Plan B for campaign-finance reform: Can the FCC help save American politics after citizens united?

Catholic University Law Review

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 97-174

  Levi, Lili ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874274599     PISSN: 00088390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (397)

1. See 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
2. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
3. (codified as amended at 2 U. S. C. §§ 431-456 (2006));
4. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U. S. 93, 224 (2003) (upholding most of the 2002 BCRA's provisions, including the "electioneering communication" provisions and the "soft money" ban)
5. overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at913.
6. See. e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, 12 MONTHS AFTER: THE EFFECTS OF CITIZENS UNITED ON ELECTIONS AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 17-22(2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/citizens-united-20110113.pdf;
7. Dan Eggen, Corporate Sponsorship Is a Campaign Issue on Which Both Parties Can Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010, at A15;
8. Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Speeding Locomotive: Did the Roberts Court Misjudge the Public Mood on Campaign Finance Reform?, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2010, 2:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2242557.
9. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, 57 N. Y. REV. BOOKS 63, 63 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens United Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 650 (2011);
11. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L. J. 978, 1025 (2011);
12. Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 643, 660-61 (2011);
13. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 582-83 (2011);
14. Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn't Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 954-55 (2011);
15. Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfrn? abstract-id=1829474;
16. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 176 (2010);
17. Justin J. Wert, Ronald Keith Gaddie & Charles S. Bullock, III, Of Benedick and Beatrice: Citizens United and the Reign of the Laggard Court, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 719, 719-20 (2011);
18. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO. L. REV. 2365, 2368-69 (2010).
19. But see Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment... United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 935 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court properly protected citizens' civil liberties in Citizens United).
20. See Paul Blumenthal, The Citizens United Effect: 40 Percent of Outside Money Made Possible by Supreme Court Ruling, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 4, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://sunlight foundation.com/blog/2010/11/04/the-citizens-united-effect- 40-percent-of-outside-money-madepossible-by-supreme-court-ruling/;
21. Kathleen Ronayne, OpenSecrets.org Unveils 2010 'Big Picture' Analysis, OPENSECRETS. ORG (July 26, 2011, 7:20 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/ 07/2010-election-big-picture.html.
22. See infra Part I. C: see also Kim Barker & Marian Wang, Super PACs and Dark Money: ProPublica 's Guide to the New World of Campaign Finance, PROPUBLICA (July 11, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/ superPACs-propublicas-guide-to-the-newworld-of-campaign-finance (predicting that the 2012 election season will set a new record for Section spending due to a wide array of organizations capable of hiding funding sources).
23. See, e.g., BILL DE BLASIO, THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Citizens United and the 2010 Midterm Elections 26(2010), available at http://advocate.nyc.gov/files/12-06-10CitizensUnitedReport.pdf;
24. see also CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 3(2011), available at httP://ssrn.com/abstract= 1776482 (discussing corporations' and unions' ability to be involved in ejections by spending through intermediaries, which does not require disclosure following Citizens United).
25. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
26. Richard L. Hasen, Justice Kennedy's Mistaken Citizens United Vision and the Lurch °ward Campaign Finance Deregulation, ACSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acs blog/justice-kennedy's-mistaken-citizens-united- vision-and-the-lurch-toward-campaign-financedere.
27. See Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1155, 1159, 1161-65 (2011);
28. see also Michael S. Kang, The Campaign Finance Debated After Citizens United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1142, 1153 (2011)
29. See Matea Gold & Melanie Mason, Independent Groups Getting a Head Start on 2012 Campaign, L. A. TIMES, July 17, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/ 2011/jul/17/nation/la-naoutside-spending-20110717.
30. See Jeanne Cummings, Don't Adjust Your Set: Now Campaign Ads Never End, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2011, 4:38 AM), www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51535.html (internal quotation marks omitted). For arguments that a clear distinction between governance and campaigning no longer exists
31. see generally THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE (Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000).
32. Petition for Rulemaking at 1, Amendment of 47 C. F. R. § 73.1212 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n filed Mar. 12, 2011), available at http://ecfsdocs.fcc. gov/filings/2011/03/22/60l6374308.html (hereinafter MAP Petition);
33. see also Paul Blumenthal, Super PACs and Secret Money: The Unregulated Shadow Campaign, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2011, 1:49 AM), http://www. huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/26./super PACs-secret-money-campaign-finance-n- 977699.html;
34. John Yoo & David W. Marston, Overruling Citizens United with Chicago-Style Politics: Federal Contract Bidders Must Disclose Political Giving, LEGAL OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst, for Pub. Pol'y Res., Wash., D. C.), July 2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/LO-2011-07-No-2-g.pdf (noting the significance of the proposed rule change and positing that its implementation would unduly expand current FEC disclosure requirements, chill political speech, and provide a powerful new tool for the FCC).
35. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff. Political Advertisements in the Era of Fleeting Indecent Images and Utterances, 84 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 199, 212 (2010) (noting the survival of the Zapple doctrine).
36. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064, 1089
37. (codified as amended at 47 U. S. C. § 315 (2006)).
38. See James Warren, Never Mind the 'Vast Wasteland.' Minow Has More to Say, N. Y. TIMES, May 7, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/05/08/us/08cncwarren.html (referring to former FCC Chairman Newton Minow's now-iconic description of television).
39. See, e.g., Donna F. Edwards, A Call to Bold Action, BOS. REV., Sept./Oct. 2010, at 23-24
40. 1 Lyle Denniston, Analysis: ANew Law to Offset Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/analysis- a-new-law-to-offset-citizens-unitedV (quoting President Barak Obama's assertion that Citizens United "has given a green light to a new stampede of special interest money in our politics");
41. see also Michael Malone, Report: O & Os Big Beneficiaries of '10 Political Cash, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www. broadcastingcable.com/article/445944-Report-O Os-Big-Beneficiaries-of- 10PoliticalCash.php
42. See Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 217, 217 (2010);
43. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41542, THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS l & n. l (2011) (describing the 1907 Tillman Act, which Congress enacted to prohibit federally created campaign contributions from banks and corporations).
44. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
45. (codified as amended at 2 U. S. C. §§ 431-435 (2006)).
46. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat 81 (2002)
47. (codified as amended at 2 U. S. C. §§ 431-456 (2006));
48. S. REP. No. 105-167, at 4468 (1998) ("[S]oft money spending by political party committees eviscerates the ability of the FECA to limit the funds contributed by individuals, corporations, or unions for the defect or benefit of specific candidates.").
49. BCRA, sec. 101, § 323, 116 Stat, at 82-84;
50. 116 Stat, at 88-90.
51. 540 U. S. 93, 224 (2003) ("In the main we uphold BCRA's two principal, complementary features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering communications.")
52. overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
53. 548 U. S. 230, 262 (2006).
54. 551 U. S. 449, 456, 476 (2007).
55. 554 U. S. 724, 729, 744-49 (2008).
56. For the fifth decision in this series, see Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011)
57. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010)
58. (citing 2 U. S. C. § 441b (2006)).
59. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 211, § 301(17), 116 Stat. 81, 92-93 (2002)
60. (codified as amended at 2 U. S. C. § 431 (2006)
61. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886-87.
62. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275, 279-80 (D. D. C. 2008) (per curiam)
63. affd in Port, rev'dinpart, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
64. Citizens United v. FEC, 552 U. S. 1278, 1278 (2008).
65. Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753, at * 1 (D. D. C. July 18, 2008)
66. affd in part, rev 'd in part, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The case returned to the Supreme Court in 2008.
67. Citizens United v. FEC, 555 U. S. 1028, 1028 (2008).
68. Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009);
69. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 4944 U. S. 652, 654, 660 (1990)
70. overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
71. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
72. BCRA, sec. 201, § 304 (f) (3XA), 116 Stat, at 88-89
73. (codified as amended at 2 U. S. C. §434 (2006)).
74. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.
75. BCRA, sec. 311, § 318 (dX2), 116 Stat, at 106
76. (codified as amended at 2 U. S. C. § 411d (2006)).
77. BCRA, sec. 207, § 304 (f), 116 Stat, at 88
78. (codified as amended at 2 U. S. C. § 434 (f)).
79. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
80. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916
81. 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010).
82. (quoting Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Fund, Inc., 525 U. S. 182, 191 (1999)).
83. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (alteration in original)
84. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 66 (1976)
85. Buckley, 424 U. S. at 18-76.
86. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (citations omitted)
87. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U. S. 93, 197 (2003)
88. overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913).
89. (quoting McConnell, 540 U. S. at 259)).
90. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D. C. Cir. 2010)
91. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 697.
92. United States v. Danielczyk, No. 1: 11cr85 (JCC), 2011 WL 2268063, at *2-6 (E. D. Va. June 7, 2011)
93. See PR Watcher, Center for Media and Democracy Submits Amicus Brief Defending Campaign Disclosure Rules, PRWATCH (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/03 0325/center-media-and-democracy-submits- amicus-brief-defending-campaign-disclosure-rul (noting a Koch-funded group's challenge, brought in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, to new disclosure rules Wisconsin passed in the wake of Citizens United);
94. Washington Post: Citizens United Decision Reverberates in Courts Across Country, DEMOCRACY 21 (May 22, 2011), http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type= B-PR&SEC=%7B ACS 1D4FF-0476-4E28-B9B1-7619D271A334%7D&DE= %7BCEAE65A4-BE66-40C3-A92F-CD54BAA4F7D6%7D (reporting that James Bopp, the legal architect of the Citizens United challenge, and his colleagues are litigating between twenty-five and thirty cases across the country, including challenges to state disclosure rules);
95. see also David D. Kirkpatrick, A Quest to End Spending Rules for Campaigns, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, at A11
96. But see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1084 (2011)
97. Adam Liptak, A Blockbuster Case Yields an Unexpected Result, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/disclosure-may-be-real- legacy-ofcitizens-united-case.html (noting that lower courts "embraced the ruling" in Citizens United and relied on it when rebutting attacks against disclosure laws).
98. David G. Savage & Kim Geiger, Secret Campaign Ad Financing in Offing as FEC Is Deadlocked, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/ 20U/feb/28/nation/la-naelection-commission-deadlock-20110228;
99. Richard L. Hasen, The FEC Is As Good As Dead, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2011/01/the- fec-is-as-good-as-dead.html.
100. see also TAYLOR LINCOLN & CRAIG HOLMAN, PUB. CITIZEN, FADING DISCLOSURE: INCREASING NUMBER OF ELECTIONEERING GROUPS KEEP DONORS' IDENTITIES SECRET 4-5(2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Disclosure- report-final.pdf (discussing the FEC's disclosure exceptions, including the agency's interpretation of its rules to require disclosure only if donors earmarked their money for specific electioneering communications at the time of contribution). Recently, the FEC unanimously approved federal-candidate and officeholder solicitations for independent, expenditure-only Political Action Committees (PACs).
101. See Lisa Rosenberg, Semi-Soft Money Prevails at the FEC, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 30, 2011, 2:55 PM), http://sunlight foundation.com/blog/2011/06/30/semi- soft-money-prevails-at-the-fec/("[CJandidates and elected officials may only ask for contributions of $5, 000 or less from individuals, but the Super PACs are free to take unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations and labor unions.").
102. See, e.g., Andy Kroll, Unmasking Dark Money Is Good for Democracy-and for the Bottom Line, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 7, 2011, 9:35 AM), http://motherjones.com/ mojo/2011/09/citizens-united-dark-rnoney-corporations-disclosure (defining "dark money" as money from anonymous fundraisers). For a description of "campaign finance disclosure in a nutshell", see
103. see also I. R. C. § 501 (c) (2006).
104. (citing Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next "Loophole? ", 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 41 (2007)).
105. Marian Wang, As Political Groups Push Envelope, FEC Gridlock Gives 'De Facto Green Light', PROPUBLICA (Nov. 7, 2011, 12:16 PM), http://www.propublica. org article/as-political-donors-push-«nvelope-fec-gridlock-gives-de-facto- green-light/single (discussing the polarization between Republican and Democratic groups).
106. Richard L. Hasen, After the Other Shoe Drops, AM. INT (Oct.12, 2010), http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=l 141 (discussing three post-Citizens United rulings that "have contributed to the precipitous decline in our campaign finance laws").
107. Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks- president-state-union-address.
108. TimothyWerner, The Sound, the Fury, and the Nonevent: Business Power and Market Reactions to the Citizens United Decision, 39 AM. POL. RES. 118, 124-25 (2011).
109. See Erika Franklin Fowler & Travis N. Ridout, Advertising Trends in 2010, 8 FORUM, 2010, at 2.
110. ElectionStats: 2010, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ elec-stats.php?cycle=2010 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
111. STEVEN WALDMAN, WORKING GRP. ON INFO. NEEDS OF CMTYS., THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE CHANGING MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND AGE 75-76(2011), available at http://transition. fcc.gov/osp/inc-report/ TheJnformation-Needs-of-Communities.pdf;
112. see also Joel Connelly, Karl Rove, Koch Brothers-on Your TV, in Your Mailbox, SEATTLEPI (Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/connelly/ article/Karl-Rove-Koch-Brothers-on-your-TV-in-your-104542 l.php (reporting that "$47 million worth of TV spots aired on local TV stations in the 2010 'off-year' election").
113. See Michael Malone, PEJ Study: 2010 Was a Good Year for Stations, Grim Trends ""d All, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/465205-PEJ-Study-2010-Was-a-Good-Year- For-Stations-Grim-Trends-and-All.php
114. See Dan Eggen, New Breed of 'Super PACs', Other Independent Groups Could Define W2 Campaign, WASH. POST, July 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/new-breedof-super-pacs-other-independent-groups-could-define-2012- ampaign/2011/06/29/gHQAo47FyH-Story.html ("Dozens of super PACs and nonprofit groups have sprung up over the past year....");
115. Dave Levinthal, 2011 Sees Super PAC Explosion, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2011, 11:26 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65310.html
116. Dan Froomkin, Candidate-Specific Super PACs Offer End Run For Maxed-Out Donors: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2011, 11:22 PM), http://www. huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/04/candidate-specific-super-pacs-donors-n-994260.html
117. Reid Wilson, Outside Groups Deflate Obama's Bully Pulpit, ATLANTIC, July 7, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/07/outside-groups- deflate-obamas-bullypulpit/241569/#.
118. Jack Gillum, Democratic Group Founded by Former Obama Aides Raises $5 Million to Counter GOP-Leaning Ads, STAR TRIB., July 31, 2011, http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/126485298.html (discussing the creation of a Democratic outside group to parry Republican groups);
119. Eduardo Porter, Editorial, How the Big Money Finds a Way In, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/18/opinion/sunday/how-the-big- money-finds-a-way-in.html (discussing Democrats' donations to an independent group called Priorities USA Action).
120. Michael Luo, Effort to Set Up Liberal Counterweight to G. O. P. Groups Begins, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at A18-19
121. Jim Rutenberg, New Liberals Offer Donors a Cash Cloak, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2011, at A3 (discussing the importance of liberal groups' involvement in coordinating an attack against conservative groups);
122. Julian Brookes, Why the 2012 Election Will Be the Most Expensive Ever, ROLLING STONE (June 7, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/ biogs/national-affairs/why-the-2012-election-will-be-the-most-expensive-ever- 20110607 (identifying new Democratic political groups and discussing outside groups' potential impact on the high anticipated expenses of the 2012 election);
123. Steven Greenhouse, A Campaign Finance Ruling Turned to Labor's Advantage, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/politics/a- campaign-finance-ruling-tumed-to-laborsadvantage.html?ref=campaign finance (describing labor unions' response to Citizens United).
124. Paul Blumenthal, Citizens United Knocks Obama for Campaign Finance Hypocrisy, HUFFtNGTON POST (June 30, 2010, 9:06 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. com/20l 1/06/30/citizens-united-knocks-obama-campaign-finance-n-887557.html?new= screen.html.
125. Raymond J. La Raja, Will Citizens United v. FEC Give More Political Power to Corporations? 3 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1642175 (concluding that although Citizens United will likely increase business-group independent spending, particularly on behalf of Republican candidates, it will also create a spending "arms race" and increase election-related spending by all groups).
126. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 1;
127. see also Steven L. Winter, Citizens Disunited, 27 GA. ST-U. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2011)
128. (citing Congressional Campaigns: Half of Outside Spending in Campaigns Came from Groups Not Revealing Donors, BNA MONEY & POL. REP., Nov. 12, 2010);
129. see also Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., Non-Parry Spending Doubled in 2010 But Did Not Dictate the Results (Nov. 5, 2010) [hereinafter CFI Press Release], available at http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/10-ll-05/Non-Party- Spending-Doubled-But-Did-Not-Dictate-Results.aspx
130. Michael M. Franz, ErikaFranklin Fowler & Travis N. Ridout, Citizens United and Campaign Advertising in 2010, at 6 (2011)
131. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9-10.
132. See Michael Luo & Griff Palmer, Outside Groups on the Right Flexed Muscles in House Races, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at P6;
133. see also Michael M. Franz, The Citizens United Election? Or Same As It Ever Was?, 8 FORUM, 2010, at 1, 16;
134. Nicholas Confessore, Without 'Super PAC Numbers, Campaign Filings Present an Incomplete Picture, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.nytirnes.com/ 2011/10/21/us/politics/CMnpaign-finance-filings-present-an-incomplete-picture. html (discussing strategic uses of super PACs that support individual candidates to run negative ads while the candidates themselves focus on positive messages).
135. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9 (claiming that over forty percent of the money spent by outside groups came from ten entities).
136. See Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS. ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ outsidesPending/index.php?cycle=2010&view=A&chart=N (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
137. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 10.
138. cf. Michael Luo & Stephanie Strom, Donor Names Remain Secret as Rules Shift, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, at A1
139. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape, OPENSECRETS. ORG (May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/ news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-arTects-political-landscape. html (reporting on a Center for Responsive Politics study).
140. TAYLORLINCOLN, PUB. CITIZEN, DISCLOSURE ECLIPSE: NEARLY HALF OF OUTSIDE GROUPS KEPT DONORS SECRET IN 2010; TOP 10 GROUPS REVEALED SOURCES OF ONLY ONE IN FOUR DOLLARS SPENT 4(2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ Eclipsed-Disclosurelll82010.pdf;
141. see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 10-11 (noting the significant decrease in disclosure by groups making electioneering communications in 2008 after the decision in WRTL).
142. Mike McIntyre, The Secret Sponsors, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at 1, 6 (describing a reporter's attempt to track down the members of the "Coalition to Protect Seniors");
143. Liz Cox Barrett, NYT Noses Around, Still Knows Nothing, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.cjr.org/campaign-desk/nyt-noses-around-still- knows-n.php.
144. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 12 (basing this conclusion on the fact that, in sixty of the seventy-five congressional contests involving a change in partisan power, outside group spending favored the victor, and in the six such Senate races, supporters of the victors outspent the loser by an average of $2.7 million).
145. See Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect, and Repetition in Public Debate, 75 MO. L. REV. 143, 154-55 (2010) (noting the dearth of understanding about the relationships among campaign financing, campaign activities, and political outcomes in the legal literature).
146. Susan Clark Muntean, Corporate Independent Spending in the Post-BCRA to Pre-Citizem United Era, 13 BUS. & POL., no. 1, 2010 at 1.
147. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 687-91 (2010)
148. Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus", 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1157-58 (2003)
149. Lyrissa Bamett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 831-32
150. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 983, 997-98 (2005)
151. Marisa Guthrie, Campaign Finance Ruling Could Spell Political-Ad Windfall, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:58 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.eom/article/4 45390-Campaign-Finance-Ruling-Could- Spell Political-Ad-Windfall.php?rssid=20069.
152. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, The Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Disclosure Laws, 16 CHAP. J. L. & POL'Y 59, 66 (2011)
153. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 12-16;
154. see also Ronald Dworkin, The "Devastating" Decision, N. Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at 39 ("The Court has given lobbyists... a nuclear weapon. ");
155. David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate. html ("A lobbyist can now tell any elected official: if you vote wrong, my company, labor union or interest group will spend unlimited sums explicitly advertising against your re-election.... The decision seeks to let voters choose for themselves among a multitude of voices and ideas when they go to the polls, but it will also increase the power of organized interest groups at the expense of candidates and political parties.");
156. cf. PUB. CITIZEN, CAUSE FOR CONCERN: MORE THAN 40% OF HILL STAFFERS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC CITIZEN SURVEY SAY LOBBYISTS WIELD MORE POWER BECAUSE OF CITIZENS UNITED 3(2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Causefor- Concern.pdf
157. See Luciana Carraro & Luigi Castelli, The Implicit and Explicit Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: Is the Source Really Blamed?, 31 POL. PSYCHOL. 617, 618-19 (2010)
158. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC. The Constitutional Right that Big Corporations Should Have Bui Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 655-59 (2011);
159. But see Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L. J. 622, 633-34 (2010)
160. Suzy Khimm, Bill de Blasio: Citizens United Avenger, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 22, 2010, 3:00 AM PDT), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/09/bill-de-blasio- citizens-united-avenger.
161. Suzy Khimm, Is Target Still Paying the Price for Citizens United?, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 7, 2010, 7:56 AM PDT), nttp://motherj ones.com/mojo/2010/09/ target-paying-price-citizens-united.
162. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311
163. MONICA YOUN, AM. CONST. SOC'Y L. & POL'Y, CITIZENS UNITED: THE AFTERMATH 3-7(2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/ACS- Issue-Brief-Youn-Citizens-United.pdf
164. Cf. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 46-59 (1997) (discussing the potential for political extortion of corporations).
165. See Congressional Elections, OPENSECRETS. ORG, http://www.opensecrets. org/races/index.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
166. See Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day Prisoner's Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1127-32 (2011)
167. Ron A. Schotland, The Post-Citizens United FantasyLand, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 753, 753 (2011)
168. Noam N. Levey & Kim Geiger, Much Corporate Political Spending Stays Hidden, L. A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/23/ nation/la-na-money-politics-survey-20110424
169. Dan Eggen, Surge in PACs at the Last, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2010
170. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9;
171. see also Marian Wang, FEC Data Shaw Big Jump in Spending by Super PACs and Outside Groups, PROPUBUCA (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/ fec-data-show-rise-of-super-pacs-and-outside-spending. The Center for Responsive Politics has tracked close to $6 million in spending by outside groups already for the 2012 cycle. 2012
172. Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS. ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ outsidespending/summ.php?disp=0.
173. Spencer MacColl, Super PAC Registrations Accelerate, Favor Conservatives, OPENSECRETS. ORG (June 17, 2011, 3:06 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/ 2011/06/superpac-registrations-accelerate.html.
174. Nicholas Confessore, Super PAC Plans Major Primary Campaign for Perry, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/us/politics/ 07donate.html?ref=campaignfinance (noting that a new super PAC called "Make Us Great Again" plans to spend up to $55 million to help Rick Perry win the Republican presidential nomination).
175. Alex Leary, In 2012 Elections, Expect More Attack Ads with the Rise of Super PACs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://www.tampabay.com/news/ politics/national/articlel 181968.ece.
176. Elite Donors Do Double Duty: Presidential Super PACs Attract Wealthy Donors Who Have Maxed Out to Candidates, OPENSECRETS. ORG (Oct. 4, 2011, 12:15 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/10/elitedonors-do-double-duty-for- super-pacs.html.
177. Michael Beckel, Would a PAC By Any Other Name Sound As Sweet?, OPENSECRETS. ORG (Sept. 29, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/ 2011/09/a-pac-by-any-other-name.html
178. Comm. on House Admin., U. S. House of Representatives 4 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Final%20testimony%20on%20CU.pdf;
179. see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 2-3.
180. H. R. J. Res. 74, 1 Hth Cong. § 1 (2010). Similarly, Senators Christopher Dodd and Tom Udall proposed a constitutional amendment in response to Citizens United.
181. S. J. Res. 29, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010);
182. See also R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.. R41054, CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 3 (2010)
183. See generally Senator Torn Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner's Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 235 (2010).
184. Elizabeth Garrett, Voting With Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (2003)
185. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 85 (2010)
186. (citing Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H. R. 4790, 111th Cong. § 4 (a)).
187. See Save Our Democracy from Foreign Influence Act of 2010, H. R. 4523, 111th Cong.
188. Rick Hasen, President's Statement on Passage of DISCLOSE Act in House Committee, ELECTION L. BLOG (May 20, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/ ?p=14873;
189. Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After Citizens United, 52 B. C. L. REV. 1027, 1056 (2011)
190. Peter Overby, Who Writes the Check? Group Wants Voters to Know, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/22/134746513/who-writes- the-check-groupwants-voters-to-know
191. Dan Eggen, Concerned Taxpayers Group Is Powered by Only Two Donors, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2010, at A6.
192. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 17-19
193. Note, Restoring Electoral Equilibrium in the Wake of Constitutionalized Campaign Finance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1545 (2011).
194. DISCLOSE Act, H. R.5175, 111th Cong. (2010);
195. H. R. 5175, § 1 (a).
196. H. R. 5175, §§ 201-203, 211-215, 221, 231, 301;
197. see also R. SAM GARRETT, L. PAIGE WHITAKER & ERIKA K. LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41264, THE DISCLOSE ACT (H. R. 5175): OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1-22 (2010) (providing an overview of the proposed DISCLOSE Act).
198. see Deborah G. Johnson, Priscilla M. Regan & Kent Wayland, Campaign Disclosure, Privacy, and Transparency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 968 (2011);
199. Life After Citizens United, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan 4, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607;
200. Press Release, Campaign Legal Ctr., IRS Urged to Review Crossroads GPS Tax Status: 501 (c) (4) Status Questioned for Anonymously Funded Attack Ad Vehicle (Oct. 5, 2010), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index. php?option=com-content& view=article&id=1119:10-5-2010-irs-urged-to- review-crossroads-gps-tax-status-501 c4-statusquestioned-for-anonymously-funded- attack-ad-vehicle-&catid=63&Itemid=61 (reporting their claim that Crossroads GPS operated in violation of 501 (c) (4)). In addition, legal academics petitioned the SEC to adopt disclosure rules for political expenditures, with newspaper editorial support.
201. See, e.g., Editorial, Serving Shareholders and Democracy, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/opinion/serving-shareholders- and-democracy.html?ref=campaign finance.
202. See IRS Calls Off Gift Tax Investigation of Donors to Karl Rove's Crossroads GPS, TAXPROF BLOG (July 7, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof- blog/20n/07/irs-calls-.html (announcing that the IRS will not continue its investigation into the applicability of the gift tax to contributions to 501 (c) (4) organizations, apparently due to Republican lawmaker pressure);
203. Sean Parnell, IRS Won't Tax Donations to 501 (c) (4) Groups, CTR. COMPETITIVE POL. (July 7, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/blog/ detail/irs-wont-tax-donations-to-50Ic4-groups (deciding that prior donations to 501 (c) (4) organizations are not subject to IRS gift taxes);
204. Stephanie Strom, I. R. S. Drops Audits of Political Donors, N. Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at B1 (noting that the IRS has ceased to pursue gift taxes stemming from contributions to 501 (c) (4) groups);
205. see also Democracy 21 and Campaign Legal Center Challenge Legality of IRS Regulations as Failing to Properly Limit Campaign Activity by 501 (c) (4) Organizations, DEMOCRACY 21 (July 27, 2011), http://www.democracy21.org/index. asp?Type=B-PR&SEC=%7B91FCBI39-CC82-4DDD-AE4E-3 A81 E6427C7F%7D&DE= %7BD68E818D-632 A-4F25-B4E3-979BD1139F A4% 7D (asserting that the IRS regulates all groups qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 40I (cX4) to "make far more campaign expenditures than is allowed by law");
206. See Alex Knott, Van Hollen Sues FEC for More Disclosure, ROLL CALL (Apr. 21, 2011, 2:24 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/van-hollen-sues-fec-for-more- disclosure-205082-1.html;
207. Kenneth P. Vogel, Federal Election Commission Sued to Disclose Anonymous Donors, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2011, 11:17 AM), http://www.rjolitico.com/news/ stories/0411/53534.html.
208. Paul Blumenthal, Draft Executive Order on Outside Spending Disclosure Would Have Sweeping Reach, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/04/22/draft-executi ve-order-on-outside- spending-disclosure-would-have-sweepingreach/.
209. Sam Stein, Obama Administration Drafts Executive Order on Contractor Donation Transparency, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2011, 5:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 11/04/19/obama-administration-drafts-order-n-8S 1228.html.
210. For a discussion of Citizens Unitecfs potential impact on FCC regulations (rather than the use of FCC rules to promote the underlying vision of Citizens United), see generally Elizabeth Elices, Citizens United and the Future of FCC Content Regulation, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 51 (2010).
211. see also Kevin Downey, In Political Spending, AH Markets Not Equal, TVNEWSCHECK (Mar. 2, 2010, 8:41 AM), http://www.rvnewscheck.com/arti cle/2010/03/03/40321/in-political-spending-all-markets-not-equal (estimating that television Political-advertising expenditures would exceed $2.7 billion in 2010).
212. Press Release. Michael J. Copps, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Statement of Michael J. Copps on Release of FCC Staff Report "The Technology and Information Needs of Communities" (June 9, 2011), available at http://transition. fcc.gov/Daily Releases/Daily Business/2011/db0609/DOC- 307421A1.pdf.
213. See 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) (2006).
214. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 19, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170.
215. Richard Kieibowicz & Linda Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship Identification Regulations, 1927-1963, 56 FED. COMM. L. J. 329, 334 (2004) ("[Rep. Emanuel Celler) unsuccessfully pressed for an amendment that would require stations to label such broadcast content as 'advertising', not simply as 'paid for' or 'furnished by' an interested party"
216. (citing 67 CONG. REC. 2309 (1926)).
217. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 317, 48 Stat 1064, 1089
218. (codified as amended at 47 U. S. C. § 317 (2006)).
219. Section 508 makes nondisclosure of sponsorship by broadcast employees, program suppliers, and sponsors a crime. Communications Act Amendments, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, sec. 8 (b), § 508, 74 Stat. 889, 896
220. (codified as amended at 47 U. S. C. § 508 (2006));
221. see Ellen Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (2006).
222. See Communications Act of 1934 §§ 2-3
223. (codified as amended at 47 U. S. C. §§ 152 (a), 153) (2006)).
224. 47 C. F. R. § 76. 1615 (2009);
225. 47 C. F. R. § 73. 1212 (2010) (tracking the language of section 317 (a) (1) of the Communications Act of 1934 very closely).
226. 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) (2006) ("If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station. " (emphasis added)).
227. Colin Vandell, Note, Words Signifying Nothing? The Evolution of§ 315 (a) in an Age of Deregulation and Its Effect on Television News Coverage of Presidential Elections, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 443, 447 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)
228. (quoting DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 603 (McGraw-Hill 1999)).
229. 47 C. F. R. § 73. 1940 (a) (2).
230. TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 23-24 (2010).
231. See 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) (2006).
232. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F. C. C.2d 707 (1970) (discussing whether broadcast stations had obligations to provide equal opportunities for political messages by candidate supporters and opponents, as well as candidates themselves);
233. see Ann Kramer Ricchiuto, The End for Equal Time?: Revealing the Statutory Myth of Fair Election Coverage, 38 IND. L. REV. 267, 281 n. 95 (2005).
234. Nicholas Zapple, Comm'ns Counsel, Comm. on Commerce, 23 F. C. C. 2d 707, 707 (1970).
235. see also Cullman Broad. Co., 40 F. C. C. 576, 577 (1963).
236. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F. C. C. 2d at 707.
237. Act of Sept. 14, 1959. Pub. L. No. 88-274, sec. 1. § 315 (c), 73 Stat. 557, 557
238. (codified as amended at 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) (1) - (4) (2006)).
239. 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a). Section 315 (b), as currently codified, also constrains what charges broadcast stations can impose on political advertising.
240. Seth Grossman, Note, Creating Competitive and Informative Campaigns: A Comprehensive Approach to "Free Air Time "for Political Candidates, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 351, 355-57, 377 (2004).
241. Codification of Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, 681 (1991).
242. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal-candidate reasonable-access provision under the First Amendment in CBS, Inc. V. FCC. 453 U. S. 367 (1981) ("Section 312 (a) (7) represents an effort by Congress to assure that an important resource-the airwaves-will be used in the public interest. We hold that the statutory right of access, as defined by the Commission and applied in these cases, properly balances the First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters.").
243. 424 U. S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
244. see also Recent Case, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Ninth Circuit Holds Montana Election Contribution Disclosure Requirements Unconstitutional as Applied to De Minimis Contributions-Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church of East Helena, Inc. V. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2009)
245. 123 HARV. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2010) (applying the three rationales in the ballot-related context).
246. See Edward Wyatt, The Caucus. A Plea for More Disclosure on Political Ads, N. V. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, http://mecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/a- plea-for-moredisclosure-on-political-ads/(discussing disclosure advocates' pleas to the FCC for assistance in strengthening rules following Citizens United).
247. (citing Act of Aug. 29, 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 539, 554
248. (codified as amended at 18 U. S. C. § 1734 (2006))) (explaining that the legislation required
249. See generally Richard B. Kielbowicz, Postal Subsidies for the Press and the Business of Mass Culture, 1880-1920, 64 BUS. HIST. REV. 64 (1990) (providing a historical summary of postal advertising). Congress enacted the Newspaper Publicity Act as a rider to the 1912 postal appropriations bill.
250. (quoting FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 47 (Arno Press, Inc. reprt. ed. 1974)
251. (quoting COMM'N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 64 (1947)).
252. see also Clay Calvert, What Is News?: The FCC and the Battle Over the Regulation of Video News Releases, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 361, 366-67 (2008)
253. (quoting Sponsorship Identification Rules, 34 F. C. C. 829, 849 (1963)).
254. (quoting Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F. C. C. 141, 141 (1963)
255. modified, 40 Fed. Reg. 41, 936 (Sept. 9, 1975)).
256. See generally Identification of Sponsors, 9 Fed. Reg. 12, 817 (Oct. 25, 1944).
257. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F. C. C. 141, 150 (1963)
258. modified, 40 Fed. Reg. 41, 936 (Sept. 9, 1975).
259. Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 1616, 1616 (1992)
260. Compare Announcement of Sponsored Programs, 9 Fed. Reg. 14, 734 (Dec. 12, 1944)
261. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F. C. C. 141, 150 (1963)
262. modified, 40 Fed. Reg. 41, 936 (Sept. 9, 1975).
263. see also Paul Loveday, 87 F. C. C. 2d 492, 497 (1981) (reiterating VOTER'S focus on the identity of the person with editorial control).
264. Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1445 (D. C. Cir. 1983).
265. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F. C. C. 141, 150 (1963)
266. 47 U. S. C. §317 (2006).
267. See 47 C. F. R. § 73. 1212 (e) (2010).
268. John Eggerton, Survey Says: Put Contributors On Air, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Sept. 16, 2010, 4:08 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/ 457220-Survey-Says-Put-Contributors-On-Air.php
269. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010);
270. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam).
271. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916;
272. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914
273. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U. S. 93, 196 (2003)
274. overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913).
275. McConnell, 540 U. S. at 196-97.
276. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916
277. (quoting McConnell, 540 U. S. at 259
278. See E. Rebecca Gantt, Note, Toward Recognition of a Monetary Threshold in Campaign Finance Disclosure Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 385, 399-400 (2011)
279. See William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 861-62 (2011).
280. McConnell, 540 U. S. at 196.
281. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914
282. (quoting McConnell, 540 U. S. at 198).
283. see also Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 passim (2010);
284. see also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 268 (2000)
285. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 651 (2011)
286. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L. J. 273, 299-301 (2010)
287. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255 (2010)
288. See David Lourie, ANote, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After the Proposition 8 Campaign, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 155-56 (2009).
289. See Alexandre Couture Gagnon & Filip Palda, The Price of Transparency: Do Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws Discourage Political Participation by Citizens' Groups?, 146 PUB. CHOICE 353, 353-74 (2011).
290. see also James Bopp, Jr. & Jared Haynie, Citizens Divided on Citizens Vmted. Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment: The Tyranny of "Reform and Transparency": A Plea to the Supreme Court to Revisit and Overturn Citizens United's "Disclaimer and Disclosure" Holding, 16 NEXUS 3, 19 (2010)
291. See Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 75 (2010) (discussing the "unintended effect" of enabling political candidates to trace the origin of their financial support).
292. See Note, Restoring Electoral Equilibrium in the Wake of Constitutionalized Campaign Finance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1128-31 (2011).
293. Cf. Jonathan C. Zellner, Note, Artificial Grassroots Advocacy and the Constitutionality of Legislative Identification and Control Measures, 43 CONN. L. REV. 357, 361 (2010)
294. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010)
295. accord Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 987 (2011).
296. see PATRICIA MOLONEY FLGLIOLA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32589, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ITS ROLE IN THE CHANGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS LANDSCAPE 3 n. 4 (2011)
297. see also Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L. J. 295, 295 (2005)
298. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010)
299. see also Michael Isikoff, Firm Gives $ I Million to Pro-Romney group, Then Dissolves, Records Offer No Clues Who Was Behind Mystery Company that Donated to 'Super PAC, MSNBC. COM (Aug. 4, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn. eom/id/44011308/ns/politics-decision-2012/t/firm-gives- million-pro-romney-group-then-dissolves/#. Tj2YTGH5NrY
300. See Dan Eggen, Mystery Pro-Romney Donor Revealed as Former Executive at Private Equity Firm, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2011, at A2.
301. See Brad Hooker, Men Linked to Corporate Donations to Pro-Romney Super PAC Have Long History of Donating to Romney, OPENSECRETS. ORG (Sept. 13, 2011, 4:50 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/0 9/money-men-pro-romney-super PAC.html;
302. see also Ronald Campbell, SuperPACs May Leave Official Campaigns in Dust, OC REGISTER. COM (Sept. 19, 2011, 5:02 AM), http://articl es.ocregister.com/ 2011-09-19/news/30177265-1-romney-super-pac-priorities-usa-action-romney- campaign
303. See. e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Rove the Bogeyman Is Back, POLITICO (Sept. 30, 2010, 4:32 AM), htrp://dyn. politico.corn/memrjeiVforurnsytrtft^xfm?catid= l&subcatid=2&threadid-4 572980&adv=l
304. Cf. Editorial, The FCC Muzzle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2011, at A16 ("The petition also seems to have pulled the 25% and 10% disclosure thresholds out of the air, because it makes no attempt to justify them.").
305. See, e.g., Michael Corcoran & Stephen Maher, Media Don 't Bile the Ruling that Feeds Them, FAIR (Jan. 2011), http://www.fair.org/index. php7pageM223.
306. See 47 U. S. C. §317 (2006);
307. See The History of the Good Housekeeping Seal. GOODHOUSEKEHPFR, http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/product-reviews/history/(last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
308. See Tom Denari, Why Attack Ads and Disney Movies Are So Darned Effective, ADAGE (Oct. 19, 2010), http://adage.com/article/small-agency-diary/attack-ads- disney-movies-darnedeffective/146579/;
309. Do Negative Campaign Ads Work?, THISNATI0N. COM (Oct. 25, 2011), http://thisnation.com/question/031.html ("[V]oters overwhelmingly dislike negative advertising and are troubled by its widespread use.");
310. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Skeptical About What They See in Political Ads, GALLUP (Oct. 20, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/25093/americans- skeptical-about-what-they-see-political-ads.aspx
311. See 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) (2006)
312. John Eggerton, FCC Strikes Fairness Doctrine from Fed Rukbook, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Aug. 22, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable. com/article/472722-FCC-Strikes-Fairness-Doctrine-From-Fed-Rulebook.php.
313. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D. C. Cir. 2000);
314. Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 66, 643, 66, 644 (Nov. 7, 2000)
315. See Stephen Clark, FCC Agrees to Take Fairness Doctrine' Off the Books, FOXNEWS. COM (June 8, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/poJitics/2011/06/08/fcc- agrees-to-take-faimess-doc trine-off-books/.
316. See Nicholas Zapple, 23 F. C. C. 2d 707, 707 (1970).
317. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass 'n, 184 F.2d at 877-78 (recanting the history of challenges to the personal-attack and political-editorializing rules).
318. Zapple, 23 F. C. C. 2d at 710 n. 4. 368.
319. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 178 (1968)
320. (interpreting the 1968 incarnation of 47 U. S. C. § 152 (a)).
321. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority over Commercial Television Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 11 NW. U. L. REVRR. 403, 436-39 (1982);
322. see also Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779. Title I of the Act also gives the FCC authority to "perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in me execution of its functions"
323. 47 U. S. C. § 154 (i) (2006).
324. This provision is often referred to as the "necessary and proper" clause of the Act. John Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition Promotion: A Unified Theory of the FCC's Ancillary Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 585, 596 & n. 53 (2009). The extent of the agency's ancillary authority is also part of the current discussion on FCC's authority to regulate the Internet.
325. James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 107 (2010)
326. see Susan P. Crawford, The Ambulance, the Squad Car, & the Internet, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 873, 925-31 (2006);
327. Joseph R. Fogarty & Marcia Spielholz, FCC Cable Jurisdiction: From Zero to Plenary in Twenty-Five Years, 37 FED. COMM. L. J. 113 passim (1985);
328. Mark D. Hofifer, The Power of the FCC to Regulate Cable Pay-TV: Jurisdictional and Constitutional Limitations, 53 DENV. U. L. REV. 477 passim (1976);
329. James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 15, 22-30 (2003)
330. Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 41, 50-51 (2003).
331. 47 U. S. C. § 315
332. See Zapple, 23 F. C. C.2d at 707.
333. Glen O. Robinson, Regulating Communications: Stories from the First Hundred Years, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 303, 308-09 (2010).
334. @see Nat'l Broad. Co. V. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 219 (1943)
335. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U. S. 525, 529 (1959).
336. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. V. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U. S. 94, 104 (1973)
337. (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12, 503 (1928)).
338. See, e.g., Stephen Clark, FCC Agrees to Take 'Fairness Doctrine' Off the Books, FOXNEWS. COM (June 8, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/06/08/ fcc-agrees-to-takefairness-doctrine-off-books/.
339. Cf. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Media Buying After Citizens United, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, June 2010, at 10
340. Katharine Q. Seelye, About $2.6 Billion Spent on Political Ads in 2008, N. Y. TIMES Dec-2, 2008, 4:15 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nvtimes.com/ 2008/12/02/about-26-billion-spent-°'1-Political-ads-in-2008/.
341. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F. C. C.2d 707, 709-1] (1970)
342. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. V. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U. S. 94, 105 (1972)
343. (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 5482 (1926)
344. see also 5 AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION: PRIMARY MATERIALS 419-52 (Irving J. Sloan, ed. 1977)
345. Mark R. Arbuckle, The Evolving "Communications Marketplace": Rethinking Broadcast Fairness Two Decades After Syracuse Peace Council, 18 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 69, 72 (2008)
346. 76 CONG. REC. 5038 (1933);
347. see also Turner Catledge, Congress Ends in Solemn Dignity, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1933, at D5.
348. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 3, 5 (1950);
349. 5 AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION, supra, at 450-52.
350. See 78 CONG. REC. 10, 988 (1934)
351. 67 CONG. REC. 12, 504 (1926).
352. see also 68 CONG. REC. 4152 (1926)
353. 68 CONG. REC. 4152 (1926)
354. See 68 CONG. REC. 3032, 3258 (1927)
355. Jack H. Friedenthal & Richard J. Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 72 HARV. L. REV. 445, 484-65 (1959);
356. Note, Campaign Speeches on Radio and TV: Impartiality Via the Communications Act, 61 YALE L. J. 87, 89 (1952)
357. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Offensive Political Speech from the 1970s to 2008: A Broadcasters Moral Choice, 8 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 241, 282-83 (2008).
358. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U. S. at 98-99 (describing CBS's policy against accepting controversial advocacy advertising).
359. Although Supreme Court cases such as Red Lion Broadcasting Co. V. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1960)
360. See Christina H. Burrow, Thomas M. Clyde & Michael D. Romberg, Negative Issue Advertisements: A Practical Matter, COMM. LAWYER, Summer 2004, at 7.
361. See, e.g., FCC Political Primer. 100 F. C. C.2d 1476, 1513 (1984)
362. (citing Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. V. WDAY. Inc.. 360 U. S. 525 (1959);
363. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio ptation, 186 F.2d 1 (1950));
364. (citing George F. Mahoney, 40 F. C. C. 336 (1962)));
365. WDAY, 360 U. S. at 529
366. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 968 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting));
367. see also John Eggerton, Obama Takes on Campaign-Ad Ming in State of the Union, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Jan. 27, 2010, 10:32 PM), http://www. broadcastingcable.conVarticle/446345-Obama-Takes-on-Campaign-Ad-Ruung-m-State- of-the-Union.php
368. See The Money Behind Elections, OPENSECRETS. ORG, http://www.opensecrets. org/big Picture/(last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
369. Suzy Khimm, The Citizens United Effect, MOTHER JONES (June 7, 2010, 3:00 AM PDT), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/06/citizens-united-effect
370. See Andrea Morabito, The Cable siom/2011: Local TV Still 'Nuclear Weapon' of Election Ads, BROADCASTING & CABLE (June 15 2011, 12:59 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/469757-The-Cable-Show-2011-Local-TV- Still-NuclearWeaponofElection Ads.php
371. See Travis N. Ridout, Erika Franklin Fowler & John Branstetter, Political Advertising in the 21st Century: The Rise of the YouTube Ad 13-17 (Aug. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract-id=1642853;
372. Kate Kaye, The State of Online Political Advertising, YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/lSP/Kate-Kaye.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
373. See 47 U. S. C. § 154 (2006).
374. see also Compliance with Laws Outside the FEC's Jurisdiction, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, hrtp://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/compliance-nonfec. shtmlommunications (last updated 2008)
375. See 47 U. S. C. § 151 (2006).
376. tSee John Eggerton, Rep. Walden Will Go 'Nuclear' If FCC Adopts MAP Petition, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Apr.), 2011, 6:24 PM), http://www. broadcasting cable.com/article/466160-Rep-Walden-Will-Go-Nuclear-If-FCC-Adopts- MAP-Petition. php
377. Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public Qlicipatian in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9224, 926-27 (2009);
378. see also Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and °w of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L. J. 525, 525 (1982)
379. See Barry R. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation and Reregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 52 (1981).
380. Bill Carter, Court Overturns FCC Cross-Ownership Rule, N. Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at B4.
381. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
382. Brian Stelter, A New Test Is Proposed in Licensing Radio Ad TV, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at B31.
383. See generally Lili Levi, A "Pay or Play" Experiment '° ln Vrove Children's Educational Television, 62 FED. COM. L. J. 275 (2010)
384. But cf. James A. Gardner, Mi-regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery Sl°pe, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 673, 702-04 (2011)
385. See, e.g., Broadcast Localism, 23 FCC Rcd. 1324, 1348-49 (2008).
386. See, e.g., Kevin Koe et al., Hostile News: Partisan Use and Perceptions of Cable News Programming, 58 J. COMM. 201-19 (2008);
387. Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo Coverage, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 686-96 (2007)
388. cf Lauren Guggenheim, Nojin Kwak & Scott W. Campbell, Nontraditional News Negativity: The Relationship of Entertaining Political News Use to Political Cynicism and Mistrust, 23 INT'L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 287 (2011).
389. (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 14, 451 (1959)
390. accord Michael Damien Holcomb, Congressional Intent Rebuffed: The Federal Communications Commission s New Perspective on 47 U. S. C. § 315 (A) (2)
391. 34 SW. U. L. REV. 87, 88-89 (2004);
392. see also Telepictures Prod., Inc., 23 FCC RCD. 7168, 7169 (2008)
393. Aangelides for Governor Campaign, 21 FCC Rcd. 11, 919, 11, 923 (2006)
394. @ Clay Calvert, What Is News?: The FCC and the New Battle Over the Regulation of Video News Releases, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 361, 362 (2008).
395. See Akilah N. Folami, Freeing the Press From Editorial Discretion and Hegemony in Bona Fide News: Why the Revolution Must Be Televised, 34 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 367, 368 (2011)
396. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1, 27-29 (1995)
397. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 905 (1998);