The end of campaign finance law

Virginia Law Review

Volumn 98, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 1-66

  Kang, Michael S ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84859854851     PISSN: 00426601     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (185)

1. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, and 47 U.S.C.).
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
3. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
4. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
5. See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Campaign Spending Limit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1.
6. Press Release, Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, Batten Down the Hatches: Supreme Court Opens Floodgates for Corporate Spending in Elections (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.seiu.org/2010/01/batten-down-the-hatches-supreme-court- opensfloodgates-for-corporate-spending-in-elections.php.
7. Ari Berman, Citizens Unite Against Citizens United, The Nation, Aug. 16-23, 2010, at 29.
8. 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
9. See generally Craig B. Holman & Luke P. McLoughlin, Buying Time 2000: Television Advertising in the 2000 Federal Elections (2001)
10. Jonathan S. Krasno & Daniel E. Seltz Buying Time: Television Advertising in the 1998 Congressional Elections (2000).
11. See Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and Regulation of the Democratic Process, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 533, 560-68 (2010) (describing this expansion of the government interests in campaign finance regulation).
12. "Express advocacy" is a "communication[] that in express terms advocate[s] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.
13. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91 (2006) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006)).
14. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006). Electioneering communications therefore include all express advocacy carried by broadcast media targeted at the relevant electorate during election season, in addition to issue advocacy that meets the same conditions and mentions a candidate running for federal office.
15. See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2008).
16. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
17. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 931 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
19. (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
20. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 931 (2010) (No. 08-25).
21. David G. Savage, Hillary: The Law Changer, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2009, at 24, 25.
22. Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009) (mem.) (internal citations omitted).
23. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930, 952-56 (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
25. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
26. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904-05 (citation omitted).
27. See Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 243, 245-46 (2010).
28. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006) (incorporating by reference 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(3) (2006)).
29. See Eva Rodriguez, On Alito's State of the Union Head Wag, You're All Wrong, PostPartisan, Wash. Post (Jan. 28, 2010, 1:49 PM), http://voices. washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/01/on-alitos-state-of-the-union-h.html (quoting President Obama's State of the Union Address).
30. Citizens United specifically reserved the issue. See 130 S. Ct. at 911.
31. Russ Feingold, Who is Helped, or Hurt, by the Citizens United Decision, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 2010, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/22/AR2010012203874.html
32. Fred Wertheimer, Supreme Court Decision in Citizens United Case is Disaster for American People and Dark Day for the Court, Democracy 21 (Jan. 21, 2010),http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B-PR&DE={5DEFDF8F-21A1-4A73- 9EFF-361083E7D509}.
33. See Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court's Decision on Campaign Financing, Wash. Post (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html.
34. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 143 & n.2 (2010) (identifying these popular criticisms of Citizens United).
35. See Jennifer Martinez & Tom Hamburger, Target Feels Backlash From Shareholders, L.A. Times (Aug. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/ 19/nation/lana-target-shareholders-20100820.
36. See Katrina vanden Heuvel, Citizens United Aftershocks, Wash. Post (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/ AR2010082405642.html.
37. See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118, 130 & n.66 (2010) (noting that only the Chamber of Commerce made the expansive case under the First Amendment on behalf of corporations).
38. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and Elections, 4 Charleston L. Rev. 91, 135-37 (2009) (surveying corporate campaign spending).
39. Jay Weiner, In the Bull's-Eye, How Target-and Minnesota-Landed at Ground Zero of an Expensive U.S. Debate, Minn. Post (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2010/08/05/20267/in-the-bulls-eye-how-target- and-minnesota-landed-at-ground-zero-of-an-expensive-us-debate (quotingIan Maitland).
40. Suzy Khimm, Bill de Blasio: Citizens United Avenger, Mother Jones (Sept. 22, 2010, 3:00 AM),http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/09/bill-de-blasio- citizens-united-avenger.
41. See Javier C. Hernandez, Political Ads Off Limits, Goldman Promises, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2010, at A24.
42. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1103, 1115 (2002)
43. Richard J. Mahoney, Letter to the Editor, A Corporate Mood, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1997, at A20.
44. See generally Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion (1997)
45. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1380 (1994).
46. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
47. Michael M. Franz, The Citizens United Election? Or Same as It Ever Was?, 8 Forum, no. 4, at 4 (2010).
48. Issue advocacy is the residual category of all political communications that do not use words of express advocacy, including so-called sham issue advertisements that are intended to influence elections while skirting the definition of express advocacy. See Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1773, 1776-77 (2001) (defining "sham issue advocacy").
49. Wis. Right to Life II, 551 U.S. at 476-77.
50. FEC Interpretative Rule, 11 C.F.R § 114.15(a) (2009).
51. Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1644, 1662 (2009).
52. See Wis. Right to Life II, 551 U.S. at 482 (stating that there was "no occasion to revisit" McConnell).
53. Nathaniel Persily, The Floodgates Were Already Open, Slate (Jan. 25, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2242558.
54. Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 935, 935 (2011).
55. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 581, 583 (2011).
56. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (striking down the Millionaire's Amendment to BCRA)
57. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down expenditure prohibitions on corporations and banks in direct democracy)
58. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down expenditure limits on individuals and candidates).
59. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
60. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1998).
61. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 391.
62. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003).
63. Id. at 150 (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)).
64. Id. at 293 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
66. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003)
67. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205-07.
68. But cf. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that the application of a statute restricting independent spending is inapplicable to an organization that is more akin to a voluntary political association than a business).
69. Memorandum from Daniel R. Ortiz for Democracy 21 and the Campaign Legal Center (Mar. 7, 2005) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
70. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152.
71. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
72. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 79 n.105 (1976)
73. see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2006).
74. FEC Advisory Opinion 2007-32 (Jan. 22, 2008).
75. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2006).
76. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70, 77 (D.D.C. 2008)
77. citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20.
78. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
79. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, §§ 304, 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947).
80. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
81. quoting Senator Taft, 93 Cong. Rec. 6439 (1947).
82. H.R. Rep. No. 79-2739, at 40 (1945).
83. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 622-25 (D.D.C. 2003).
84. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46
85. see also FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) (noting that it is "hypothetically possible . . . that candidates may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC expenditures by giving official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages")
86. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (acknowledging that "Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections").
87. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26).
88. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
89. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
90. Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion).
91. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
92. 548 U.S. 230 (2006)
93. see Nathaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 89, 109-10 (2008) ("From Buckley v. Valeo until Randall v. Sorrell, contribution limits appeared almost untouchable by the Supreme Court.").
94. FEC Advisory Opinion 2010-09 (July 22, 2010) (sanctioning of super-PACs at the request of Club for Growth).
95. See Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, 'Super PACs' Alter Campaign, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 2010, at A1, A6.
96. See Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, Two Conservative Groups Emerge as Biggest Midterm Spenders, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 2010, at A9.
97. Eggen & Farnam, supra note 131, at A6 (quoting Trevor Potter). The FEC subsequently made clear that federal officeholders and candidates were permitted to solicit contributions to super-PACs provided that they do not solicit contributions above the $5000 contribution limit. See FEC Advisory Opinion 2011-12 (June 30, 2011) (Majority PAC). Solicited contributors, however, remain free to make unlimited contributions.
98. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (West 2010) (defining social welfare organizations as "operat[ ing] exclusively for the promotion of the social welfare . . .[,] the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes").
99. See Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next "Loophole"?, 6 First Amendment L. Rev. 41, 50-56 (2007) (describing the distinctions among 527 organizations, political committees, and 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations).
100. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (2010) (stipulating that "[t]he promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office").
101. Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 Geo. L.J. 1181, 1220-29 (2007) (discussing the major purpose test).
102. For these groups, the FEC requires disclosure of their contributors' identities only when the contribution is specifically 139 See Marty Cohen et al., The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform 3-7 (2008) (depicting party-based networks of campaign professionals and regular campaign donors)
103. Seth E. Masket, No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures 43-53 (2009) (describing coordination between party professionals and networks of regular campaign donors)
104. Gregory Koger, Seth Masket & Hans Noel, Cooperative Party Factions in American Politics, 38 Am. Pol. Res. 33, 35 (2010) (describing parties as social networks that include campaign consultants and regular donors).
105. See Richard M. Skinner, Seth E. Masket & David A. Dulio, Presentation at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference: 527 Committees and the Political Party Network (Sept. 5, 2009) (documenting the network of partisan actors tying together the formal party organizations and allied 527s).
106. See Jeanne Cummings, Texas Builder Gives Crossroads $7M, Politico (Oct. 20, 2010, 8:53 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1010/43937.html.
107. See Tom Hamburger & Matea Gold, Parties Ignite a Financial Arms Race, L.A. Times, Dec. 12, 2010, at A1, A25.
108. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70, 75, 75 n.8 (D.D.C. 2008)
109. see also Michael S. Kang, From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging Challenge for Campaign Finance Law, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1070, 1073-80 (2005) (discussing coordination among Democrat-allied groups in 2004).
110. See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 949, 965-69 (2005) (discussing the relationship among and between outside groups and the parties in 2004)
111. Meredith A. Johnston, Note, Stopping "Winks and Nods": Limits on Coordination as a Means of Regulating 527 Organizations, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1166, 1184-85 (2006) (describing informal coordination with 527 groups in 2004)
112. see also Jeanne Cummings, GOP Groups Coordinated Spending, Politico (Nov. 3, 2010, 12:54 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/ 44651.html (describing coordinated strategy and meetings among Republican-allied groups in 2010).
113. Congressional Campaigns: Half of Outside Spending in Campaigns Came from Groups Not Revealing Donors, BNA Money & Pol. Rep., Nov. 12, 2010.
114. See T.W. Farnam, Super PACs Spent $83M on Election, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10340/1108611-84. stm.
115. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1998)
116. Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1751 (1999)
117. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1803 (1999).
118. After Carey v. FEC, however, the FEC announced that it must permit even outside groups that make contributions also to collect unrestricted funds for independent expenditures, free from source restrictions and contribution limits, provided those funds for independent expenditures are kept in a segregated account.
119. See FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC: Reporting Guidance for Political Committees that Maintain a Non-Contribution Account (Oct. 5, 2011). As a result, now there is virtually no practical restriction on the ability of a super-PAC to contribute except that super- PAC contributions must be made from segregated hard-dollar funds. Even the limitation on super-PAC contributions thus has lost almost all its bite.
120. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1705 (1999).
121. See Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: A Declaration for Independence 250 (Feb. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
122. See Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Separating Myth From Reality in McConnell v. FEC, 3 Election L.J. 291, 293-94 (2004).
123. See David B. Magleby, A Change Election, in The Change Election: Money, Mobilization, and Persuasion in the 2008 Federal Elections 1, 12-13 (David B. Magleby ed., 2011). In fact, total campaign spending by parties and candidates increased after BCRA as increases in hard-money contributions under the higher limits offset the loss of soft money.
124. see also Norman Ornstein & Anthony Corrado, Jr., Reform That Has Really Paid Off, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 2007, at B3.
125. See Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 131, 156-59 (2005).
126. See, e.g., Daniel Malloy, Special-Interest Spending Looms Large, Pitt. Post-Gazette, Oct. 27, 2010, at A1 (quoting a campaign spokesperson saying that "[o]bviously you'd like to have control over your message in a campaign, so the less control you have there's an uncertainty factor").
127. See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) ("[T]he absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.").
128. See Kathleen Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 663, 667 (1997) (arguing that Buckley "attempt[ed] to solve an analogical crisis by splitting the difference").
129. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Unbearable Lightness of Being McConnell, 3 Election L.J. 299, 301 (2004)
130. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
131. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
132. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.
133. See Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley A. Smith, The Caperton Caper and the Kennedy Conundrum, 2009 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 319, 340-41 ("The holding in Caperton, and the resulting jumble of propositions, suggests that if independent expenditures create the probability of bias, they must also create at least the 'appearance of corruption.'").
134. See Peter J. Wallison & Joel M. Gora, Better Parties, Better Government: A Realistic Program for Campaign Finance Reform 53 (2009) criticizing outside groups for having none of the transparency, accountability, or policy coherence of political parties and candidates)
135. See generally Albert L. May, Swift Boat Vets in 2004: Press Coverage of an Independent Campaign, 4 First Amendment L. Rev. 66 (2005).
136. See David C. Anderson, Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie Horton Story Changed American Justice 229-30 (1995).
137. Taylor Lincoln, Disclosure Eclipse 3 (2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/ documents/Eclipsed-Disclosure11182010.pdf.
138. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 Election L.J. 295, 296 (2005).
139. 130 S. Ct. at 913-17.
140. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus," 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1141 (2003) (surveying the literature on heuristic cues and applying it to campaign finance disclosure)
141. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 255 (2010) (discussing campaign finance disclosure in terms of voter education).
142. See Laura MacCleery, Goodbye Soft Money, Hello Grassroots: How Campaign Finance Reform Restructured Campaigns and the Political World, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 965, 999 (2009).
143. See Donald P. Green & Alan S. Gerber, Get Out the Vote!: How to Increase Voter Turnout 1-4 (2004)
144. Steven J. Rosenstone & John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America 117 (1993).
145. Tim Fernholz, What to Expect When You're Expecting a Majority, Am. Prospect, Oct. 2008, at 23
146. quoting Brian Wolff, Chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
147. see also Molly J. Walker Wilson, The New Role of the Small Donor in Political Campaigns and the Demise of Public Funding, 25 J.L. & Pol. 257 (2009) (describing the trend toward small donors in the 2008 elections).
148. See generally Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 73 (2004) (describing a small group of contributors that dominate federal campaign finance)
149. Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1469 (2001) (criticizing the racial stratification of federal campaign finance).
150. Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money: The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government 355 (2009) (quoting Bob Dole).
151. See, e.g., Tom Hamburger & Matea Gold, Democrats Rethink Outside Spending, L.A. Times, Nov. 4, 2010, at AA1, AA6 (describing the revision of Democratic thinking for 2012
152. Eliza Newlin Carney Democrats Join the Battle Nat'l J. Feb. 27 2011 http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/democrats-jointhe- battle-20110227 (outlining Democratic strategy for 2012 to match Republicanallied outside spending).
153. FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985).
154. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
155. 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010).
156. See generally George D. Brown, The Gratuities Debate and Campaign Reform: How Strong Is the Link?, 52 Wayne L. Rev. 1371, 1397-1413 (2006) (discussing the overlapping conception of corruption across bribery and campaign finance law)
157. discussing the overlapping conception of corruption across bribery and campaign finance law); Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional Battle over Anticorruption: Citizens United, Honest Services, and the Legislative-Judicial Divide, 9 First Amendment L. Rev. 363, 385-412 (2010) (same).
158. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28 ("[L]aws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action.").
159. See George D. Brown, New Federalism's Unanswered Question: Who Should Prosecute State and Local Officials for Political Corruption?, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 417, 491-95 (2003).
160. See Dorie Apollonio, Bruce E. Cain & Lee Drutman, Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm, 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 13, 15-16 (2008).
161. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931.
162. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1155, 1161-68 (2011)
163. Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734428.
164. See Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 105 (2008)
165. Elisabeth Bassett, Comment, Reform Through Exposure, 57 Emory L.J. 1049 (2008).
166. See David Austen-Smith, Campaign Contributions and Access, 89 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 566, 566 (1995)
167. John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 591, 593, 609-11 (2005)
168. Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 797, 798-99 (1990)
169. James F. Herndon, Access, Record, and Competition as Influences on Interest Group Contributions to Congressional Campaigns, 44 J. Pol. 996, 999-1001 (1982)
170. Laura I. Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J. Pol. 1052 (1986).
171. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625-26 (1954).
172. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Allard, Lobbying Is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to Be Right, 19 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 23, 42-46 (2008) (describing the provision of expertise and information as central to lobbying)
173. Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 69, 69 (2006) (characterizing lobbying as an informational subsidy).
174. See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 205-07 (2d Cir. 2010)
175. Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 2d 855 862-64 (S.D. Ohio 2010)
176. cf. Vannatta v. Or. Gov't Ethics Comm'n, 222 P.3d 1077, 1089 (Or. 2009) ("Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court would construe and apply the First Amendment to those restrictions, and yet reach a different conclusion under federal law.").
177. 692 F. Supp. 2d at 863-64.
178. Citizens United itself cites with approval at least the Court's earlier upholding of registration and disclosure requirements for lobbyists. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
179. 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011).
180. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 Utah L. Rev. 311, 313 (1998).
181. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-23.
182. See FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC: Reporting Guidance for Political Committees that Maintain a Non-Contribution Account (Oct. 5, 2011).
183. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009).
184. See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in Government and Business, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1637, 1666-69 (2011)
185. William V. Luneberg, The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: Where We Are Now and Where We Should Be Going, 41 McGeorge L. Rev. 85, 115-20 (2009).