Task assignments and incentives: Generalists versus specialists

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 380-403

  Prasad, Suraj ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350144764     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00070.x     Document Type: Article

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