The three pillars of Basel II: Optimizing the mix

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 132-155

  Decamps, Jean Paul ^a   Rochet, Jean Charles ^a,b   Roger, Benoît ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942467322     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2003.06.003     Document Type: Article

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