Requiem for market discipline and the specter of TBTF in Japanese banking

Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1429-1459

  Pop, Adrian ^a   Pop, Diana ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE NANTES   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ D'ANGERS   (France)

Author keywords

Credit Default Swap; Event study; Market discipline; Too Big To Fail

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350613220     PISSN: 10629769     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2009.08.001     Document Type: Article

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