The stock market reaction to the public announcement of a supranational list of too-big-to-fail banks during the financial crisis

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 49-72

  Abreu, José Filipe ^a   Gulamhussen, Mohamed Azzim ^b  

^a Central Bank of Portugal (Banking Supervision Department)   (Portugal)

^b UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LISBON   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Banks; Regulation; Too big to fail

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874256666     PISSN: 10424431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2013.01.003     Document Type: Article

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