Rethinking donor disclosure after the proposition 8 campaign

Southern California Law Review

Volumn 83, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 133-172

  Lourie, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 77952276396     PISSN: 00383910     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (307)

1. See, e.g., Tamara Audi, Justin Scheck & Dionne Searcey, Election '08: The New Landscape; California Set to Join Trend of Banning Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2008, at A10 (discussing Proposition 8 results);
2. Jessica Garrison, Cara Mia DiMassa & Richard C. Paddock, Voters Approve Proposition 8 Banning Same-Sex Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at Al (same);
3. Cal. Sec'y of State, Statement of Vote 2008 General Election Summary Pages 13 (Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008- general/8-13-sov-sumniary-final.pdf.
4. See Audi et al., supra note 1 ;
5. Garrison et al., supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., Cara Mia DiMassa, Tami Adbollah & Shelby Grad, Prop. 8 Boycott Talk Spreads to Movies and More, L.A. NOW, Nov. 13, 2008, htto://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2008/11/theboycott-eff.html.
7. See, e.g., Jessica Garrison & Joanna Lin, Mormons' Prop. 8 Aid Protested: Gay-Rights Activists Criticize the Church for Its Role in Helping to Pass California's Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at B1;
8. Mormon Church Draws Protest over Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A34.
9. See DiMassa et al., supra note 3.
10. See Jesse McKinley, Theater Director Resigns amid Gay-Rights Ire, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at Cl.
11. See id.
12. See 29 C.J.S. Elections § 315 (West 2009).
13. See, e.g. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84602 (West 2009);
14. Campaign Disclosure Project, Grading State Disclosure 2008: Executive Summary, http://www.campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate/execsum.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Grading State Disclosure 2008: Executive Summary].
15. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 84211, 84602;
16. Grading State Disclosure 2008: Executive Summary, supra note 9.
17. California donor disclosure information is available on the Secretary of State's website at http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
18. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84211.
19. See Federal Election Commission, Disclosure Data Search, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/disclosure-dato-search.shtml (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) [hereinafter FEC Disclosure Search].
20. Under the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), candidates must disclose donors who gave more than $200 in an election cycle, including their address, occupation, and employer.
21. See 2 U.S.C. §434(b) (2006). This rule also applies to political committees.
22. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 § 103(a), 2 U.S.C. § 434(e)(3).
23. See, e.g., FEC Disclosure Search, supra note 12.
24. See, e.g., Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org (follow "Donor Lookup" under "Quick Links") (Last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
25. The Huffington Post, Fundrace 2008, http://fundrace.huffingtonpost.com (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Fundrace 2008].
26. Id.
27. See Prop 8 Maps, http://www.eightrnaps.com (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
28. See John R. Lott, Jr. & Bradley Smith, Op-Ed, Donor Disclosure Has Its Downsides, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2008, at A13.
29. The complaint that Proposition 8 supporters filed with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California to challenge compelled disclosure of their identities noted: The threats and harassment have included threatening phone calls, emails, and postcards. [] John Doe #1 (received harassing phone calls that referenced his support of Proposition 8);
30. John Doe #4 (received multiple threatening emails including one that read "hello propagators & litigators [sic] burn in hell"....)....In some instances, such phone calls and e-mails were accompanied by death threats, a threat made all the more plausible by the compelled disclosure of the addresses of the donors. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 35, ProtectMarriage.com Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (No. 2:09-CV-00058-MCE- DAD) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint].
31. See, e.g., Lott & Smith, supra note 19.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).
35. See Lott & Smith, supra note 19.
36. See James Bopp, Jr. & Susan Lee, So There Are Campaign Contribution Limits That Are Too Low, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 266 (2007).
37. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 96.
38. See ProtectMarriage.com Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1226 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
39. See id. at 1208-1209
40. See, e.g., Campaign Disclosure Project, http://campaigndisclosure.org/ about.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
41. See also infra note 33.
42. See Campaign Disclosure Project supra note 30.
43. See CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE MODEL LAW, at vii-x (2004), available at http://campaigndisclosure.org/modellaw/ ModelDisclosureLaw.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 123 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK] ("Disclosure requirements historically have had the strong support of both the public and policymakers, and that support continues into the present.");
45. Clyde Wilcox, Designing Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: Tracing the Tributaries of Campaign Finance, 4 ELECTION L.J. 371, 371 (2005) ("Even many of those who oppose contribution limits and other types of regulation support more rigorous disclosure laws....").
46. See Ian Ayres, Should Campaign Donors Be Identified?, REGULATION, Summer 2001, at 12, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv24n2/ayres. pdf.
47. See DICK M. CARPENTER II, INST, FOR JUSTICE, DISCLOSURE COSTS: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 13 (2007), available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf-folder/other-pubs/DisclosureCosts.pdf ("[M]andatory disclosure on ballot issues is a public policy worthy of more critical attention and debate than it currently receives.");
48. William McGeveran, Mrs. Mclntyre's Checkbook Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 5 (2003) (noting that "[e]xisting scholarship and case law largely ignore the privacy problems inherent in disclosure of individual contributions"). It is worth noting, however, that some scholars have been critical of donor disclosure. Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres have proposed a disclosure regime that recommends, inter alia, anonymity of all contributors to candidate elections.
49. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 9 (2002).
50. William McGeveran juxtaposes the availability of disclosure information before and after the Internet: Before the rise of the Internet, data on these disclosed contributions was available to the public in theory, but difficult to obtain in practice. A curious journalist or voter needed to travel in person to an election agency office and rummage through piles of paper reports arranged in filing cabinets. One could not search, sort, aggregate, or analyze these documents in the ways we take for granted using a computerized database.
51. McGeveran, supra note 35, at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
52. For example, the amount of money spent on television advertising in the 2008 presidential election cycle was nearly double the money spent in the 2004 cycle.
53. See Mark Preston, Political Television Advertbing to Reach $3 Billion, CNN, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/15/ad.spending/ index.html. In the direct democracy context, money expended on the Proposition 8 campaign "shatter[ed] spending records."
54. Justin Ewers, California Same-Sex Marriage Initiative Campaigns Shatter Spending Records, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/10/29/califomia-same-sex- marriage-initiative-campaigns-shatter-spending-records.html.
55. Elizabeth Garrett argues that "[t]he choice... is not between no disclosure and full disclosure. Rather, policymakers need to determine what information should be disclosed and in what form." Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2003). She goes on to argue that "further study is required to learn precisely what information promotes voter competence so that statutes can be tailored to produce information that best serves as a shortcut."
56. Id. at 1014.
57. See McGeveran, supra note 35.
58. See Garrett, supra note 38, at 1027 (arguing that many group donors "are associated easily and correctly in voters' minds with particular policies").
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 ( 1976).
65. See id. at 143.
66. Id. at 64
67. (quoting Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963);
68. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960)).
69. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 194.
72. Id. at 194-195
73. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237 (2004) (stating that the ability of disclosure requirements to withstand constitutional challenges has been strengthened after McConnell).
74. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 67.
77. See Garrett, supra note 38, at 1023.
78. See id. at 1023-1026
79. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
80. Id. at 67-68.
81. See Robert F. Bauer, Not Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory System, 6 ELECTION L.J. 38, 39 (2007).
82. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 202-03 (1999) (noting that the voter informational interest can justify disclosure in the issue election context);
83. Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105-07 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).
84. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981);
85. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978).
86. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 297 (2005).
87. See Cal. Pro-Life Council, 328 F.3d at 1105-1106
88. Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
89. Id. at 338 n.3.
90. Id. at 334.
91. Id. at 337.
92. Id. at 347.
93. Id. at 357.
94. See id. at 348-349
95. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, supra note 20.
96. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
97. See Garrett, supra note 38, at 1048.
98. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 33, at 142.
99. See, e.g., Yes for Life Political Action Comm. v. Webster, 84 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Me. 2000);
100. Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997);
101. W. Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996).
102. ACLU v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 2004).
103. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. ViIl. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 160-164 (2002).
104. See, e.g., Ky. Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 647-48 (6th Cir. 1997);
105. FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 296-298 (2d Cir. 1995).
106. See Ky. Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 296; Survival Educ. Fund, 65 F.3d at 296.
107. Garrett & Smith, supra note 64, at 301.
108. McGeveran, supra note 35, at 15.
109. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 275-277 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976).
112. Id.
113. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 452 (1958).
114. Id. at 453.
115. Id. at 462.
116. Id. at 466.
117. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982).
118. See id. at 98-101.
119. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198-199 (2003).
120. Id. at 199.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 34-40.
123. See Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 344-45, 347-350 (1995).
124. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 549 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2008).
125. See also 2 U.S.C.S. § 1603(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2009).
126. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 549 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
127. See id. at 46.
128. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1066-1067 (2008).
129. See id. at 1104
130. ("[Recent cases] make clear that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito form the controlling bloc on campaign finance questions, and they have sent strong signals through the tone of their opinions that they are both very skeptical of campaign finance regulation challenged under the First Amendment. They are quite willing to entertain challenges to existing campaign finance precedents in future cases. It is worth recalling that Justice Alito separately concurred in both Randall and WRTL II to invite litigants to bring facial challenges to Buckley's contribution limits and to McConnell's upholding section 203 of the BCRA against a facial challenge.");
131. Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/012833.html (Jan. 16, 2009, 08:48 PST) (noting that "Chief Justice [Roberts] and Justice Alito take a much more deregulatory approach in the campaign finance area than Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor").
132. Cf. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S 182, 223 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("'Total disclosure' has been recognized as the 'essential cornerstone' to effective campaign finance reform and 'fundamental to the political system.'" (citation omitted)
133. (quoting H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 164 (4th ed. 1992)).
134. Richard Hasen notes that if the current Supreme Court makeup stays the same, "little will be left of campaign finance regulation beyond campaign finance disclosure within a decade."
135. Hasen, supra note 102, at 1067.
136. Thus, few election scholars argue that all disclosure will be declared unconstitutional, even if other aspects of campaign finance regimes are.
137. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 09-198, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.corn/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract-id=1338895 (discussing the Roberts Court's preference for as-applied litigation).
138. Election Law Blog, supra note 103.
139. See also Adam Liptak, Hillary: The Movie Tests Campaign Finance Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at Al 2.
140. See Hillary: The Movie, http://hillarythemovie.com/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
141. See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275, 280-282 (D.D.C. 2008).
142. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-155, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 81, 88-90 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006)).
143. Id.
144. See Brief for Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, No.08-205 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Citizens United Brief).
145. Id. at 44
146. (arguing that strict scrutiny should apply to disclosure).
147. But see Brief for the Appellee at 37-38, Citizens United, No.08-205 (U.S. Feb. 2009) [hereinafter FEC Brief] (arguing that intermediate scrutiny should apply to disclosure).
148. Citizens United Brief, supra note 111, at 15.
149. Id. at 53.
150. Id.
151. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976)).
152. Id. (alteration in original)
153. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003)).
154. See Election Law Blog, supra note 103.
155. See, e.g., supra note 36.
156. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
157. See ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
158. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88-89 (1982).
159. Id. at 99.
160. Id.
161. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1976).
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976).
163. See ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1214-1215 (ED. Cal. 2009).
164. Id. at 1217.
165. Id. at 1215.
166. Jessica Garrison, Angrier Response to Prop. 8 Arbes: After a Professional Campaign Failed to Defeat the Measure, a Web-Based Opposition Is Making Itself Heard, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at Al.
167. See, e.g., Janet Komblum, Post-Prop 8, Thousands Join Protest: Gay-Marriage Ban in California Stirs Torchbearers, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2008, at 3A (reporting that one young Proposition 8 protester noted that he "learned about the protests through Facebook after the measure passed").
168. See ProtectMarriage.com 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
169. See, e.g., Californians Against Hate, http://www.californiansagainsthate. com (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) ("We will let the world know who these donors are.").
170. See generally MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA (1999) (explaining the history and impact of consumer boycotts in the twentieth century);
171. DONNIE WILLIAMS WITH WAYNE GREENHAW, THE THUNDER OF ANGELS: THE MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT AND THE PEOPLE WHO BROKE THE BACK OF JlM CROW (2006) (analyzing the effectiveness of the Montgomery bus boycott to jumpstart the modern civil rights movement).
172. See, e.g., Alex Johnson, Southern Baptists End 8-Year Disney Boycott: Company Seen as More "Family-Friendly, " MSNBC, June 22, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8318263/.
173. See WILLIAMS, supra note 133, at 56-59, 82-85, 103-106
174. See, e.g., M. V. Lee Badgett, A Win at Cracker Barrel, NATION, Feb. 10, 2003, at 7.
175. See id.
176. SEE M. V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 236 (2001).
177. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
178. For examples of boycotts Proposition 8 proponents engaged in, see Jim Carlton, Gay Activists Boycott Backers of Prop 8, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2008, at A3.
179. See, e.g., supra note 125 and accompanying text.
180. See Citizens United Brief, supra note 111, at 53
181. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976)).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98-101 (1982).
184. See Ana Marie Cox, How Americans View Hillary: Popular but Polarizing, TIME, Aug. 19, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1229053, 00.html.
185. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, supra note 20.
186. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003).
187. See, e.g., ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1219-1220 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
188. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 202-203 (1999).
189. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2006).
190. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84211 (West 2009).
191. Center for Responsive Politics, Donor Demographics, http://www. opensecrets.org/bigpicture/
192. DonorDemographics.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) ("Only a tiny fraction of Americans actually give campaign contributions to political candidates, parties or PACs. The ones who give contributions large enough to be itemized (over $200) is even smaller.").
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Jeff Zeleny & Michael Luo, New Donors Help Obama Raise a Record $66 Million in a Month, N.Y. TIMES, , 2008, at A1;
196. Julie Kosterlitz, Study: Big Donors Carried Obama, NAT'L J., Nov. 26, 2008, http://undertheinfluence.nationaljoumal.com/2008/11/study-big-donors- carried-obama.php
197. See Zeleny & Luo, supra note 155.
198. See Robert Schlesinger, Barock Obama's Fundrabing and the Small Donor Myth, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., NOV. 25, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/ robert-schlesinger/2008/11/25/ barack-obamas-fundraising-and-the-small-donor- myth.html. Twenty-six percent of Obama's donors gave less than $200; 27 percent gave $201-$999; and 47 percent gave $1000 or more.
199. Id.
200. Center for Responsive Politics, Winning vs. Spending, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/bigspenders.php?cycle=2008 (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
201. Center for Responsive Politics, Top Individual Contributors, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/topindivs.php?cycle=2008 (last visited Nov. 23, 2009)
202. [hereinafter 2008 Top Individual Contributors].
203. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus, " 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2003).
204. See Garrett, supra note 38, at 1043 ("[I]ndividuals act from a mixture of motives so the signal their support provides is less informative.").
205. See DeGeneres Thanks Pitt for Fighting Prop 8: Actor Says Measure to Deny Gay Marriage Steps on Pursuit of Happiness, MSNBC, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28036757.
206. See Garrett, supra note 38, at 1043.
207. See Kang, supra note 160, at 1143 ("Voters can quickly learn a great deal about ballot measures without investing much time or effort, simply by knowing which favored and disfavored political elites support or oppose those ballot measures.").
208. See Garrett, supra note 38, at 1043.
209. To see the names on this list, see 2008 Top Individual Contributors, supra note 159.
210. Id.
211. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
212. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 34, at 12-13 ("Even when politicians do not condition their behavior on contributions, they may nonetheless expect that taking certain positions will cause donors to give more money. And... wealthy donors... may reasonably believe that giving to a candidate with whom they agree will increase the candidate's chances of (re)election.").
213. But see Justin M. Sadowsky, The Transparency Myth: A Conceptual Approach to Corruption and the Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 308, 331-334 (2005) (arguing that disclosure requirements do not serve the corruption rationale).
214. See Ayres, supra note 34, at 13.
215. See, e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389.
216. See, e.g., FEC, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS (2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimits0910.pdf.
217. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976).
219. See McGeveran, supra note 35, at 32 (noting that "enforcement may require reporting, but not true public disclosure").
220. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (arguing that disclosure is essential to gathering necessary data to detect violations of contribution limits).
221. See, e.g., Bopp & Lee, supra note 26.
222. See McGeveran, supra note 35, at 32-33.
223. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 38, at 1043-1044
224. See supra text accompanying notes 155-158
225. See supra note 6 and accompanying text
226. Meredith Hattendorf, Comment, Theoretical Splits and Consistent Results on Anonymous Political Speech: Majors v. Abell and ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 925, 954 (2006).
227. See id. at 954-955
228. Donors can even use Twitter.
229. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 38, at 1042.
230. In fact, even if the voter knows who Jane Smith is, it is unclear this would be a helpful voting cue.
231. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-349 (1995).
232. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 35, at 30.
233. See id. at 18
234. (citing McVeigh v. Cohen, 938 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998));
235. Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 199-202 (2003).
236. For concerns about free speech and military personnel, see generally Danley K. Cornyn, Note, The Military, Freedom of Speech, and the Internet: Preserving Operational Security and Servicemembers ' Right of Free Speech, 87 TEX. L. REV. 463 (2008).
237. See McGeveran, supra note 35, at 18 (citing McVeigh, 938 F. Supp. 215).
238. See, e.g. Campaign Disclosure Project, Grading State Disclosure 2008, http://carrpaigndisclosure.org/gradmgstote/criteria.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009)
239. [hereinafter Grading State Disclosure 2008].
240. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976)
241. (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat'l Home Library Found. 1933) (1914)).
242. See also Grading State Disclosure 2008, supra note 191 (supporting disclosure of donor names).
243. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 35, at 30.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
246. See id.
247. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 35, at 32-33.
248. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
249. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
250. See FEC Brief, supra note 112, at 40 (second alteration in original)
251. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003)).
252. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 64, at 300 (noting that groups sometimes seek to disguise themselves by using misleading or ambiguous names).
253. See Grading State Disclosure 2008, supra note 191.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Marianne Lavelle, The 10 Biggest Carbon Dioxide Polluters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 2007, http:// www.usnews.com/article/business/ economy/2007/11/14/the-10-biggest-carbon-dioxide-polluters.html.
257. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 38, at 1036.
258. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 64, at 300.
259. See id.
260. See Fundrace 2008, supra note 16 (run "USC" employer search).
261. For example, in the Massachusetts case of Korb v. Raytheon Corp., the court denied a wrongful discharge and civil rights claim by a defense contractor who was fired because he publicly advocated for a defense spending reduction because this made him an "at-will employee who [became] ineffective."
262. Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370, 372 (Mass. 1991).
263. See also Email from Richard Bales, Professor of Law and Assoc. Dean of Faculty Dev., N. Ky. Univ., to Author (Mar. 24, 2009, 07:32 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bales Email]; Email from Mareia L. McCormick, Professor of Law, Samford University, to Author (Mar. 25, 2009, 17:45 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter McCormick Email].
264. Employment law scholar Richard Bales notes that "[t]he First Amendment protects public employees, but not employees of nonprofits." Bales Email, supra note 210. See also McCormick Email, supra note 210. One major exception is that a secular employer cannot fire an employee based on their religion, though there is an exception for religious institutions. See Bales Email, supra note 210.
265. See Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Admin., Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf.
266. Fundrace 2008, supra note 16 (run "Wal-Mart" employer search).
267. Id. (run "General Electric" employer search).
268. Id. (run "Bank of America" employer search).
269. See, e.g., Garrett & Smith, supra note 64, at 300.
270. See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Why a New Paradigm?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1147, 1168 (2003) ("An unmistakable signal that trial lawyers financially support Gore or that tobacco executives overwhelmingly support Bush [might improve voter competence].").
271. See, e.g., Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 69-72 (1994).
272. See, e.g., Mike Norbut, Tort Reform Ballot Initiatives Face Off in Washington State, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 10, 2005, http://www.ama-assn.org/ amednews/2005/10/10/gvsb1010.htm.
273. See Fundrace 2008, supra note 16 (run "nurse" occupation search).
274. See id. (run "attorney" occupation search).
275. See id. (run "professor" occupation search).
276. For example, Barack Obama received $1, 591, 395 from the University of California and $994, 795 from Goldman Sachs in the 2008 presidential election cycle. See Center for Responsive Politics, Barack Obama: Top Contributors, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/contrib.php?cycle= 2008&cid=N00009638 (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
277. Id.
278. McGeveran, supra note 35, at 53-54.
279. Id. at 53.
280. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 64, at 325-326 ("[K]nowing the identity of individuals who are active in direct democracy is not as helpful a voting cue as the group-support heuristic ...."). See also Ackerman & Ayres, supra note 217, at 1168.
281. See Ewers, supra note 37.
282. See also Donor Groups Identified, Largest Is Individual Mormons, MORMONS FOR PROPOSITION 8, Sept. 28, 2008, http://mormonsfor8.com/?p=154.
283. See Knights of Columbus Contributes $1 Million to Prop. 8 Campaign, CATH. NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/ new.php?n=13582.
284. See Ewers, supra note 37.
285. Posting of John Wildermuth to SFGate.com Politics Blog, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/nov05election/detoil?blogid=14&entry-id= 32216 (Oct. 31, 2008, 18:58 PST).
286. Prop 8 Maps, supra note 18.
287. See, e.g., J. J. LUNA, How TO BE INVISIBLE: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO PROTECTING YOUR PERSONAL PRIVACY, YOUR ASSETS, AND YOUR LIFE 57-70 (rev. ed. 2004).
288. See id. at 57-58, 266-269
289. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 64, at 306.
290. See Posting of Lindsay Renick Mayer to Center for Responsive Politics Capital Eye Blog, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2008/10/house-members-rely-on- outofsto.html (Oct. 28, 2008, 09:28 EST).
291. See John Wildermuth, California Prop 8 Attracb Out-of-State Donors, SCRIPPSNEWS, July 30, 2008, http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/35103.
292. See Michael Doyle, California Animal-Cage Measure Lures Out-of-State Donors, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 16, 2008 (on file with author).
293. See Michigan Initiative Mostly Funded by Out-of-State Donors, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION & DIVERSITY PROJECT, Feb. 23, 2005, http://aad.english.ucsb.edu/ docs/02-23-05CivilRights.htm.
294. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 38, at 1038.
295. See Grading State Disclosure 2008, supra note 191.
296. See Garrett, supra note 38, at 1038.
297. Campaign Disclosure Project, State Campaign Finance Disclosure in 2008: An Overview, http://campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate/statistics.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009)
298. [hereinafter Campaign Disclosure Project Overview].
299. Id. See also 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(6)(A) (2006).
300. See Campaign Disclosure Project Overview, supra note 243.
301. See id.
302. For example, Alabama does not provide an online searchable database; it merely provides scanned PDFs of disclosures, and therefore it is difficult for users to process and sort this information. See Campaign Disclosure Project, Grading State Disclosure 2008: Alabama, http://campaigndisclosure.org/ gradingstate/al.html In contrast, Washington's online database gives voters multiple categories to search, and therefore it is easy to search the results.
303. See Campaign Disclosure Project, Grading State Disclosure 2008: Washington, http://carnpaigndisclosure.org/gradingstote/wa.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
304. Bopp's challenge to California's disclosure requirements argued that the "state's Informational Interest... ceases to exist the moment the last ballot is cast for the measure." See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 20, ¶105.
305. See Campaign Disclosure Project, Grading State Disclosure 2008: Wyoming, http://campaindisclosure.org/gradingstate/wy.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
306. Campaign Disclosure Project, Grading State Disclosure 2008: Campaign Disclosure Laws, http://www.campaigndisclosur.org/gradingstate/lawfindings.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
307. Currently, disclosure is enforced at the federal level through the FEC's civil enforcement authority, the Justice Department's Public Integrity Section, or U.S. Attorneys; the BCRA implemented serious penalties for knowing and willful violations of its disclosure requirements. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 33, at 134-135