courts have an independent duty to determine uniformity [of various states' laws] sua sponte, even if neither party raises it.'"
198. (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex. 1996))). The Montana Supreme Court came to the same conclusion.
199. See Sieglock v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 81 P.3d 495, 499 (Mont. 2003).
200. E.g., Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 427 A.2d 1121, 1129 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)
201. Himes v. Stalker, 416 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
202. Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.)
203. Vacated, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
204. This was arguably the approach that the Supreme Court originally took to the matter. See Stoner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 467 (1940)
205. West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1940)
206. Six Cos. Of Cal. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940)
207. Fid Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940).
208. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
209. Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1423-31 (2005).
210. In an important new article, Abbe Gluck has recently argued that rules of statutory interpretation should be subject to Erie. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as 'Law' and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011). Although she does not distinguish between the constitutional and the nonconstitutional Erie doctrines
211. See, E.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 569-74 (1996)
212. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 303 (1990)
213. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1005-08 (1991) [hereinafter Kramer, Renvoi]
214. see JOHN WESTLAKE, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-41 (5th ed. 1912)
215. Erwin N. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1186-87 (1938).
216. States still using the traditional lex loci delicti rule for torts are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 279-80 (2009).
217. An example of such a case is Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113, 113-14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). The Court of Appeals of Georgia applied Florida interspousal immunity law to a Georgia couple who got into an accident in Florida.
218. Florida. Pennington v. Dye, 456 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
219. Indeed, the First Restatement is explicit that the choice-of-law rules of foreign jurisdictions should be ignored by the forum, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1934) making an exception only in cases of title to land and the validity of a decree of divorce.
220. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). No state explicitly adopts all of Currie's approach, although all modern propoapproaches are heavily influenced by it. Symeonides
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969). This is the most prevalent approach, used by at least twenty-two states for torts. Symeonides
222. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966)
223. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice- Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966). This approach (also known as the "better law" approach) is used by Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin for torts. Symeonides
224. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963). Baxter's approach is arguably used in California. Symeonides
225. see also Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 721-24 (Cal. 1976).
226. An example from a contract case is Dillard v. Shaughnessy, Fickel & Scott Architects, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). The Missouri Court of Appeals, using the Second Restatement, applied Kansas law to interpret a contract entered into in Missouri, on the ground that the subject matter of the contract was a building project in Kansas.
227. see JOHN PAWLEY BATE, NOTES ON THE DOCTRINE OF RENVOI IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1904).
228. Discussion of this issue has largely occurred in the context of the socalled renvoi problem in choice of law. But renvoi in fact addresses a different issue. Renvoi had its origin in the traditional approach. To see how it was supposed to work, consider Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113, 113-14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
229. E.g., Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REV. 555, 563 (1984)
230. Lea Brilmayer, The Problem of Provenance: Constructing a Positive Law Foundation for Choice of Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Donald Earl Childress III ed., forthcoming)
231. See, E.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 97 (1991)
232. Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The Law of a Country," 27 YALE L.J. 509, 517-18 (1918) (arguing that nations do not consider their choice-of-law rules to be binding upon foreign courts).