Who gets to the top? Generalists versus specialists in managerial organizations

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 577-601

  Ferreira, Daniel ^a   Sah, Raaj K ^b,c  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^c INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84872862939     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: 17562171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12000     Document Type: Article

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